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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
Women have made a significant progress in the medical profession. In 2013, they 
accounted for 46.8% of total physicians in OECD countries, a 10% increase from 2003. 
In Italy, women account for almost 40% of the medical work-force in 2013 and their 
increase has been very strong in years, up to +34% in the decade 2001-2011 and up to 
+3% from 2012 to 2013. Notwithstanding the strong feminization of the medical 
workforce, gender inequalities still persist. Empirical research has shed light on gender 
inequalities in pay, leadership and specialty fields. It is widely acknowledged that women 
physicians earn less than men, cluster in less remunerative specialties and progress more 
slowly through ranks. Most of these studies have taken place in the United States, where 
cross-sectional and longitudinal dataset are available. This research is part of the wider 
European project S.T.A.G.E.S. (Structural Transformation to Achieve Gender Equality in 
Science) at the University of Milan and it aims to fill the gap in the literature – with 
respect to the European context – on gender inequalities in medical careers. Data on more 
than one thousand physicians working in five hospitals in the Lombardy Region have 
been collected through an online survey with a rate of response of 48.7%. Data have been 
analysed through descriptive statistics and through regression analysis. The results point 
out that women earn 15% less than men, controlling for human capital, work and family 
characteristics, while they are 44.4% less likely to be promoted to the intermediate levels 
of the career ladder. Female physicians tend to cluster in medical specialties, while 
surgery still remains a male-dominated specialty area. Moreover, they do less private 
practice than their male colleagues, which is highly remunerative. Compared to private 
institutions, public hospitals seem to guarantee a stronger equality in earnings. The 
division of paid and unpaid work appears strongly unbalanced, with women as the main 
responsible for the care of children and the elderly. As a consequence, they tend to solve 
their work-life conflict by outsourcing care activities while reducing the number of 
children or renouncing to motherhood (39% of women in the dataset are childless). 
Regression analysis show that mechanisms of gender discrimination take place both in 
pay and promotions. Moreover, the same attributes are differently “rewarded” whether 
they refer to women or men. Hence, being father significantly increase men’s income and 
their likelihood to promotion. The pay penalty for motherhood is significant at 90% level 
from the third child, while it negatively affects promotion from the second child. Overall, 
the fatherhood premium appears stronger than the motherhood penalty. Being married 
positively increases male’s income but it doesn’t have any effect on female colleagues. 
Educational credential “pays” more for men than for women in terms of pay, as well as 
being a surgeon and a head of a unit. Doing private practice is more rewarding, controlling 
for work hours, for men than for women. The amount of time spent at work and the years 
of work experience are also differently rewarded in terms of career outcomes, suggesting 
that gender inequalities are not only a matter of “being like men are”. Overall, these 
results fill a gap in knowledge and argue that structural constraints – preventing female 
physicians to earn as much as men do and to have the same chances of career than men 
have – are taking place.  
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Introduction  
 
 
 
 
 
Women have made a significant progress in the medical profession. In 2013, they 
accounted for 46.8% of total physicians in OECD countries, a 10% increase from 20031. 
Their number varies significantly across countries, ranging from the minimum of Japan2 
and Korea (where only one out of four physician is a female) and the maximum of the 
Baltics, driven by Latvia (74.3% of women physicians), Estonia (69.6) and Lithuania 
(61.6%). Between the two extremes, a wide range of industrialized countries stays in the 
middle. In the middle, Eastern-European Countries account for the highest rate of female 
doctors (ranging from around 50 to 60%) while Western Europe and Anglo-Saxon States 
show more moderate rates of female physicians, ranging from around 30% to slightly 
more than 50% of the medical population.  
The high rate of women in the medical profession in eastern countries finds its 
explanation in the earlier process of feminization of the medical profession due to a long 
tradition in gender-parity policies which stressed equality in education and favoured the 
entrance of women in scientific fields (Glover 2005). On the contrary, the feminization 
of the medical profession in western countries occurred only recently. This time gap finds 
evidence in the growth rates over time: eastern countries show the smallest variations in 
the last years, while western countries register the highest growth of women in medicine 
(see Figure 1). In this context, Italy fits in the western model: in 2013 women accounted 
for almost 40% of the medical work-force and their increase has been very strong in years, 
up to +34% in the decade 2001-2011 and up to +3% from 2012 to 20133.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 OECD (2015), Health care resources, OECD Health Statistics (database). Data avalaible here: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00541-en (Website consulted on February, 28th 2016).  
2 Last data available for Japan refers to 2012.  
3 No useful data are available for the decade 2003-2013 for Italy a cause of a methodological change in 
coverage occurred in 2012. 
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Figure 1  
 
 
       
 Source:  OECD (2015), "Health care resources"4  
     
 
No matter such a strong feminization of the medical work-force, gender inequalities 
still persist. Empirical research has shed light on gender inequalities in pay, leadership, 
specialty fields. It is widely acknowledged that women physicians earn less than men 
(Hoff 2004, Sasser 2005, Weeks et al. 2009, Jagsi et al. 2012), they are clustered in less 
remunerative specialties (Hinze 2000, Sasser 2005, Boulis and Jacobs 2010, Crompton 
and Lyonette 2011) and they progress more slowly through ranks (Jagsi et al. 2011, Carnes 
et al. 2008).   
Most of the studies on gender inequalities in medical careers have taken place in the 
United States, where cross-sectional and longitudinal dataset, as the American Medical 
Association dataset (AMA) or the Young Physicians’ Survey (YPS), are available (Baker 
1996, Sasser 2005, Boulis and Jacobs 2010, Weeks et al. 2015). Studies based on self-
administrated surveys (Hinze 2000, Hoff 2004) as well as qualitative in-sights (Carr et al. 
2003, Kass et al. 2006, Levine et al. 2011) into medical organisations are also mostly 
American. Only a few researches have been conducted outside the United States and more 
                                                 
4 For Japan, Denmark and Sweden last data available refer to 2012.  
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specifically, at my knowledge, in Japan (Nomura and Gohchi 2012), UK (Crompton and 
Lyonette 2011), in the Netherlands (Pas et al. 2011) and Sweden (Magnusson 2015). Italy 
has a long tradition in the study of the medical profession in a gendered perspective 
(Vicarelli 1989, Vicarelli 2003, Vicarelli and Bronzini 2003, Vicarelli 2008, Spina e 
Vicarelli 2015). Vicarelli’s studies are mostly concerned with female physicians’ 
identities, values and career trajectories. Women in the profession are her unit of analysis. 
On the contrary, this research takes in consideration both female and male physicians as 
it aims to identify, and explain, gender inequalities in the workplaces and within 
organisations.  
This research is part of the wider European project S.T.A.G.E.S. (Structural 
Transformation to Achieve Gender Equality in Science)5 at the University of Milan and 
it aims to fill the European gap in the literature on gender inequalities in medical careers. 
For the first time in Italy, data on more than one thousand physicians have been collected 
through an online survey in five hospitals in the Lombardy Region, where the University 
of Milan is located. The submission of the questionnaire took from two to three months 
for each hospital and more than one year overall, taking start in June 2014 and ending in 
July 2015. The survey aimed to collect information on human capital, work and family 
characteristics of the physicians, as well as on work environment. Out of 2205 physicians 
receiving the questionnaire, 1074 answered, for a rate of response of 48.7%. Quantitative 
data analysis was made using descriptive statistics to identify the forms of gender 
inequalities and through regression analysis to identify their causes.  
The field was made accessible by the members of the research group of the project 
S.T.A.G.E.S. as well as by its partners, and more specifically by the Health Department 
of the Region, which played a crucial role in promoting this study. Hospitals were chosen 
to be as more representative as possible of the Lombardy health system, which is a quite 
peculiar case within the (strongly decentralized) national health system, as it is based on 
a mixed logic, where one third of providers are private and two third are public. This has 
made the Lombardy health system very competitive and attractive both in terms of 
scientific research (Lombardy has the highest concentration of medical schools in Italy) 
                                                 
5 The STAGES project – Structural Transformation to Achieve Gender Equality in Science – GA n° 289051, 
has been financed by the DG Research and Innovation of the European Commission within the Seven 
Framework Research Programme and it is co-funded by the Italian General Inspectorate for relations with 
the European Union of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (IGRUE).  
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and quality of care services (10% of services are provided to patients coming from other 
regions with peak concentrations of 50% in some specialties). 
Studying gender inequalities in such a competitive and high-quality context has many 
advantages. One must objects that, since this study focuses on a very restricted 
population, made of high-qualified professionals and more specifically by physicians in 
five hospitals organisations, it can’t provide useful insights on the general population. 
Statistically speaking, no doubt that this study is made of five quantitative case-studies 
which are representative of the five hospitals only. As these hospitals have been chosen 
in order to be as more representative as possible of the Lombardy health system, one 
could add, at the most, that this study provides information on the Lombardy health 
system as well. Is that all? Many reasons suggest that it is not. I argue that this study 
doesn’t only provide precious insights on gender inequalities in the medical profession 
but in the general population as well. I will explain this concept by quoting Kathleen 
Gerson. “Large issues – she says – are often best illuminated by small, well-crafted 
studies” (Gerson 1985, p. XVIII). That is, if gender inequalities occur with respect to a 
very specific and committed population, it is very reasonable to think that they occur in a 
greater extent to the rest of the labour market. In other words, if gender inequalities occur 
in a population where women are very similar to men in terms of educational and work 
investments (Wajcman 1998), it is likely to think that they occur even more in a 
heterogeneous population, where gender differences (in characteristics) are stronger. The 
population of this research is restricted twice: with respect to the general population, as it 
represents the “slice” made of high-skilled professionals, and with respect to the medical 
profession itself, as it represents the very excellence of the health system in Italy and in 
Europe. As a consequence, by shedding light on the mechanisms and the reasons of 
gender inequalities among physicians in five health organisations in Lombardy, this 
research can provide many useful insight on how gender inequalities work in the medical 
profession and in the labour market as a whole.  
This research is structured in five chapters. The first chapter will provide the review 
of the literature on gender inequalities by adopting a multi-disciplinary approach. 
Contributions both from the sociological and economical traditions to the study of gender 
inequalities will be discussed, with the aim of systematizing the different forms of gender 
inequalities and their different explanations identified by international scholars. The 
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second chapter is the methodological chapter. The choice of the methods – in the data 
collection and in their analysis - will be discussed, as well as the problematics linked to 
the access to the field, challenges and resistances. The questionnaire will be also 
illustrated and the representativity of the dataset analyzed. The third chapter will provide 
descriptive statistics on the population based on data collected through the survey. The 
fourth and fifth chapter will focus on two forms of gender inequalities: the gender pay 
gap and the vertical segregation. Both chapters aim to identify the reasons of gender 
inequalities in pay (chapter 4) and in authority (chapter 5). In order to do that, a set of 
hypothesis, drawn from the literature, will be tested using multiple regression models. 
The results will be then discussed at the end of each chapter. In the conclusions, research 
outcomes will be summarized, limits and strengths of the study discussed and further 
investigations outlined.  
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Chapter 1 - The literature 
 
 
 
 
 
Studies on gender inequalities in the medical profession parallel the wider literature 
on gender inequalities in the general population and in non traditional jobs6. Many 
scholars have shed light on the obstacles that women face in the world of professions 
(Crompton and Sanderson 1990, Beccalli 2004), as managers (Jacobs 1995, Wajcman 
1998), in the financial (Roth 2006) and IT (Wright and Jacobs 1995) sector, as well as in 
science (Evetts 1996, Glover and Campling 2000, Etzkowitz et al. 2008, Gupta et al. 
2004, Smith Doerr 2004).  
As for studies on gender inequalities in medical careers, most of the them have been 
taken place in the United States, where cross-sectional and longitudinal datasets, as the 
American Medical Association dataset (AMA) or the Young Physicians’ Survey (YPS), 
are available (Baker 1996, Sasser 2005, Boulis and Jacobs 2010, Weeks et al. 2009). 
Studies based on self-administrated surveys (Hinze 2000, Hoff 2004) as well as 
qualitative in-sights (Carr et al. 2003, Kass et al. 2006, Jagsi et al. 2011 and 2012, Levine 
et al. 2011) into medical organisations are also mostly American. Only a few researches 
have been conducted outside the United States and more specifically, at my knowledge, 
in Japan (Nomura and Gohchi 2012), UK (Crompton and Lyonette 2011), in the 
Netherlands (Pas et al. 2011a and 2011b) and Sweden (Magnusson 2015). Italy has a long 
tradition in the study of the medical profession in a gendered perspective based on 
Vicarelli’s work (Vicarelli 1989, Vicarelli 2003, Vicarelli and Bronzini 2003, Vicarelli 
                                                 
6 I use the expression “non traditional jobs” or “traditionally male occupations” to mean both male-
dominated occupations (or sex-segregated occupations) and feminized occupations (or mixed-sex 
occupations which have recently experienced a process of feminization). In male-dominated (or sex-
segregated) occupations, women account for a minor part of the work-force. Cutting points for defining an 
occupation as “sex-segregated” (being either female or male dominated) vary according to scholars: “75% 
or 80% one sex, a one-sex majority, or a percentage-point deviation from the sexes’ representation in the 
labour force” (Reskin 1993, p. 244). Example of male-dominated occupations are engineering, finance and 
the hard-sciences. Male-dominated occupations can experience a process of feminization and can become 
mixed-sex occupations. I use this term in the same way used by Roos and Jones (1995), that is to indicate 
a growing presence of women within occupations and not to suggest that women have become the 
predominant, or even the majority, sex. Examples of feminized occupations are journalism, judiciary and 
medicine.  
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2008, Spina e Vicarelli 2015).  Her research is mostly concerned with the historical 
process of the feminization of the profession on one hand and with female physicians’ 
identities, values, behaviours and career trajectories on the other. In her studies, women 
physicians are the unit of analysis. On the contrary, this Ph.D. thesis takes in consideration 
both female and male physicians with the aim of identifying the causes of gender 
inequalities in workplaces at within organisations.  
 
 
I. The forms of gender inequalities 
There are different forms or different types of gender inequalities in non traditional 
occupations: the horizontal segregation (disparities in sectors/specialties), the vertical 
segregation (disparities in rank) and the pay gap (between men and women and between 
mothers and childless women).   
The horizontal segregation (better known as occupational sex segregation) refers to 
the degree to which men and women do different works (Blau 1984, Milkman 1987, 
Walby 1988, Reskin and Ross 1990, Reskin 1993, England 1982, England 1992, Jacobs 
1989, Jacobs 1995, Charles and Grusky 2004). Men and women can work in different 
industries, in different kinds of organisations (public, private, non-profit), in different 
occupations. Within the same occupation, they can work in different sectors or specialties, 
as it is the case of medicine (Boulis and Jacobs 2010). Once women enter into a male-
dominated profession, mechanisms of re-segregation take place inside the same 
occupation (Reskin and Ross 1990). Workplace segregation is usually measured by the 
index of dissimilarity, which indicates the proportion of women who would have to move 
in order for them to be distributed in the same manner as men (Jacobs 1995). Analytically 
speaking, this distribution should not necessarily be a synonym of gender inequality. 
Nevertheless, it is well acknowledged that female occupations are usually less well paid 
than men’s, provide less on the job-training, promotion opportunities and the 
opportunities to exercise authorities (England 1992, Reskin 1993, Jacobs 1995). 
Therefore, the occupational sex segregation has some important implications in terms of 
gender inequality.   
The vertical segregation refers to the female overrepresentation in the lower levels of 
the career ladder and the glass ceiling is the most common metaphor to describe it 
15 
 
(Federal Glass Ceiling Commission 1995, Baxter and Wright 2000, Cotter et al. 2001, 
Liff and Ward 2001). The glass ceiling is defined as an “unseen, yet unbreakable barrier 
keeping women from rising to the upper rungs of the corporate ladder, regardless of their 
qualifications or achievements” (Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, 1995: 4) and it 
emphasises the existence of obstacles at the end of the career ladder. More recently, a 
second metaphor has been introduced to offset the limits of the glass ceiling: the sticky 
floor (Padavic and Reskin 1994, Britton and William 2000, Booth et al. 2003, Baert et al. 
2016). Sticky floors can be described as the pattern that women are, compared to men, 
less likely to start climbing the career ladder. In this way, sticky floors complement the 
concept of glass ceiling and suggest that barriers can be found also at the beginning of the 
career ladder (Baert et al. 2016). The sticky floor is consistent with a third metaphor which 
has been mostly used in the literature on scientific careers: the leaky pipeline (Alper 1993, 
Blickenstaff 2005). This latter suggest that there is no difference between barriers at the 
beginning and barriers at the end of the ladder, as female talents are “dropped” all along 
the trajectory, implying the existence of equal obstacles throughout the ladder.   
The vertical and the horizontal segregation are two forms of gender inequality. On the 
other hand, they are, in themselves, two of the most relevant explanatory factors of a 
further form of gender inequality in the workplace: the pay gap. According to Eurostat, 
in 2013 women have earned 16.4% less than men in the UE 27 without adjusting for work 
hours and other characteristics7. In Italy, the pay gap is “only” 7.3%, mainly because the 
female part-time work is less common than in Nordic European Countries. Women earn 
less (also) because they are concentrated in female jobs (which are usually worse paid 
than male jobs) and (also) because they are stuck in the lower ranks of the job ladder 
(Jacobs 1995). Nevertheless, the vertical and horizontal segregation are not the only 
causes of wage differentials. Many scholars have shed light on the child penalty for 
motherhood (Folbre 1994, Waldfogel 1997, Lundberg and Rose 2000, Buding and 
England 2001, England 2005) as well as on employers’ discrimination (Becker 1957, Blau 
1984, Reskin and Ross 1990, Gupta et al. 2004).  The debate over the explanatory factors 
of the gender pay gap is very rich in contributions, both from the economic (Oaxaca 1973, 
Blau and Kahn 2000) and the sociological (England 1992, Rubery et al. 2005, Lips 2013) 
                                                 
7 Gender pay gap in unadjusted form in %. Data available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. 
Accessed on February 25th, 2016.   
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traditions. Both perspectives have been adopted in this research, as they complement each 
other: providing the technical tools to calculate the determinants of the gap the former, 
correctly interpreting such determinants the latter.  
 
 
II. The reasons of gender inequalities 
Many studies have shed light on the reasons of gender inequalities and a few attempts 
to organize the debate have been done. I suggest to clearly distinguish between two levels 
of explanation: the level of the explanatory factors (first level) and the level of theoretical 
explanations (second level).  
Explanatory factors are usually divided between “supply-side” and “demand-side” 
(Reskin 1993, Kelly 2012). The former emphasizes workers’ characteristics, the latter 
emphasizes employer’s actions (including discrimination) or, more in general, 
organisational obstacles. Supply-side explanatory factors are: 1. The human capital 
characteristics of workers (educational credentials, work experience and seniority, 
training, commitment and productivity); 2. Their institutional work characteristics (the 
industrial sector, the kind of organisation, the type of contract); 3. Their family 
characteristics (number of children, marital status). Demand-side explanatory factors are: 
1. Employers’ discrimination; 2. Gender bias; 3. Gendered organisations.  
Supply-side explanatory factors (first level) are, in themselves, neutral, as they can be 
“interpreted” in different (even opposite) ways on the base of two different theories 
(second level): theories emphasizing the agency of the subject and theories emphasizing 
structural constraints8. That’s why it is important to separate the two levels.  
                                                 
8 Many scholars have already attempt to systematize the different contributions on gender inequalities. Jerry 
Jacobs (1995) distinguishes between the economic and the sociological perspective, the former 
emphasizing the agency of the subject, the latter emphasizing structural conditionings. Nevertheless, not 
all economists adopt such a theoretical approach. This is true only for neo-liberal economists. Reskin 
distinguishes between the neo-classical or neo-liberal economic perspective and the gender-role 
socialization theory (Reskin 1993). This is also partially correct as the socialization theories (Marini and 
Brinton 1984, Parsons 1942) are not the only one emphasizing the impact of external factors on individual 
agency. Gerson (1985) identifies two main strands sharing a structural approach: theories stressing the 
importance of socio-structural coercion (within the Marxist tradition) and theories stressing childhood 
socialization (within the psychoanalytic tradition). In order to better comprehend the heterogeneity of 
theoretical contributions on both side of the debate, I prefer to distinguish between theories focusing on the 
agency of the subject and theories focusing on structural constraints. Indeed, I believe it is a more 
comprehensive distinction, including economists and sociologists on both sides of the querelle, as well as, 
with respect to the second side only, sociologists and social psychologists. Moreover, I will use the 
expression “structural constraints” with a slightly different meaning with respect to Gerson’s (1985). While 
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  Theories focusing on the agency of the subjects interpret workers actions in terms of 
preferences (Hakim 2000) or rational choices (Becker 1985).  According to this 
perspective, for example, women would choose “family-friendly” jobs because they 
prefer to spend more time in caring their children or because they expect that family 
obligations will limit their market work. On the contrary, structuralist theories would shed 
light on the social construction of gender (Connell 2002, Risman 2004, Piccone Stella 
and Saraceno 1996, Ruspini 2003) shaping women and men’s choices towards specific 
occupations (Faulkner 2009, Powell et al. 2009) while determining their structure of 
opportunities (Crompton et al. 2005, Crompton and Lyonette 2010).  
The two level-approach (explanatory factors vs theoretical interpretation) works for 
the supply-side factors only. For one simple reason: supply-side factors concern the 
actions of the unit of the analysis of the research (the worker), which can be differently 
“interpreted” (as free or constrained action). On the contrary, demand-side factors concern 
employers’ actions which, from the point of view of the unit of the analysis (the worker), 
are – per se – external constraints as long as they don’t depend on workers’ choice. As 
such, they hardly can give place to a theoretical querelle around their nature and they are 
usually interpreted by advocating theories stressing structural constraints. In their case, 
then, the two levels (factors and interpretation) coincide. The contributions of the 
literature will be now explored by shedding light on the explanatory factors of gender 
inequalities and their theoretical interpretations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
she reduces structural constraints to socio-economic coercion, I prefer to use the same expression in a more 
comprehensive way which is drawn from the structuralist tradition. That is, as an heterogeneous dimension, 
including linguistic, psychological, social and economical “conditionings” of human actions.  
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Figure 1. Gender inequalities at work: explanatory factors and theoretical interpretations 
 
 
 
III. Supply-side explanations 
III.1. Human capital characteristics  
The human capital theory in economics (Becker 1985 and 1991) and the preference 
theory in the social sciences (Hakim 2000) both argue that differences in individual 
characteristics between female and male workers account for gender inequalities. 
According to the human capital approach, gender differences in human capital – defined 
as the investment that workers make in their skills and commitment through education, 
training and work experience – engender inequalities. Since women (or at least married 
women) prioritize family over career, they invest less in their (market) human capital and 
they reduce their commitment to work. This may reduce women’s productivity either 
because they work less hours in order to take care of the children or because they put less 
effort par hour relative to men who spend fewer off-job hours on household task. Lower 
productivity lead to lower earnings, which explains the gender pay gap, or into the choice 
of family-friendly occupations, which explains the occupational segregation.   
As one of the foremost exponent of the human capital theory, Gary Becker argues that 
married women seek less demanding jobs because of their greater child care and 
housework responsibilities (Becker 1985 and 1991). Nevertheless, the way he describes 
how and why women “choose” to invest less in paid work doesn’t exclude at all the role 
of the “structure” and more in particular of discrimination. In his attempt to explain why 
19 
 
women would be less committed to paid work, thus reproducing the sexual division of 
labour, he proposes two possible explanations: either they choose it because of their 
biological differences or they choose it because they anticipate discrimination. “Whatever 
the reason for the traditional division – perhaps discrimination against women or high 
fertility – housework responsibilities lower the earnings and affect the jobs of married 
women by reducing their time in the labour force and discouraging their investment in 
market human capital” (Becker, 1985, p. 55). However, while he doesn’t explain any 
further how biological differences affect choices, he is clear on discrimination: since 
women have lower returns from their investments in the market human capital than men, 
they “choose” not to commit themselves in paid work as much as men do. By 
“anticipating” discrimination, they make a perfect rational choice.  
Becker’s contribution in explaining gender inequalities has certainly been remarkable 
as he has shed light on the relation between family responsibilities and the structure of 
opportunities, arguing that un unequal division of non paid work in the household has an 
impact on women’s and men’s investments in market human capital. This translate into 
lower productivity and, therefore, lower earnings. Nevertheless, studies have shown that 
women are not less productive than men even when they reduce their work hours (Sasser 
2005). Moreover, gender inequalities occur also for childless and career-oriented women, 
that is –   given equal level of (market) human capital investments – women earn less than 
men (Roth 2006, Wajcman 1998, Falcinelli 2009). In these cases, the human capital 
theory appears clearly inadequate in explaining inequalities.  
 
 
III.2. Institutional work characteristics: the horizontal segregation  
As above-mentioned, the occupational sex segregation can be both a form of gender 
inequality and, at the same time, an explanatory factor of a further form of gender 
inequality: the gender pay gap. In both cases, its interpretation depends upon which 
theoretical framework one chooses. The debate on the causes and the consequences of 
the horizontal segregation will be briefly illustrated.  
The human capital approach to occupational sex segregation holds that women avoid 
occupations that demand skills that depreciate while they are out of the labour force 
raising their children. Women would choose female-dominated occupations, with 
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relatively high rewards early in life and a low rate of growth in earnings over time. Such 
occupations are supposed to be more family-friendly, require less skills than male-
dominated ones, fewer penalties for motherhood and fewer work hours. Therefore, 
according to the human capital perspective, the horizontal segregation is the result of 
women’s choices. On the contrary, the queuing tradition explains the horizontal 
segregation through employer’s discrimination: interpreting the labour queue model in 
terms of gender queue9, Reskin and Ross (1990) show that gender stereotypes, customs 
and expectations about women performances in male-dominated occupation led 
employers to rank men ahead of women, that is to favor male workers over women in 
their hiring decisions, no matter equal levels of educational credentials. Hence, the 
persistence of male-dominated occupations is the result of barriers at the entrance level, 
which in their turn find their justification in stereotypes on women competences and 
capacities.  
The horizontal segregation is also one of the major causes of the gender pay gap 
(Jacobs 1995, Blau and Kahn 2000). Even in this case, two opposite theoretical 
approaches can be advocated. According to the neoliberal approach, female-dominated 
occupations require lower skills than male-dominated ones and that’s why they are less 
rewarded. Analytically speaking, lower levels of (market) human capital explain the 
horizontal segregation which in its turn explains the gender pay gap (Polacheck 1987). 
Unfortunately, such a position doesn’t fit the facts. First, studies have shown that male 
workers have been more successful in enforcing the definition of their jobs as skilled 
(Reskin 1993). Second, female-dominated fields pay less than male-dominated fields, 
both in the starting salary and in subsequent salary growth and promotions (England 1992, 
Roth 2006).  
The debate on the “comparable worth” of occupations, which was very popular in the 
1990’s, has shown that women’s jobs are not usually less skilled than men’s. Rather, 
women’s jobs typically provide less on-the-job training, shorter mobility ladders and less 
supervision of others (England 1992). As for the “family-friendly” presumption, many 
                                                 
9 According to this model, which was first theorized by Lester Thurow (1972 and 1975), employers rank 
groups of workers (i.e. blacks vs white) in terms of their attractiveness. For example, blacks experience 
more unemployment than whites because employers rank them below whites employees in the labour 
queue. As a consequence, they are hired only after whites are hired. Reskin and Ross (1990) interpret the 
labour queue in terms of gender queues favoring men over women.  
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studies have highlighted that women’s jobs report lower schedule flexibility, fewer 
unsupervised break times and less paid sick leaves and vacations (England 1992). Overall, 
it appears that female occupations pay less than male jobs occupation not because they 
require lower skill levels or because they are more family-friendly, but notwithstanding 
similar skill levels and fewer family-friendly arrangements (England 1992, Buding and 
England 2001). Evidence abounds that female-dominated jobs have pay levels which are 
lower than they would be if the jobs were filled mostly by men (Williams 1992). In other 
words, “women’s jobs pay less partly because women do them” (Roth 2006, p. 62). These 
facts have led many to argue that women’s jobs suffer from the cultural devaluation of all 
activities associated with women or with femininity. Hence, the process of feminization 
of a male-dominated occupation parallel its progressive devaluation: women are more 
likely to enter male-dominated occupations when their earnings, with respect to all jobs, 
are decreasing, and their opportunities for mobility and job autonomy decline (Williams 
1989, Reskin and Ross 1990, England 1992, Reskin 1993, Crompton and Sanderson 
1990, Cohen and Huffman 2003). In this perspective, the causal relation between the 
horizontal segregation and the gender pay gap is nothing for granted or rational, as a 
human capital approach would argue by reducing it to differences in skills and efforts. On 
the contrary, the pay gap appears to be due to a whole set of cultural and social 
assumptions devaluating women’s jobs simply because women do them.  
 
 
III.3. Family characteristics: Hakim vs Crompton  
III.3.1. Do women “prefer” to care for family?  
If the human capital theory reduces gender inequalities to differences in investments 
in market human capital by at least suspending the judgment on the “nature” of women’s 
and men’s choices, the preference theory developed by Catherine Hakim (2000) adds a 
further element in the debate: women choose to prioritize career over family on the base 
of their preferences. Women – she says – are different from men because of the different 
choices they make. Nevertheless, not all women are equal. Hakim argues that there are 
three groups of women: home-centred, work-centred and adaptive. Home centred women 
give priority to their families and after giving birth to their children either they don’t work 
or they work marginally. Work centred women, on the contrary, give priority to their 
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employment careers and they are often childless. Adaptive women – the largest group – 
want to combine employment and family without either taking priority for one of the two 
aspects and, therefore, they either tend to choose part-time work or they adopt other 
strategies to combine full-time work with family life, such as having only one child or 
partly outsourcing care-work. In modern societies, and more in particular in liberal and 
laissez-faire societies10, adaptive women account for around 60% in the female 
population, while home-centred and work-centred women account for one-fifth each. 
These three categories can be found also amongst men but with different proportions, as 
fewer men are home centred or adaptive. This difference in the proportions of the three 
preference categories between men and women is due, according to Hakim, both to social 
constraints and to biological factors, such as the difference in testosterone levels which, 
in her view, would make men more aggressive and competitive than women in the world 
of employment.  
Hence, Hakim doesn’t completely deny the role of economic and social structural 
factors in influencing “choices”, at least apparently. Citing Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, 
she affirms that “preferences do not express themselves in a vacuum, but within the 
context of local social and cultural institutions” (Hakim 2000, p. 168) and, therefore, they 
“do not predict outcomes with complete certainty” (Hakim 2000, p. 169). On the other 
hand, she argues that in modern societies, where “there is no single prescription for the 
good life and people have to choose between mutually incompatible values”, structural 
constraints are becoming less important and their relative weight declines as the relative 
importance of lifestyles preferences steadily grows. The preference theory, she specifies, 
simply reinstates preferences as an important determinant of women’s behavior and it 
states that they are increasingly important.  
As reasonable her theoretical premise – apparently arguing a balance between the 
agency and the structure – may appear, her conclusions are rarely consistent with it. 
Hakim’s awareness of the impacts of social conditionings is often overshadowed by her 
propensity to give priority to biological factors. As Crompton has already pointed out, 
                                                 
10 Liberal and laissez-faire societies are societies where government policy does not actively force women 
into accepting only one model of women’s role (Hakim, 2000, p. 157). Britain and the USA provide the 
main examples, having social, fiscal and labour policies that are “chaotic, confused and contradictory when 
compared to hegemonic modern societies”. In contrast, “many European societies impose more coherent, 
consistent and unidirectional policies based on well-defined models of family life, sex-roles and the 
standard jobs” (Hakim, 2000, p. 18).  
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this tension often returns in her work (Crompton 2006). For example, with respect to 
teenage pregnancies in UK, Hakim admits that given the availability of welfare provisions 
in UK for mothers, women without strong professional aspirations may find more 
attractive and satisfying to rear their own child than gaining an educational qualification 
(Hakim 2000). By confirming what many welfare sociologists have been arguing for the 
last twenty years (Orloff 2006 and 2008; Lewis 2002, Lewis et al. 2008; Gornick and 
Meyers 2003 and 2006; Naldini and Saraceno 2008), she states that public policies 
influence maternity choices. Unfortunately, a few lines after having admitted the role of 
welfare provisions on women’s choices, she states exactly the opposite, arguing that the 
choice of not aborting, after the contraceptive revolution, “reflects a real choice in most 
cases” (Hakim 2000, p. 49) as teenage girls derive pleasure, according to her, from the 
ownership of a child.  
Another example comes from Hakim’s arguments on the relation between preferences 
and social classes. If “preferences do not express themselves in a vacuum”, then the effect 
of socio-economic conditions should not be neglected. Unfortunately, it is. In Hakim’s 
view, the three types of preferences report the same proportions across social classes, 
ethnic groups and educational levels. However, as Crompton has highlighted (2006), 
empirical studies show that women in lower-level occupations or with no or lower 
qualification are more likely than women in the professions and with high qualifications 
to balance work and life by either leaving employment or switching to part-time. 
Similarly, the moral commitment towards maternal care lasts longer among working class 
women – with lower career opportunities – than among professional women (Crompton 
2006). Contrary to Hakim’s arguments, preferences do vary across social classes and 
educational levels.   
 Overall, her “structural” premises à la Bourdieu are not consistent with her essentialist 
arguments. Not surprisingly, Hakim states that differences between men and women, 
“will never disappear completely” (Hakim 2000, p. 141) and she labels choices as 
“genuine” (p. 169). In other words, no matter her references to the habitus and the impacts 
of social conditionings, she considers the subjective dimension in terms of a “pure” self, 
a transcendent “core” irreducible to any sort of constraints. That’s why her arguments 
have found favor in conservative environments and many authors consider her as a 
neoliberal gender essentialist (Crompton 2006).  
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Furthermore, her position has also epistemological and methodological implications: 
as long as preferences are “genuine”, they can clearly be reported. What women declare 
is what women prefer and the social research is called upon to “ask them directly and 
explicitly about their preferences” (Hakim 2000, p. 16) without worrying to much about 
digging into interviewee’s words and understanding the reasons standing behind 
“declared” preferences. However, the task of any social scientist is, on the contrary, to dig 
into words and investigate the reasons of human actions. From this point of view, Hakim’s 
positivist perspective on knowledge appears quite naïve with respect to the object of her 
research: human behaviors and values.  
 
 
III.3.2. Work-life balance policies, family arrangements and gender equality at 
work 
If according to the preference theory, most women “choose” to balance work and 
family responsibilities thus reducing the hours of work, theories focused on structural 
constraints, on the contrary, shed light on the unequal division of paid and unpaid work 
between men and women. In this perspective, “female” priority to work-life balance 
choices is “shaped” by structural constraints such as cultural expectations on women’s 
and men’s roles in society, the lack of adequate welfare services, limited career 
opportunities in the organisation, etc. Women “choose”, certainly, but their choices are 
taken within a context. The change in the perspective is evident also in the language used 
by structuralist scholars: family characteristics are not defined as family-related 
preferences but, rather, as family-related obstacles.  
Work-life balance issues have been investigated by two different “angles”. On one 
hand, scholars in the area of gender, work and organisations11 have analysed how work-
                                                 
11 I use the term “literature in the area of gender work and organisation” as a general term including two 
macro-strands in the sociological literature: studies of (gendered) organisations on one part and studies of  
occupations in a gendered perspective on the other. The two strands of literature have different unit of 
analysis: the organisation the former, the occupation the latter. The first strand has much develop in the 
1990’s upon the theory of gendered organisations (Acker 1990, Britton 2000). The second strand can be 
further specified in different traditions whose boundaries often overlap: the study of sex-segregated 
occupations (England 1992, Reskin 1993, Jacobs 1995); the study of non traditional  jobs (Williams 1989, 
Jacobs, 1995, Wajcman 1998, Bagilhole 2002, Crompton 2006, Roth 2006, Boulis and Jacobs 2008), 
women and sciences (Evetts 1996, Glover and Campling 2000, Etzkowitz et al. 2008, Gupta et al. 2004, 
Schibinger et al. 2008, Smith Doerr 2004), the studies of professions (David and Vicarelli 1994, Sarfatti 
Larson 1977), the queueing tradition (Reskin and Ross 1990).  
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life balance obstacles affect female career outcomes and wages in the workplace (Folbre 
1994, Wajcman 1998, Buding and England 2001, Sasser 2005, Glauber 2007 and 2008, 
Hodges and Budig 2010, Crompton and Lyonette 2006, Crompton 2006). On the other, 
welfare scholars have analysed how work-life balance policies affect gender equality both 
at the State (Orloff 2006 and 2008; Lewis 2002, Lewis et al. 2008; Gornick and Meyers 
2003 and 2006; Saraceno and Naldini 2003, Naldini and Saraceno 2008) and at the 
organisational (McDonald et al. 2005, Lewis and Taylor 1996, Lewis 1997, Dex et al. 
2001, De Cieri et al. 2005, Straub 2007, Di Santo and Villante 2013, Bombelli and 
Lazazzara 2014) level.  
Among the scholars who systematically paid attention to both “sides of the coin” is 
Rosemary Crompton (1999 and 2006). In her work, she argues that the sexual division of 
labour – that is the unequal division of paid and unpaid work between men and women – 
is the “major explanation” for gender inequalities in the workplaces and she calls for the 
importance of adopting adequate work-life balance and gender equality policies in order 
to destructure it.  
In her continuum of gender relations (Figure 2), she identifies four “models of family” 
or four forms of “gender arrangements”, going from the most to the least traditional with 
respect to the division of paid and unpaid work (Crompton 1999 and 2006). The first one 
is the male breadwinner-female caregiver model, composed by a full-time male 
breadwinner and a full-time housewife. The second one is the male breadwinner-female 
part-time earner, which differs from the previous one in the fact that the female partner 
works part-time. The third model is the dual earner model, with both members of the 
couple working part-time. The fourth model is the dual earner-dual carer model, with both 
members of the couple working three quarter of the time and both responsible for unpaid 
work.   
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Figure 2 – The continuum of gender relations of Rosemary Crompton  
 
Source: Crompton (2006, p. 193)  
 
The more traditional the gender arrangement it is, the more negative consequences it 
has in terms of female occupation and gender equality in the labour market. The 
“connection” between gender inequalities at home and gender inequalities in the 
workplace finds evidence in the child penalty for motherhood. Many scholars have shown 
that motherhood is associated with lower pay and fewer chances of promotion (Folbre 
1994, Waldfogel 1997, Lundberg and Rose 2000, Blau-Kahn 2000, Buding and England 
2001, England 2005). Comparing childless women with mothers, Buding and England 
(2001) finds a 7% of penalty per child in terms of earnings, which is stronger for married 
women. On the other hand, several contributions have suggested that fatherhood is 
associated with an increase in pay in comparison to childless men (Glabuer 2008, Hodges 
and Budig 2010, Kelly 2012). Interesting findings have been also provided by qualitative 
studies focusing on the difficulties that women face in combining work and family. 
Women professionals and managers experience stronger work-life conflict than working 
class women (Wajcman 1998, Hochschild 2001, Wajcman and Martin 2002, Blair-Loy 
2009, Crompton 2006, Roth 2006, Gerson 2010). As a consequence, either they delay or 
avoid maternity or they outsource care-work as much as they can (Roth 2006). On the 
contrary, working class women appear to be more “family-centred”, as their lack of 
qualifications and low job experience would make their career progression difficult 
(Crompton 2006).  
Viceversa, men don’t experience, or experience in a much lower extent, the work-life 
conflict, as -  by virtue of the sexual division of labour - they have less family 
responsibilities than women. Moreover, even if the male breadwinner-female housewife 
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model have become less common in western countries, in some professions men in 
traditional family arrangements still report greater career advantages with respect to their 
colleagues who are married with a working wife (Roth 2006). Pateman (1988) explains 
this mechanism in term of “sexual contract”: marriage, she argues, “frees” men from 
family responsibilities and place them in a privileged position to invest in their career. 
The less the wife works, the most she can support her husband’s career aspirations. The 
work contract, then, requires a sexual contract.  
If the literature in the area of gender, work and organisation has paid much attention 
on the effects, in terms of gender inequalities, of the sexual division of labour, welfare 
scholars have investigated how the sexual division of labour itself can be affected by 
work-life balance policies, as long as they “shape” family arrangements. Work-life 
balance policies are made of three “core policies” (Gornick and Meyers 2006): family 
and parental leaves, early-childhood education and care services, working-time 
regulation. The priority given to some pillars rather than others and the way each pillar is 
designed has a strong impact in terms of models of family or “gender arrangements” 
(Crompton 1999). For example, policies focusing mainly on family leaves and providing 
insufficient child-care services encourage women to stay home once they have children 
(thus promoting a male breadwinner-female carer model of family). Providing part-time 
policies endorse women to balance paid and unpaid work (thus promoting a male 
breadwinner-female part-time carer), but with negative consequences in terms of gender 
parity, as women are confined to the so called “mummy tracks” (Schwartz 1989) and their 
career progression becomes more difficult (Lewis and Taylor 1996, Gornick and Meyers 
2003, Crompton 2006, Lewis et al. 2008, Santo e Villante 2013). Anti-discrimination 
policies and good childcare services, on the contrary, support female full-time work (thus 
promoting a dual earner model of family), as the care of children is outsourced. Flexi-
time policies and paternity leaves promote both a dual earner – dual carer family model, 
with both partners working “three quarter of the time” and both having equal family 
responsibilities. By challenging traditional gender roles (Fraser 1994), the fourth model 
pursues two objectives: gender equality and time for care (Gornick and Meyers 2003). 
However, as long as the sexual division of work won’t be deconstructed in favour of new 
forms of gender relations (i.e. the dual earner-dual carer couples), gender equality will 
remain “unfinished” (Gerson 2010).  
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IV.  Theories focusing on the agency of the subject vs theories focusing on 
structural constraints: a double shift.  
Both the human capital and the preference theory make a causal link between gender 
differences (in characteristics) and gender inequalities and do not explore the role of 
structural constraints in shaping the former. By doing this, they tend to justify gender 
inequalities: women earn less than men, they are clustered in lower-paid occupations and 
progress more slowly through ranks because they make different choices with respect to 
work and family.  
On the contrary, studies focusing on structural constraints adopt a critical approach by 
calling gender inequalities into question. They do it through two “steps”. First, by not 
taking gender differences (between men and women) for granted. Second, by focusing on 
equality (between men and women) rather than difference. These two steps don’t exclude 
each other as very often the same author consider them simultaneously.  
The first step concerns supply-side factors: if women and men make different choices 
with respect to work and family, a structuralist approach investigates what’s “behind” 
these choices. Theories focusing on the agency of the subjects explain female choices 
either by focusing on expectations (that family will limit their work returns of investments 
in market human capital) or by focusing on their “genuine” preferences (for balancing 
work and family life). On the contrary, theories focusing on structural constraints adopt a 
critical approach. In sociological terms, this means to focus on the sexual division of 
labour and the wider context of employment and care, with the aim of identifying the 
influence of work-life balance policies and/or socio-cultural assumptions about gender 
roles and/or gender bias in shaping women’s choices. In econometric terms, it means to 
be aware of the mechanisms of indirect discrimination which encourages women to 
“anticipate” discrimination by making different choices which translate in different 
characteristics. I’ll come back to this point later.  
The second step concerns demand-side factors: if theories focusing on the agency of 
the subjects stress differences in choices (or characteristics) between men and women as 
a way to justify inequalities, theories focusing on structural constraints focus on equal 
choices (or characteristics). What happens indeed to gender inequalities if women and 
men make similar choices? If they “show” similar characteristics? If gender inequalities 
still persist, then they become hardly justifiable as long as they don’t depend upon 
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workers’ actions or characteristics. Indeed, they must depend merely on the demand-side 
factors. That is the reason why studies focusing on structural constraints often investigate 
men and women with similar characteristics in order to understand whether (and why) 
gender inequalities persist. In sociological terms, this translates into the choice of 
focusing, for example, on career-oriented women in high-skilled professions. In 
econometric terms, this means, on one hand, to focus on a homogeneous population thus 
reducing the bias due to unobservable (or at least hardly measurable) characteristics like 
ability and productivity. On the other, it means to “control” for all (observable) 
characteristics in order to figure out if direct discrimination occurs (I’ll come back to this 
point later).  
In this work, I adopt a structural approach in the understanding of gender inequalities 
and their explanatory factors. This doesn’t mean to deny the fact that women and men 
can make different “choices”.  It means, simply, to assume a critical point of view on the 
concept of “choices” and investigate what’s behind them, not to take them for granted. In 
other words, if women and men show different human capital and work characteristics, 
this will be interpreted assuming that “choices” and “preferences” are always embedded 
in cultural, social and economic constraints.  
 
 
V.  Demand-side explanations 
Many studies have shown that gender inequalities still persist controlling for human 
capital, work and family characteristics (Wajcman 1998, Roth 2006). The “part” of gender 
inequality which persists no matter similar attributes is considered in the econometric 
literature as due to discrimination. If the econometric literature on gender inequalities in 
the workplaces has much focused on discrimination and how to “quantify” it (Blau-Kahn 
2000), the sociological literature in the area of gender work and organisation has focused 
on the mechanisms underneath, shedding light on the reasons of the female disadvantage 
in non traditional jobs. Two mechanisms have drawn the attention of social scientists: 
gender bias or gender schema from one hand (Valian 1999) and he gendered dimension 
of organisations from the other (Acker 1990, Britton 2000).  
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V.1. Discrimination  
The econometric literature distinguishes between two “components” of pay 
inequalities: the first component is due to differences in observable characteristics (human 
capital, subjective and institutional work characteristics, family characteristics); the 
second component is due to differences in unobservable characteristics or to (direct) 
discrimination. Direct discrimination is defined as the part of the pay gap which occurs 
not withstanding equal characteristics between men and women. This distinction reflects 
the opposition between supply-side explanatory factors and demand-side explanatory 
factors. As above mentioned, neo-liberal economists tend to interpret the first component 
(supply-side) as a justification of the pay gap, while the second component (demand-side) 
represents the part of the gap due to “discrimination” against women (Fabbri 2001).  
Many sociologists have challenged this interpretation by adopting a critical approach. 
Olsen and Walby (2004) distinguish between indirect discrimination (concerning 
differences in characteristics: first component) and direct discrimination (concerning the 
part of inequalities given equal characteristics: second component). Indirect 
discrimination is associated with observable characteristics and can affect individuals’ 
motivations, preferences and attitudes. For example, the expectation of systematic 
disadvantage in the labour market encourage women to “anticipate” discrimination, 
making family-friendly choices. Therefore, it is incorrect to assume, as neoliberal 
economists do, that differences in the pay gap are “legitimate” because they reflect 
differences in individual characteristics as long as individual characteristics anticipate 
discrimination (Olsen and Walby 2004).  
In his study on the pay gap among physicians, Baker (1996) finds that, controlling for 
all characteristics, there is no gender difference in pay. That is, regressing all explanatory 
variables, being a female doesn’t have a significant impact on pay. In his OLS model, 
differences in specialty and practice settings account for the majority of the difference in 
hourly earnings between the sexes. Nevertheless, he admits that his study “did not address 
the process by which male and female physicians choose – and are chosen for – their 
specialties and practice settings”. Such choices involve a variety of considerations: “these 
include their preferred practice environments and each physician’s sense of his or her 
social role and family responsibilities. Limitations in opportunity, real and perceived, may 
also be important”. In other words, social expectations on gender roles in society, which 
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reflects the sexual division of labour, play an important roles in “shaping” choices 
opportunities. Therefore, he concludes, “the results of this study should not be interpreted 
as the evidence that discrimination is no longer a problem” (Baker 1996, p 963). In short, 
if there is no evidence of (direct) discrimination after controlling for individual 
characteristics, it doesn’t mean that there is no evidence of (indirect) discrimination at 
all. 
 
 
V.2. Gender bias or gender schema  
Employers discriminate women also on the base of their expectations on women’s 
performance which in its turn is conditioned by gender bias. One of the foremost 
contribution on how gender bias function is Virginia Valian’s Why so slow? The 
advancement of women (1999). In the book, Valian sheds light on the reasons of the slow 
advancement of women into traditional-male occupations through a literature review of 
the studies in the fields of social and cognitive psychology as well as sociology and 
economics. Her analysis is centered on two concepts: the gender schema and the 
accumulation of advantages (and disadvantages). Gender schema are cognitive 
frameworks or hypothesis about sex differences, playing a crucial role in women’s and 
men’s professional lives12. They are a set of implicit or unconscious expectations on 
female and male’s characteristics and behaviors which belong both to men and women. 
In white, western, middle-class societies, “the gender schema for men includes being 
capable of independent, autonomous action (agentic, in short), assertive, instrumental, 
and task-oriented. Men act. The gender schema for women is different; it includes being 
nurturant, expressive, communal and concerned about others” (Valian 1999, p. 13). As 
such, these expectations influence the evaluation of women and men’s work and their 
performance as professional. Their most important consequence for their professional life 
is that men are consistently overrated, while women are underrated. Valian thinks of 
professions but her analysis applies to all scientific and traditionally-male dominated 
                                                 
12 Schema are cognitive frameworks or hypothesis about social phenomena. Hence, gender schema are a 
particular type of schema, concerning gender differences. The concept of schema differs from the concept 
of stereotype. Schema can be accurate or inaccurate, positive, negative or neutral. Moreover, they are a 
necessary cognitive framework which enable us to put all the information together and give a sense to the 
world around us. On the contrary, stereotypes tend to describe phenomena in a inaccurate and negative 
way. Therefore, schema are a more inclusive concept that stereotypes. 
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occupations, where male’s traits and attributes fits with social expectations about the traits 
and attributes that people, in those occupations, should have.  
Gender schema are acquired from the early childhood and are strongly intertwined 
with the sexual division of labour. It’s by observing the unequal divisions of paid and 
unpaid work between men and women – both at home and in the wider world - that 
children search for an explanation for it and build their gender schema. The most simple 
explanation, Valian says, is to make a link between biology and talents, interests, 
preferences, attitudes and behaviors. However, biology is not destiny (as neither is the 
social environment): “neither determines behavior: both influence it” (Valian 1999, p. 
12). This is a very important passage because it clearly makes a link between the sexual 
division of labour and gender bias (or, in Valian’s terms, gender schema). That is to say 
that the sexual division of labour is not only a material device, assigning greater family 
responsibilities to women and thus reducing their time for paid-work. Indeed, it is also a 
cultural device, creating gender schema and justifying them by appealing to differences 
in nature. For example, to explain and justify the fact that almost all engineers are men 
and almost all homemakers are women, “people may say that men have traits and abilities 
that fit them to be engineers and cause them to choose engineering over homemaking, 
and women have traits and abilities that fit them to be homemakers and cause them to 
choose homemaking over engineering” (Valian 1999, p. 13). By assigning different 
characteristics and skills to men and women, the sexual division of labour works as a 
cultural constraints on people’s choices and evaluations.  
 
 
V.2.1. The Matthew effect 
Gender schema are strictly connected to two other mechanisms which have been used 
to describe the obstacles that women face are the Matthew effect (which is in turn strictly 
connected to the “self-fulfilling prophecy”) and the Matilda effect.  
The Matthew effect has been elaborated by Robert Merton in his study on the 
allocation of rewards to scientists and derives its name from the parable of the talents in 
the gospel of Matthew, according to which “for unto every one that hath shall be given, 
and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that 
which he hath” (Merton 1968). According to the Matthew effect, eminent scientists get 
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disproportionately greater credit for their contributions to science while relatively 
unknown scientists tend to get disproportionately less credit for comparable 
contributions. In other words, there is a pattern of recognition skewed in favor of the 
established scientists acquiring further advantages (Merton 1968). Like in interest on 
capital, advantages accrue and, like interests on debt, disadvantages accumulate. This 
mechanism – cognitive material presented by an outstanding scientist may have greater 
stimulus value than roughly the same kind of material presented by an obscure one – give 
place to a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
Indeed, the material of the outstanding scientists will be read more carefully, “and the 
more attention one gives it, the more one is apt to get out of it” (Merton 1968, p. 7). This 
becomes a self-confirming process, as the eminent scientist can reinforce his image in the 
scientific community, confirming the expectations on him.  
Following Merton’s analysis, as women scientists are often outsiders or in 
subordinated positions, they are more likely to get disproportionately little credit for their 
contribution thus accumulating disadvantages and confirming the expectations that 
women don’t fit in science as men do. In this perspective, the occupational disadvantage 
of women is the result of mechanisms of accumulation of advantages and disadvantages 
at work (Merton 1968, Zuckerman 1975). Virginia Valian reads Merton’s concept in a 
gendered perspective: since gender schema affect the evaluation of women’s and men’s 
performance, she says, “the long term consequences of small differences in these 
evaluations can, as they pile up, result in large disparities in salary, promotion and 
prestige” (Valian 1999, p.3). In other words, minor instances of group-based bias add up 
to major inequalities. Indeed, expectations on any further performance will be influenced 
by our first evaluation, thus giving place to a self-confirmed process. Similarly, attributing 
to men and women different characteristics and attitude, we treat them in accordance with 
our expectations about those characteristics, thereby confirming hypotheses about the 
different natures of males and females. An example can be a work meeting, where often 
women talk less than men because they don’t feel recognized in their professional role. 
The consequence of a simple “rational” choice (not talking gives a minor disadvantage 
than talking without being listened) can provoke a disadvantage in terms of reputational 
career (Evetts 1996, Valian 1999).  
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V.2.2. The Mathilda effect 
Another interesting mechanism, foremost explored in the studies of women scientists, 
is the Mathilda effect. Named after the U.S. women’s rights activist Matilda Joslyn Gage, 
who first observed the phenomenon at the end of the 19th century, it was then used by 
Margaret Rossiter (1995) to describe the systematic denial of the contribution of women 
scientists in research, by attributing their work to their male colleagues. The Mathilda 
effect is strongly related to the Matthew effect, as women scientists’ contribution is as 
long as male scientists are the ones who often coordinate research groups or held the top 
positions in the scientific organisations and therefore enjoy higher visibility, while women 
are comparatively unknown. Rossiter provides many examples of the Mathilda effect. 
Rosalind Franklin, for example, is now recognized as one of the main contributors to the 
discovery of DNA structure but at the time her work was minimized in the distorted 
autobiographical account written by two of her male colleagues - Francis Crick and James 
Dewey Watson - who actually won the Nobel Prize after her death. Another case of theft 
of Nobel credit was Lise Meitner, who worked for decades with Otto Hahn on nuclear 
fission. In 1944, Hahn was awarded the Nobel prize for one of the biggest discovery of 
the century. An “happy ending” story comes instead from Frieda Robscheit-Robbins, the 
associate for thirty years of pathologist George Hoyt Whipple and the co-author of nearly 
all of his publications. After having being awarded the Nobel, in 1934, realizing the 
indebtedness to her and the injustice of the award, he decided to share the money with her 
and two other female assistants (Rossiter 1995).  
 
 
V.3. Gendered organisations 
In explaining the persistence of gender inequalities no matter the absence of normative 
(and therefore “visible”) barriers, many authors have focused on the functioning and 
characteristics of the organisations. The reasons of inequalities, they argue, must be 
searched inside the firms and in the organisation of work.  
Within this strand of literature, Kanter’s Men and women of the corporation (1977a) 
is still today considered a milestone in the studies of gender and organisations. In her 
ethnography in a big selling company, she analyses what happens when women are 
“token”, that is when they account for no more than 15% of the workforce. Her works 
35 
 
investigates the effects and the dynamics of tokenism: for example, the pressure on 
women’s performance (due to their higher visibility when they are few), their isolation in 
the organisation and from informal networks (the so called “old boy networks”), and their 
entrapment into pre-defined roles. Kanter gets deep into the description of the 
mechanisms of the male culture within organisations, arguing that the image of the top 
corporate manager include “a masculine ethic” (1977a) and provides a very precise 
description of the “role traps” in which women-token are confined in male-dominated 
organisations (1977b). However, in Kanter’ view, the dominance of the male culture is 
only a matter of numbers: the male culture is stronger as long as men outnumber women 
in a significant proportion. That’s why her approach, she says, can be generalized 
“beyond male-female relations to persons-of-one-kind and person-of-another-kind 
interaction in various contexts” (Kanter 1977b, p. 967). In other words, her models fits 
for any minority, for examples black workers in white-dominated occupations or also 
male workers in female-dominated occupations. Her implicit assumption is that once 
women will have reached the “critical mass”, gender inequalities will disappear.  
Many have criticized this “critical-mass” assumption by showing that women’s 
exclusion from the top positions occurs also in mix-sex occupations which have recently 
went through a process of feminization or by demonstrating the success of men in female-
dominated occupations (Yoder et al. 1996, Williams 1992). The case of medicine itself 
contradicts Kanter’s conclusions, where many studies have shown that gender 
inequalities persist no matter the feminization of this profession (Baker 1996, Hoff 2004, 
Sasser 2005, Carnes et al. 2008, Boulis and Jacobs 2010, Crompton and Lyonette 2011, 
Pas et al. 2011a, Magnusson 2015),  
No matter her “gender-neutral” approach, Kanter’s work has nevertheless shed light 
on many cliché about women at work. Stereotypes like “women are too rigid and 
aggressive to be good leaders”, “women don’t help other women”, “women are less 
committed to paid work because of their higher commitment to care work” have been 
explained by Kanter in terms of opportunities, power and numbers (Falcinelli 2009).  
If Kanter has explained stereotypes in terms of “material” constraints (numbers), the 
following “generation” of scholars in the study of gender and organisations – mostly post 
1980’s – adopted a “cultural” approach, focusing on “gendered” organisations and 
gendered identities (Acker 1990, Cockburn 1991, Gherardi 1995, Britton 2000). If, as 
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above mentioned, gender inequalities persist even when women have reached the critical 
mass, then Kanter’s “numerical” paradigm is not sufficient. In order to explains the 
persistence of this “paradox”, some scholars called into question the “gendered nature” 
of workplaces. The idea is that organisations are not gender-neutral but, on the contrary, 
they are defined and structured in terms of a distinction between masculinity and 
femininity which inevitably will reproduce gender differences (Britton 2000). Gender is 
a constitutive element of organisations which not only influences processes and identities 
but also reflects and preserves men’s interests. Indeed, organisations promote the idea of 
an “abstract worker” which, in reality, is based on male characteristics, with its “body, its 
sexuality, minimal responsibility in procreation and conventional control of emotions” 
(Acker 1990, p. 152). This idea includes being assertive and decision-maker, but also 
working extra hours, while never interrupting its career, for example, by taking parental 
leaves (Bombelli 2000). The so called “face-time” culture, evaluating employee’s 
performance more on the base of the time spent in the office than on their actual results, 
imply that (ideal) workers have no family responsibilities (Pateman 1988, Gherardi 1995, 
Wajcman 1998, Blair-Loy 2009). Being the ideal worker doesn’t only imply to be free 
from family responsibility: it also can mean to have a nonworking spouse at home who 
takes care of the children, of the house, and who support her husband’s career’s aspiration. 
The work contract imply a sexual contract, which make fathers and married man more 
likely to climb the career ladder than single and childless men (Pateman 1988). In other 
words, the gendered nature of organisations is based on, and reinforces, the gendered 
division of labour.  
Hence, the paid and unpaid division of labour between men and women is deeply 
intertwined with the gendered nature of organisations. When Crompton (2006) takes the 
distance from the “cultural turn” in the study of organisations, leading, in her opinion, to 
a considerable emphasis on the construction of sexual identities, her purpose is not to 
reject this kind of contribution, but to refocus the attention on its “material” origin: the 
sexual division of labour. There is a sort of “fundamental” priority of the sexual division 
of work which explains why the “stigma of motherhood” (Crompton 2006) affect all 
women, both mothers and childless women. Indeed, the sexual division of labour is both 
a material and a cultural device: as a material device, it reduces working mother’s time 
dedicated to paid work, thus negatively impacting their earnings and chances of 
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promotions. As a cultural device, it promotes the idea of an “ideal worker” with male 
characteristics, it affects employers’ expectation and evaluations on men and women’s 
work, it shapes individual “choices”.  
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Chapter 2 – The methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
Most of the studies on gender inequalities in the medical profession using quantitative 
data sources have been taken place in the United States, where federal and national 
datasets on physicians are available. Only a few studies have been conducted in Europe, 
and more specifically, at my knowledge, in UK (Crompton and Lyonette 2011), the 
Netherlands (Pas et al. 2011) and Sweden (Magnusson 2015). This study aims to fulfil 
the gap in the European literature by focusing on the Italian labour market.  
A dataset on more than a thousand of Italian (male and female) physicians has been 
used in order to investigate gender inequalities. An online survey has been sent to 2205 
physicians working in five hospitals in the Lombardy Region: the Policlinico Hospital in 
Milan, the Civil Hospital in Legnano, the Sant’Anna Hospital in Como, the San Donato 
Hospital in San Donato and a fifth hospital in Milan whose general direction asked to 
remain anonymous in order to participate. It will be called with a fantasy name: the 
Machado Hospital. The survey was sent in order to collect demographic, human capital, 
work and family characteristics. A few questions on work environment and the 
organisational culture have also been proposed. Out of 2205 physicians, 1074 answered 
the questionnaire, for a response rate of 48.7%.  
 
 
I. The S.T.A.G.E.S project  
This research is part of the European project S.T.A.G.E.S. (Structural Transformation 
to Achieve Gender Equality) at the University of Milan. Under the coordination of the 
Department for Equal Opportunities of the Italian Presidency of Council of Ministers, and 
assisted by a research centre specialized in gender and science (ASDO), five research 
Institutes/Universities from Italy, Germany, Denmark, Romania and the Netherlands have 
been implementing a self-tailored action plan in 3 strategic areas : women-friendly 
environment, gender-aware science, women's leadership of science. The project took start 
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in January 2012 and it will end in December 2020. It is made of two phases: the first 
phase (January 2012-December 2015) was devoted to the implementation of the action 
plan, while the second phase (January 2016-December 2020) will be devoted to ensure 
the sustainability of the plan. At the University of Milan, the project has been coordinated 
and implemented by the research centre GENDERS (Gender & Equality in Research and 
Science)13. The Centre has implemented an integrated set of actions aimed at triggering 
structural change processes to foster gender equality and equal opportunities by focusing 
on the faculties of agriculture and medicine, but also envisaging actions concerning the 
whole University and the territory (for further details on the S.T.A.G.E.S. project see the 
guidelines, Cacace et al. 201514). The research on gender inequalities on medical careers 
is one of the actions of the project.  
 
 
II. Field and methods 
At the University of Milan (UMIL), gender inequalities in academic-scientific careers 
persist throughout all disciplines. At the time when the action plan was drafted, 67% of 
the post-doctoral students and almost half of the researchers at the faculty of Medicine 
were women, while only 15% of women were full professors (Cacace et al. 2015). Such 
unbalance brought the S.T.A.G.E.S team to decide to devote an action of the plan to the 
study of the reasons of gender inequalities in medical careers. Since the beginning, the 
research was designed with the idea of focusing both on academic and hospital medical 
careers as, at UMIL, they are strongly intertwined. Indeed, the University of Milan itself 
was founded in 1924 by merging an ancient Academy of arts with the Policlinico 
Hospital15, which is the main Hospital in UMIL and the oldest one in town. Today, almost 
one third of UMIL employees work in the eight medical departments of the University.  
At first, the idea was to focus on a single case study, by entering into the Policlinico 
                                                 
13 The S.T.A.G.E.S project team at the University of Milan (UMIL) is composed by: Dr. Daniela Falcinelli 
(Team leader), Prof. Luisa M. Leonini (Scientific Responsible 2014-2015), Prof. Claudia Sorlini (Scientific 
Responsible 2012-2014), Prof. Bianca Beccalli, Prof. Maria Domenica Cappellini (head of Department of 
Internal Medicine and Medical Specialties at the Policlinico Hospital), Prof. Antonio M. Chiesi (head of 
the Department of social and political sciences at UMIL), Dr. Elena Del Giorgio, Camilla Gaiaschi, Prof. 
Marisa Porrini, Dr. Patrizia Presbitero. See www.stages.unimi.it Accessed on February 28th, 2016.  
14 The guidelines can be downloaded here: http://www.stages.unimi.it/news.php#25. Accessed on February 
28th, 2016.  
15 For further details on the history of the faculty of Medicine at the Policlinico Hospital: 
http://www.lastatale90.it/. Accessed on February 28th, 2016.  
41 
 
and conducting an organisational ethnography. This approach would have shed light on 
the micro-dynamics and daily practices that produce inequalities. By analyzing the every-
day experiences of people working in the hospital, it would have provided an up-close 
understanding of the mechanisms of gender discrimination. Nevertheless, this idea ended 
not to be realizable, as renovation works started a few weeks after the launch of the 
S.T.A.G.E.S project at UMIL. In a short time, the Policlinico became a giant open-air 
construction site whose works haven’t finished yet today. Many operational units were 
temporary displaced and physicians were often obliged to work in different buildings. 
This event had led the S.T.A.G.E.S team to discard the idea of conducting an 
organisational ethnography at the Policlinico. Conducting interviews was then taken in 
consideration but it didn’t seem – at least by itself – to adequately balance the loss of the 
advantages provided by ethnography and more specifically its in-depth analysis of the 
micro organisational dynamics. The team opted then for a (census) survey to sent to the 
whole population of the Policlinico with the idea of extending it to other hospitals. If the 
advantages of a single-case in-depth analysis would have been lost, the advantages of a 
large-scale survey could be at least taken. The research would have lost in details but it 
would have gained in representativity. Moreover, the idea of conducting interviews was 
not completely abandoned. If the quantitative data collection and analysis have been the 
object of the implementation phase of the S.T.A.G.E.S. project, a qualitative investigation 
will be realized during the sustainability plan (see conclusions for further details).  
After a long phase of contacts and bargains (see next paragraph), five hospitals of the 
Lombardy Region have been surveyed and a dataset of more than a thousand physicians 
was collected. Investigating gender inequalities in this specific population has its 
advantages and its limits. On one hand, it is a homogeneous population which allows to 
reduce unobserved heterogeneity as it is composed by very similar individuals in terms 
of educational and work investments. On the other hand, for these same reasons, one can 
say that it is not representative of the whole labour market as long as female physicians 
are not adequately representative of the general female labour force. The latter 
comprehends a very large spectrum of female workers, going from residual and part-time 
workers to high-skilled professionals working in high-performance jobs (Crompton 2006) 
characterized by long hours of work. Considering the two extremes of the spectrum, 
female physicians are much closer to the latter than the former.  
42 
 
However, as already mentioned in the introduction, if gender inequalities occur with 
respect to a very specific and committed population, it is very reasonable to think that 
they occur in a greater extent to the rest of the labour market. In other words, if 
discrimination occurs no matter if women are very similar to men (in human capital and 
work characteristics), it is likely to occur in a greater extent if women are much more 
heterogeneous among each-other and difference in work attributes, among women and 
with respect to men, are bigger. Moreover, the population of this research doesn’t only 
represent a very specific slice of the labour market – the physicians – but, within this 
slice, its excellence – the physicians in Lombardy. As a consequence, it is reasonable to 
think that if gender inequalities occurs among physicians in Lombardy, it is reasonable to 
think that they can occur not only in other similar (high-quality) contexts in Europe, but 
also in less efficient health systems in Italy.  
 
 
III. The access to the field: challenges and resistances  
Being part of a EU project has certainly helped in opening the field. The access to the 
Policlinico Hospital and to the San Donato hospital was made possible by, respectively, 
two members of the S.T.A.G.E.S. research group, that is the head of Department of 
Internal Medicine and Medical Specialties at the Policlinico and by the scientific 
responsible of the project. The access to the remaining three hospitals – the Legnano 
Hospital, the Como Hospital and the Machado Hospital – were made possible by the 
Health Department at the Lombardy Region, which is a partner of the project in the 
activities on gender medicine16.  
The three of them put me in contact with the “gate-keepers” of each organisation: the 
general director at the Policlinico, the general director in Legnano, the head of one of the 
emergency units in Como and two physicians in S. Donato and Machado who, in their 
turn, put me in contact with the vice-director of the Health Department of the former and 
the Human Resources team of the latter. The first four organisations (Policlinico, 
Legnano, Como, San Donato) were all very committed to gender equality and provided 
me with all the support I needed, also in terms of internal human resources (most of the 
                                                 
16 More specifically, the access to the three above-mentioned hospital was made possible by Dr. Maria 
Antonietta Banchero of the Health Department of the Lombardy Region.  
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time the IT and/or HR offices), during the research. This is not the case of the fifth 
organisation (the Machado hospital): the commitment of the human resource unit whom 
I’ve worked with – it is my impression – was only formal, their participation to the 
research drawn by the need to please the Health Department of the Region which strongly 
promoted it. As a consequence, they put many limitations in the research with respect to 
the number of physicians to be contacted and they didn’t provide me with all the 
information that I was looking for on the population. As it will explain later, this had an 
impact on the of the results. 
It is worth to mention that the five above-mentioned hospitals were not the only ones 
to be contacted. In total, ten hospitals have been asked to participate and only five 
accepted to enter into the research. I didn’t personally carry on the contact-phase at the 
very beginning: the STAGES project started in January 2012 but I have entered into the 
research group only in October 2013. At that time, the research group had already asked 
four hospitals holding an agreement with UMIL – among them the Policlinico – to 
participate. The Policlinico was the only one accepting their request. Two of them, at first, 
showed interest in entering into a European project but once they realized the aim of the 
research – mapping gender inequalities in their organisation – they didn’t go further. The 
third hospital actually accepted, the participation to the survey was approved by the board 
but the change of the general director stopped the negotiations. In the three cases, the 
actors in charge of the negotiations put “implicit resistance” to gender equality (Mergaert 
and Lombardo 2014) and no clear explanation was provided to the research group for 
their denial. Furthermore, in one of the three hospitals, a private one, such resistance 
clearly contradicted its public image of a women-friendly company. This mechanism is 
not new, as scholars have highlight the gap existing in many organisations between their 
good intents and their real implementation, suggesting that the former are sometimes only 
a marketing tool to ameliorate the company’s profile (Bombelli and Lazazzera 2014).  
No matter the failure in drawing the three hospitals into the research, the attempt 
required an important amount of time. The whole process – which implied choosing the 
hospitals, getting in contact with them, having meetings with the persons responsible for 
negotiating with the research team and providing all the documents they required in order 
to take a decision – started in January 2012. After my arrival, in October 2013, only the 
Policlinico hospital had agreed to be part of the research, putting its Equal Opportunity 
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Office and its IT Office at disposal in order to organize the survey. The first of the five 
surveys, which was conducted at the Policlinico, would have been sent in June 2014, two 
years and a half after the beginning of the project. Once entered into the project, while 
preparing the questionnaire I have contacted six further hospitals. Four of them accepted. 
Two didn’t. For one of them the denial was not due, at least at that phase of the 
negotiation, to any implicit or explicit resistance. On the contrary, the Equal Opportunity 
Committee of the Hospital was very interested in the research but it was already 
committed on a similar survey regarding employees’ wellbeing and work-life balance. 
Therefore, at that time it couldn’t engage its human resources in a second survey. The 
second hospital made open resistance. I was introduced to the president of the Equal 
Opportunity Committee of the hospital who tried hard to convince the general director to 
participate into the research. The director didn’t want to and the reason of his resistance, 
as he personally explained to me, was due more to the fear of making public the level of 
precarious work in the organisation (which is mostly female in any cases17) than to show 
gender inequalities.  
Over all, of the ten hospitals contacted, five participated to the survey while five did 
not. Among the five hospitals which didn’t participate, four have shown implicit or 
explicit resistance with respect to gender equality or, more in general, to social equality. 
Among the five hospitals participating, four have proved to be very helpful while one has 
in some way hindered the research as its engagement was strictly formal. I will come back 
to this point later.  
 
 
IV. The health system in the Lombardy Region 
The Italian National Health System (NHS), established in 1978, is universal and 
financed by the government through taxes. Nonetheless, the strong policy of 
decentralization, which has been taking place since the early 1990s, has gradually shifted 
powers from the state to the twenty-one Italian regions. As a consequence, the state now 
                                                 
17 Data are published in the Equal Opportunity Plan (“Piano di Azione Triennale”) of the organisation which 
was provided to me by the president of the Equal Opportunity Committee. The Equal Opportunity Plan is 
a document containing information on women and men’s career trajectories as well as a specific plan of 
actions to be implemented in order to foster gender equality. It is prescribed by law to all Public 
Administrations.  
45 
 
retains limited supervisory control and continues to have overall responsibility for the 
NHS in order to ensure uniform and essential levels of health services across the country, 
while regions have a strong autonomy in structuring and organizing their own health 
system (Nuti et al. 2012)   
The health system of the Lombardy Region is quite peculiar in the Italian context as it 
incorporates the principle of universal coverage and solidarity but, on the other hand, it 
promotes the development of a mixed system, made of public and private health care 
providers. In Lombardy, private hospitals represent one third of the entire offer. Patients 
can access to private providers at the same costs as if they went to public ones as services 
are reimbursed by the Region (Pelissero 2010). The promotion of the competition 
between public and private providers, alongside with the affordable costs of the latter, 
have settled the condition for the development of a very rich – in services and quality – 
offer which is able to attract many patients from all over Italy.  
According to data provided by the Health Department of the Lombardy Region18, there 
are 220 health care providers in Lombardy. Around one third of them are private and two 
third are public. Out of the 220 providers, 24 are University hospitals or IRCCS (“Istituti 
di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico”19). Lombardy has the highest concentration 
of medical schools in Italy, as 7 Universities (five public and two private) have a faculty 
of medicine and surgery (“Facoltà di medicina e chirurgia”). Out of the 24 IRCCS, four 
are public (among which the Policlinico). The whole health system in Lombardy provides 
employment for 100.000 workers, while 10% of the services are provided to patients 
coming from other regions. In some specialties, as oncology and the cardio-vascular area, 
the percentage of patients living outside Lombardy increases to 50%. Half of the stroke 
units in Italy are settled in Lombardy.  
 
 
V. The choice of the five hospitals 
The five hospitals were chosen in order to be as more representative as possible of the 
hospital system in the Lombardy Region. Out of the five hospitals, three are public 
(Policlinico, Legnano, Como) and two are private (S. Donato and Machado). Three are 
                                                 
18 Data were provided by Federica Petraglia, of the Health Department of the Lombardy Region.  
19 “Scientific Institutes for hospitalization and care” in Italian.  
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University hospitals or IRSCS (Policlinico, San Donato and Machado) and two are not 
(Legnano and Como). Among the three IRCCS, one is public (Policlinico) and two are 
private (San Donato and Machado). University hospitals hold an agreement with the 
University. This agreement has three main implications. First, some units (or all of them) 
are directed by full professors. Second, part of the medical work-force in the hospital 
(mainly in the top positions) is made by academic physicians20. Third, because of the 
presence of academic physicians and its tight link with the University, the hospital’s 
mission is double as it is focused not only on clinics and care but also on research (and 
teaching). On the contrary, “regular” hospitals don’t have any agreement with the 
University. As a consequence, their medical work-force is made only by hospital 
physicians focusing on clinics and referring to one single employer: the hospital.  
From a geographical point of view, two hospitals (Policlinico and Machado) are in 
Milan. Two hospitals (Legnano and San Donato) are in two small cities outside Milan 
which are part of the “metropolitan city”, a recently constituted administrative unit which 
has taken the place of the old province. Nevertheless, their location with respect to Milan 
is different. San Donato Milanese is 12 km away from downtown Milan and it is 
considered part of the bigger urban area, a sort of an annex to the city. It is located within 
the ring-road surrounding Milan and it is connected to downtown by the subway. 
Legnano, on the contrary, is 31 km away from downtown Milan, it is situated outside the 
ring-road and it is not connected with the subway. If the former is felt as being part of the 
city, the latter is not. Finally, the Como hospital is in the city of Como, which is not only 
another municipality but also another province, 50 km away from Milan, located closed 
to the Alps and besides the homonymous lake, near the Swiss border. As such, it 
represents the only hospital out of the five ones located in the regional territory.  
The five hospitals vary not only in terms of their sector (public vs private), vocation 
                                                 
20 Physicians can be either academic or hospital physician. Academic physicians can be either 
“convenzionati” (holding an agreement with the hospital) or “non convenzionati” (not holding an 
agreement with the hospital). “Non convenzionati” physicians are “pure” academic physicians. As such, 
they are mainly focused on academic research, they follow the academic career track and they refer only to 
one employer: the University. “Non convenzionati” physicians are quite rare. Indeed, most of academic 
physicians are “convenzionati”, thus holding an agreement with a hospital. As such, their activity is split 
between research and clinic and they follow a double career: as professor in their own University and as 
physicians at the hospital. As a consequence, they have two employers: the University and the hospital. 
Because in Italy academics earn less than physicians, the legislator has decided that academic physicians 
who are “convenzionati” must earn as much as their hospital colleagues (law 200/74). Therefore, their base 
salary is paid by the University and the rest is paid by the hospital.  
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(scientific or clinic) and geography (city vs province). They also show differences in their 
size. The Policlinico is the largest hospital reporting a medical population of 902 
physicians, followed by Legnano (721 physicians). Machado and Como are in the middle, 
with, respectively, 587 and 524 physicians, while San Donato is the smallest hospital 
reporting a medical population of 302 physicians, slightly less than one third of the 
Policlinico.  
 
 
VI. The data collection  
A questionnaire has been sent by email to the physicians of the five different hospitals. 
The data collection took from two to three months for each hospital and more than one 
year overall to be realized, starting in June 2014 and ending in July 2015. The first 
organisation in which the survey was realized was the Policlinico hospital, followed by 
Legnano, Como, San Donato and, finally, Machado. The physicians received the survey 
by email and each hospital contributed to advertise the initiative in its own specific way. 
San Donato and Como organized a public meeting with the heads of the units of the 
hospital in which the research team presented the survey and invited them to spread the 
word among their subordinates. Machado has announced the arrival of the survey in the 
letter containing the monthly pay. Policlinico and Legnano advertised the survey on their 
Intranet. After the first email containing the web link to the survey, at least three email 
recalls in each hospital have been made in order to foster the rate of response.  
The survey was conducted by the Laboratory of Opinion Polls (LID) at the University 
of Milan21. In two cases (Policlinico and Legnano), the hospital decided to handle the 
submission internally: the questionnaire’s link was sent by email by their IT offices and 
data were collected afterwards by the LID. In one case (Policlinico), the web link of the 
questionnaire was “universal” while in the other four hospitals was “personalized”. The 
universal link is the same for all physicians and, as a consequence, respondents can’t be 
identified if needed.  
                                                 
21 The Laboratory had the task to computerize the questionnaire through the software IdMonitor V 4.9.2., 
to send the questionnaire’s web link to the physicians by email, to collect data, match them with the dataset 
provided by the hospitals (through a numeric code associated to each cases) and deliver it to the research 
group on a Spss format. Afterwards, I have transported them into STATA and merged them in one single 
file. 
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Indeed, beside the dataset collected through the survey, each hospital provided me with 
a dataset containing information on its medical population (or, in the case of Machado, 
on part of it, see below). Each dataset contained different information on its physicians, 
like for example the type of practice, the gender, the rank, the specialty, etc.. Policlinico 
and Legnano provided me with the richest and most detailed datasets, while Machado 
was the least generous.  
 In the cases where the web link of the survey was personalized and the respondents 
where, as a consequence, identifiable (Legnano, Como, San Donato and Machado), the 
data collected through the questionnaire were “matched” with the dataset provided by the 
hospitals through a numeric code associated to each case. This has had an undoubtable 
benefit as long as it allowed me to avoid to pose the question (i.e. are you a male or a 
female?) when the information (i.e. gender) was already available and, therefore, to 
shorten the questionnaire and its time of compilation. Only in the case of the Policlinico 
the dataset drawn from the survey couldn’t be matched with the one provided by the 
hospital because of their choice to use a universal web link. As already mentioned, the 
universal link doesn’t offer the possibility to identify respondents, nor to matched them 
to a second dataset. For the same reason, if one day there will be the conditions to repeat 
this study in a longitudinal perspective, the Policlinico dataset will be unfortunately 
dropped. The Policlinico choice of using a universal link was due to the fact that the Equal 
Opportunity Office and IT office – with I’ve worked whom – explicitly asked us to do so 
in in order to guarantee the maximum level of privacy of the physicians.   
 
 
VII. The questionnaire  
The questionnaire aimed to collect information on physicians’ demographic, human 
capital, work and family characteristics as well as opinions on the work environment and 
the organisational culture. Sixty-six questions have been formulated in total, with their 
number varying according to the dataset provided by each single hospital, the type of 
practice22 and the answers given by the respondent. The questionnaire was written and 
                                                 
22 Many American scholars use the term “practice setting” to refer to the setting of the medical practice, 
which can be, for example, a solo practice, a group practice, a practice in hospital, in Hmo - Health 
maintenance organisation, at University, in government, etc.. The term practice setting emphasizes the 
“place” where a physician practices. On the contrary, I prefer to use the term “type of practice” (or simply 
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submitted in Italian and it can be found in appendix 1. Questions on demographic 
characteristics include the gender and the year of birth of the respondent. Questions on 
educational credentials include the grade of the medical degree, possible honors, the type 
of specialty and further educational titles (second specialty, PhD, masters, etc.). Questions 
on work-related human capital characteristics include the number of years of work 
experience, the number of years of seniority and the number of weekly work hours. With 
respect to work hours, respondents have been asked to specify how many hours they have 
worked within the organisation and outside the organisation to control for free-lance 
physicians working in more than one hospital. Physicians were also asked to provide the 
number of hours of private practice. In order to explore physicians’ propensity for 
mobility, they have been asked to provide the number of hospitals in which they have 
worked and if they are willing to move to another city in order to be promoted. 
Motivational drives have been explored by asking respondents why they have changed 
hospital (if they did) and why they work extra-hours (if they do).  
Questions on institutional work characteristics include the type of practice, the 
contract, the rank within the organisation and pay. The contracts are divided into four 
items: open-ended contracts, short-term contracts, contracts of collaborations/grants and 
free-lance contracts (in Italian “partita Iva”). Ranks are different between public and 
private hospitals (as the former follow the national collective agreement while the latter 
don’t) and also between the two private institutions, as each of them has signed its own 
specific union contract. Physicians in top positions have been also asked to specify the 
year in which they have been promoted. As for the pay, I have asked for the gross annual 
income in order to better assess the impact of private practice on total income. Finally, 
with respect to the specialty, this could have been assessed either by asking the specialty 
school or the operational unit in which the respondent works. The first of the two options 
                                                 
practice) as long as this research refers only to one type of setting or place (the hospital) in which different 
types of practice exist. I have operationalized the concept of type of practice in four categories: hospital’s 
employees, hospital’s free-lancers, hospital’s collaborators and academic physicians which corresponds to 
the items of the variable “practice” as it has been recoded (see paragraph IX). Such classification is based 
on the grids used by the hospitals in order to classify their medical working-force. As one can see, the 
concept of type of practice include both the type of career (i.e. academics vs hospitalists) and the type of 
contract (employees vs freelancers). There is a clear correspondence between the type of practice and the 
type of contract. Hospital employees’ are hired either with an open-ended contract or with a short-term 
contract. Hospital’s free-lancers have a free-lance contract. Hospital’s collaborators can have a contract of 
collaboration (either in the form of a co.co.pro. or co.co.co) or a grants or scholarship. Academic physicians 
can have all types of above-mentioned contracts. For all the details on the types of contracts, right and 
duties related to each of them, see next chapter, paragraph II.1 and II.2.  
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was preferred as the school classification is common to all the physicians of the five 
hospitals while operational units change from hospital to hospital and sometimes are not 
comparable.  
Many questions have focused on family-related characteristics. Respondents have 
been asked to declare whether they have a cohabiting partner or if they are married, if 
they are separated or divorced. The number of children was asked, as well as the number 
of children under 14 years old and living in the household. A specific set of questions 
investigates work-life balance issues. Respondents have been ask whether they 
experience a work-life conflict and for which reasons. Who cares for their children when 
they are at work and if they can count on a maid and/or a baby-sitter and for how many 
hours a week. Whether they do flexi-time or not and which level of time flexibility at 
work they can dispose. In order to assess the sexual division of work within the couple, 
respondents were asked how many hours a week they spend in nonpaid work, divided by 
type of activity (care for children, for the elderly, domestic, etc.). I have repeated the same 
question with respect to their cohabiting partner or spouse, asked for his/her occupational 
status and how many hours a week he/she works. Respondents were also asked whether 
they have a component in their family who is a physician and in which degree of 
relationship. A set of questions also relates to the time spent in parental leave (maternity 
leaves, paternity leaves and parental leaves).  
Most of the questions included in the survey aimed at collecting information on 
respondents’ characteristics. The underlying idea was to obtain as much information as 
possible in order to control for differences in individual attributes (between men and 
women) in the analysis of gender inequalities. In other words, to control for supply-side 
factors in order to assess the impact of gender discrimination in pay and career 
advancement. As long as it is possible via quantitative data collection, demand-side 
characteristics related to the work environment and the culture of the organisation were 
explored. Hence, respondents were asked whether they have faced any obstacle at work 
and which kind of obstacle among a set of pre-given answers (including sexual 
harassment and mobbing); whether they could count on somebody supporting their career, 
including possible role models or networks; what’s considered important in the 
organisational culture in order to progress the career. Demand-side factors question the 
role of structural conditions in producing gender inequalities. Certainly, experimental 
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research and qualitative methods are the most appropriate methods for investigating the 
mechanisms of discrimination as well as the functioning of gendered organisations and I 
am well aware of the limitations of the questionnaire as a tool to collect information on 
these aspects. This doesn’t mean that these aspects should be completely excluded from 
surveys as they provide useful suggestions which could be eventually deepen in through 
qualitative methodologies afterwards.  
 
 
VIII. The rate of response 
The survey was sent to 2436 email addresses through an email containing the web link 
to the questionnaire. In order to calculate the rate of response, the number of emails has 
to be corrected by subtracting those individuals who didn’t receive or should never have 
received the email. The number of email to subtract is 231 and it includes: wrong email 
addresses and full email boxes (77 emails), non medical professionals who were included 
in the email list by the hospitals by mistake (biologists, psychologists and dentists: 63 in 
total), residents (91)23. After having subtracted these cases to the original email list, the 
number of physicians included in the correct email list decreases to 2205. This is the 
number from which the rate of response has been calculated. As 1074 physicians 
answered the questionnaire, the rate of response is 48.7%.  
The rate of response varies significantly from hospital to hospital. Policlinico has a 
medical population of 902 physicians but the original email list provided by the hospital 
contained only 594 email addresses (see next paragraph). Subtracting wrong email 
addresses, full email box, non medical professionals and residents, the correct email list 
is reduced to 565 physicians. Out of 565, 249 physicians answered, for a rate of response 
of 43.6%. Legnano provided an email list of 759 physicians coinciding with the 
population. Subtracting wrong and full email addresses, non medical professionals and 
residents, the correct email list is composed by 711 physicians; 403 of them answered, 
for a rate of response of 56.68%. Como provided an email list of 533 physicians 
                                                 
23 Legnano, Como and San Donato provided me also with the email addresses of their residents. Machado 
and Policlinico didn’t (no matter two residents of the Policlinico were wrongly included in the email list 
and I had to take them out). Because of the lack of residents in two out of three email lists, I had to exclude 
them all as they wouldn’t have been representative of the whole population, especially considering that 
Policlinico has many residents because of its tight connection with UMIL.  
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coinciding with the population. The correct email list is composed by 498 addresses and 
239 physicians answered, for a rate of response of 48%. San Donato provided a list of 
402 physicians coinciding with the population. Considering the correct email list (288), 
the rate of response is 39.2% as 113 physicians answered. Machado has a medical 
population of 587 physicians but the email list provided by the hospital was composed 
only by 147 physicians (see next paragraph). The correct email list included 143 
addresses, 72 physicians answered for a rate of response of 50.3%.  
 
 
Tab. 1 – The number of respondents by hospital 
  Frequence Percent 
Policlinico 247 23 
Legnano 403 37.52 
Como 239 22.25 
San Donato  113 10.52 
Machado 72 6.7 
Total 1074 100 
 
 
 
IX. Population and email lists: a problem of under-coverage  
This research is based on a census survey as the questionnaire was sent to all the 
physicians working in each hospital, that is to the whole population without doing any 
sampling. Statistically speaking, the survey is representative of that specific population: 
the medical population in Policlinico, Legnano, Como, San Donato and Machado.  
As it is often the case in census survey, also this survey reports a problem of 
undercoverage (Dick 1995). The problem relates to Policlinico and Machado: part of the 
population of the two organisations was not recorded in the lists of physicians’ emails 
provided by the hospitals in order to send them the questionnaire. In other words, the 
elements (or the individuals) in the population didn’t fully correspond to the elements of 
the lists who would have been contacted by email. Therefore, a part of the population has 
not received the questionnaire, with some consequences in terms of representativity as it 
will be discussed in the next paragraph.  
As already mentioned, 565 physicians - out of 902 - were included in the Policlinico 
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email lists, while 147 - out of 587 - were included in the Machado email lists. In 
percentage term, the 63% of the Policlinico population and the 25% of the Machado 
population were “covered” by the survey, that is it was included in the email lists of the 
physicians who were contacted. The reasons of such exclusion were different depending 
on the hospital. Since the questionnaire was submitted by email, the condition for being 
in the email lists was to have an email account. Unfortunately, the Policlinico has a limited 
web provider and not all the physicians have a institutional email account, especially the 
precarious ones. Moreover, not everybody without an institutional email account has 
communicated his/her private email address to the IT office. Therefore, many physicians 
couldn’t be included in the list.  
A similar problem occurred for Machado, where many free-lance physicians don’t 
have an institutional email account. In this case, the HR office decided not to provide me 
with private emails evoking privacy reasons. Moreover, this was only one part of the 
problem: the HR office put explicit and further limitations in the number of physicians to 
be reached by the survey in order to participate, asking for the academics to be excluded. 
Privacy reasons were invoked also in this case, as academics refer to two employers: the 
hospital and the University. Moreover, the Hr office decided to exclude also physicians 
working less than 20 hours per week, supposing that they work in more than one hospital 
(as part-time work in the sector is residual) and therefore not considering them as 
representative of the organisation. I could made up only for the academics, as out of 
thirteen academic physicians working in the hospital (mostly head of units), twelve are 
UMIL professors, whose email address could easily found by asking to internal UMIL’s 
staff.  
 
 
X. The representativity of respondent data 
In order to test the representativity of the dataset, differences in characteristics – 
between respondents and non respondents – should be analysed. To do so, the statistics 
drawn from the respondents’ dataset should be compared to the statistics drawn from the 
email lists’ dataset, that is the dataset containing the information of the physicians to 
whom the questionnaire has been sent by email. In three cases (Legnano, Como, San 
Donato), the email lists provided by the hospitals coincided with the population while in 
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two cases (Policlinico and Machado) they did not. For Policlinico and Machado the best 
option, in order to test the representativity of respondent data, would have been to make 
a double comparison:  between respondent data and data based on the email lists and 
between respondent data and data based on the population. Unfortunately, this wasn’t 
always possible: for Policlinico the comparison was made on the population dataset while 
for Machado it was made on the email lists dataset. T-tests have been run in order to 
discover self-selection biases24. All descriptive statistics and t-tests are contained in 
appendix 2.   
With respect to the Policlinico, the statistics based on respondent data could be 
compared only with those based on the whole population as the email list of physicians 
used by the IT office to submit the survey didn’t contain any useful statistics to compare 
with, except for the email address (but without possibility of inferring the gender of the 
person). Therefore, no analysis of representativity on the email list of physicians 
contacted was possible. On the other hand, the hospital provided a rich dataset on the 
medical population which was nonetheless restricted only to 735 employees (out of 902 
physicians working at the Policlinico in total)25. Therefore, statistics based on respondent 
data could be compared with those based on a restricted population of 735 employees. 
The population dataset contained information on gender, rank, age and salary and no 
particular differences in the frequencies and means between the respondent data and the 
institutional dataset, except for a slight under-representation in the fourth and five step of 
the career ladder, have emerged. This problem would be in any case overcome as the 
“public” six-steps career scale of the Policlinico would have been merged, in the general 
respondent dataset, into a three-step ladder in order to harmonize all the different 
hospitals’ classifications (see appendix 2).  
As for Machado, the only information regarding the population provided by the 
hospital was its composition in terms of type of practice: out of 587 physicians, 376 are 
free lance physicians, 98 are (hospital) employees and 13 are academic physicians. The 
comparison between respondent data and population data was therefore possible only on 
                                                 
24 One-sample T-tests have been run in order to know, for each hospital, if there are significant differences 
in the mean of comparable attributes contained in the two datasets (population/email list dataset versus 
respondent dataset).  
25 Out of 902 physicians working at the Policlinico, 735 are employees (either with an open-ended or a 
short-term contract) and 167 are atypical workers (freelance or collaborators). Atypical workers were not 
included in the population dataset provided by the Policlinico.  
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the type of practice. The hospital provided me also with the email list of physicians to be 
contacted which was matched with the respondent dataset. Nevertheless, the email list 
contained only two useful information: the type of practice (divided in the three above 
mentioned categories) and the gender. The comparison between respondent data and 
email lists was therefore possible only on the base of two statistics. The comparison 
between email list dataset and respondent dataset doesn’t show any particular difference, 
while the gender results to be slightly mismatched, with 47% of male respondents versus 
51% of male physicians in the email list (see appendix 2)26. Unfortunately, this is not the 
case with the population. Because of the choice, by the HR direction of Machado, to 
exclude from the email lists those who don’t have an institutional email address, many 
free lance physicians were not covered by the survey. Therefore, they are strongly under-
represented in the respondent dataset. If in the population, free-lance physicians account 
for 77% of the entire medical work-force (that is 376 physicians out of 587), in the 
respondent dataset the free lance-employees ratio turns around completely, with 25% of 
respondents being freelance. Such under-representation of freelance physicians in 
Machado is due to the above-mentioned problem of under-coverage of the population 
(and more in particular of the freelance population) and it can bias the statistics, both 
descriptive and analytic. The possibility of weighting the dataset has been taken in 
consideration in order to have a better representativity in terms of the type of practice. On 
the other hand, the five datasets would have been merged in one single file, thus 
smoothing the mismatches between the population and the respondents. Moreover, I 
would have been careful in the analysis. Hence, descriptive analysis of the type of practice 
and the type of contract (which is linked to the type of practice) in Machado report both 
the statistics of the respondent dataset and the statistics of the population (chapter 3) to 
provide a better idea of the organisation. The model on the pay gap and the model on the 
vertical segregation don’t include neither the type of practice nor the contract among the 
explanatory variables (chapter 4), thus excluding those elements that could bias the 
results.   
As for Legnano, Como and San Donato, the analysis of representativity has proved to 
be simpler. The lists of physicians to be contacted by email coincided with the medical 
                                                 
26 One has to consider the low level of total respondents in Machado (72), which makes mismatches of this 
sort highly possible.  
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population of each organisation thus avoiding any problem of under-coverage.  Legnano 
has provided the list of emails physicians including their gender, practice setting, 
specialty, rank and seniority. Como email lists contained information on gender, practice 
setting and specialty. San Donato email lists contained information on gender, practice 
setting, rank, specialty and age. The comparative analysis of statistics has shown a 
substantial correspondence between the statistics of the respondent dataset and the 
statistics of the population except for a few ones. In Legnano, free-lance physicians are 
significantly under-represented (they are 3.9% in the population and 2.2% in the 
respondent dataset), while hospital employees are significantly over-represented (97.7% 
in the respondent dataset vs 95.5% in the population). As for the specialty, a slight under-
representation of physicians in surgery (28% among respondents vs 32% in the 
population) balances a slight over-representation of physicians in diagnostic (24% among 
respondents vs 21% in the population). On the other hand, in Como it is the medical area 
to be over-represented (50% in the respondent dataset vs 45% in the population), while 
surgery is slightly under-represented (24% vs 29%). Also the San Donato respondent 
dataset shows a relevant discrepancy with respect to the specialty: the medical area is 
over-represented, with 51% of respondents against a rate of 41% in the population. As a 
consequence, surgery and diagnostic are under-represented, with respectively the 22% 
and 24% of respondents against 28% and 30% in the population. The differences in 
distributions with respect to the specialty in the three hospitals are not significant, except 
for the over-representation of the medical area in San Donato. For all the comparisons of 
statistics and t-tests see appendix 2.  
 
 
XI. Recoding the dataset 
After controlling for the representativity of statistics, the five datasets were merged 
into one single file in order to analyse it. A very long work or recodification has proved 
to be necessary. Beside the usual and most simple codifications (i.e. transforming strings 
containing numbers into numeric variables, transforming multiple choice items in one 
single categorical variable, etc.), some challenging tasks had to be solved. First, many 
multiple-choice questions offered the possibility, to the respondent, of choosing an empty 
item in which he/she could write his/her personal answer. For example, with respect to 
57 
 
the question on the specialty, 110 physicians preferred to write his/her own specialty as 
they didn’t find theirs in the pre-given list. This was due to the fact that the items were 
based on the last ministerial classification of specialty schools (dating back at the end of 
the Nineties). Physicians who specialized before that reform may have not found the same 
specialty denomination and their answers had to be recode by comparing the different 
classifications. The analysis of the free answers related to the specialty also allowed me 
to identify those cases who were wrongly included by the hospitals in the email lists 
(dentists, psychologists, biologists: 20 in total).  
Recoding free items was necessary also with respect to the two questions made in order 
to assess the motivational drives (the first one associated with the reasons for changing 
hospital and the second one with the reasons for working extra hours): 192 and 154 “free 
answers” were recoded on the base of a content analysis. This has meant either to include 
the free answer into a pre-given item (if the free answer was very similar in the meaning) 
or to create a new item. For example: many physicians declared to have change hospital 
to be closer to home and to better commute. I didn’t actually think of that option while I 
was building the questionnaire: it was therefore add it ex-post.  
Second, many inconsistencies in the answers had to be corrected. Cross-checking the 
type of practice and the contract allowed me to discover that some employees have 
declared to have a free-lance contract, which is an oxymoron. Some free-lance physicians 
declared to have a regular contract, either in an open-ended or in a short-term form, with 
the hospital: another oxymoron. There were other single cases of inconsistency between 
the type of practice and the contract (i.e. a collaborator declaring an open-ended 
contract27). Once again, it was possible to disentangle these problems and recoding these 
cases by checking the information of each single physician with the HR offices of the 
hospitals.   
By cross-checking the contract and the rank, I also realized that a few physicians in 
private hospitals chose the wrong item with respect to the contract. For example, a few 
heads of a unit in San Donato declared to have a contract of collaboration which, in 
general, it is used for younger physicians. Luckily, having at my disposal the institutional 
dataset provided by the hospital, I knew that only three physicians in the whole 
                                                 
27 In this case, for example, this physician considered its contractual relationship with the hospital as an 
open-ended form of employment as its contract of collaboration was annually renewed. Formally speaking, 
it wasn’t.  
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organisation had a contract of collaboration. Therefore, they couldn’t be more than three 
respondents, which wasn’t the case. Checking the information by the HR office, I 
discovered that many of them, in reality, had a free-lance contract (partita Iva).  
Third and last challenge to mention, the answers related to the rank had to be 
harmonized. Public hospitals follow a national union contract while private hospitals have 
their own union contract which is different between San Donato and Machado. Public 
contracts include six steps, while the two private hospitals envisage, respectively, five and 
three steps. The only common step to the five hospitals was the last one: the head of the 
unit. As a consequence, the ladders of the three public hospitals (six steps) and Machado 
(five) had to be merged into the three-steps ladder of San Donato. This was done by 
analysing the mean age, experience and income par step and by hospital. Also in this case 
the HR offices’ precious collaboration helped me to understand the tasks and the 
responsibilities implied in each rank.  
Overall, the support of the human resources of the hospitals has certainly been 
fundamental. As doubts and problems arose little by little in the recoding phase and 
through out the analysis of the dataset, this has meant to contact them many times and 
counting on professionals who in some way believed in the project certainly helped. It 
wasn’t always the case as, for instance, collecting information and having adequate 
support in Machado hasn’t been simple. I had to insist and sometimes renounce to gather 
information (as in the case of population statistic, as they provide me only with the type 
of practice). Hopefully, this hasn’t had any impact on the recodification of the dataset.  
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Chapter 3 – The dataset 
 
 
 
 
 
Do men and women differ in human capital, work and family characteristics? Is this 
difference relevant? This chapter will answer to these two questions by presenting the 
descriptive statistics of physicians in the five health organisations. Coherently with the 
theoretical chapter, the findings will be presented distinguishing between human capital, 
institutional work and family characteristics. Human capital characteristics are divided 
between educational credentials on one hand and individual work characteristics on the 
other hand. Individual work characteristics include commitment and productivity and 
differ from institutional work characteristics not only because they provide information 
on human capital but also because of their subjective dimension28. Some of the 
characteristics described in this chapter will be used as explanatory variables for the two 
forms of gender inequality which will be discussed in the following chapter: the 
differences in pay and the differences in rank.  
The frequencies of the characteristics have been distinguished by gender and tested for 
significant differences using Chi2 tests for categorical variables and two-sample t tests 
for interval ones. Given that, on one hand,  the respondent dataset is representative of the 
population made by the physicians working in the five hospitals, tests provide information 
on the significance of the difference in characteristics between men and women with 
respect to that specific population.  
As for the structure of this chapter, the above-mentioned three groups of characteristics 
– human capital, work and family characteristics – correspond to three different 
paragraphs. Each paragraph ends with a summary table presenting the means of the main 
characteristics by gender with the results of the difference tests.  
                                                 
28 This is a conventional distinction. Many would use a different classification, arguing, for example, that 
the variable “hours of work”, doesn’t properly describe commitment, neither productivity. Sometimes work 
hours are not even a subjective “choice”, as it is the case of “forced” part-time work. This is certainly true 
and I also adopt this critical approach. However, one must not forget that the human capital is (also) a 
function of the hours spent at work and this is the reason why I’ve chosen to place such variable among 
individual work characteristics rather than institutional ones. 
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I. Human capital characteristics 
I.1. Age, experience and seniority  
Out of 1074 physicians, 553 are males (51.5%) and 521 are females (48.5%). Women, 
in average, are younger than their male colleagues: the mean age for women is slightly 
less than 48 years old, while the mean age for men is slightly more than 52 years old. As 
a consequence, women report, in average, a shorter work-experience than men in terms 
of years of work (17 years versus 21.6), as well as a shorter seniority, defined as the years 
of continuous work within the organisation in which they actually work: 14.1 for females 
years versus 16.4 for males (for means and t-test see table 3 at the end of paragraph I).  
 
 
I.2. Educational credentials and trainings 
Women graduate from medical schools with slightly better grades than men (108 vs 
107) and, among best-in-class students (that is students obtaining the maximum degree, 
which in Italy is 110/110), women tend to obtain special honors slightly more often than 
men (47.2% of best-in-class women obtained honors versus 40.8% of men). If women 
show better educational credentials up until the University, on the other side men tend to 
have more post-graduate titles. For instance, 26% of the male respondents hold two (or 
more) specialties against 16% of females (pvalue=0.000), while the difference shrinks 
with respect to Ph.D. (6.9% versus 5.2%, pvalue=0.2445).  
Results on further educational titles need further insights. The likelihood of having a 
second specialization or a Ph.D. changes between different cohorts. In general, older 
physicians are more likely to have a second specialty than younger ones, while younger 
physicians are more likely to have a Ph.D. than older ones (see table 1 and table 2 in 
appendix 3)29. Both phenomena are due to changes in law.  
With respect to the second specialty, the reform of specialties schools in 1991 has 
strongly decreased the likelihood of having more than one single specialty. The decree 
                                                 
29 The mean age for physicians holding more than one specialty is almost 58 years, while those without a 
second specialty are 48 years old in average. The mean age for physicians holding a Ph.D. is 44,5 years 
old, while the mean age of those without is 54,5 years. Age significantly increases the likelihood of having 
a second specialization (beta=0,1459, p=0.000), while significantly decreases the likelihood of having a 
Ph.D (beta=-0,0643; p=0,000). See table 1 and table 2 in appendix 3.   
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law no. 25730 established that specialty schools were a “full-time” and remunerated 
activity. Eight years after, with the decree law no. 368/199931, a further element was 
introduced: such activity must be regulated by a contract (between the resident and the 
hospital) which is renewable each year. In other words, if before the 1990’s physicians 
were used to take a second or even a third specialty while working, as a form of permanent 
training, the reorganisation of the school system made this option hardly feasible. Today, 
if one takes a second specialty he/she will likely “abandon” his/her own career trajectory 
and start from the beginning a new one. This has certainly decreased the number of 
physicians holding more than one specialty among younger generations.  
For similar reasons, but with opposite results, the likelihood of having a Ph.D. has 
increased among younger generations. In this case, a reform at University level occurred. 
The Ph.D. was introduced in Italy in 1980 with presidential decree no. 38232 and only 
recently, it has become, even if informally, a necessary step for climbing the academic 
career-ladder. Today, many full professors don’t hold a Ph.D., as it wasn’t required at the 
beginning of their career, while both assistant and associate professors, who are much 
younger, do. It is interesting to notice that only three academic physicians in the dataset 
(out of thirty-three in total) have a Ph.D. Indeed, most of the academic physicians (23) 
are heads of units as – at least in University Hospitals – being an academic is a necessary 
(even if informal) requirement to reach the top positions in the organisation. Therefore, 
their age, as a group, is higher than the average (56,4 the mean age for academics against 
49,9 for non academics) and this explains why they rarely hold a Ph.D.  
The cohort effect on the likelihood of having a second specialty and a Ph.D. has some 
important implications for women. With respect to the second specialty, it is also because 
of their late entry in the medical profession and, as a consequence, of their younger age 
(in average), that women are less likely than men to hold a second specialty. In other 
words, the relation between gender and the likelihood of having a second specialty is  
“spurious” and influenced by age (see table 3 and 4 in appendix 3). This is confirmed by 
the higher percentage of women holding more than one specialty among younger cohorts. 
                                                 
30 See law at: http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:1991;257. Accessed 
on February 27th, 2016.  
31 See law at: http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/deleghe/99368dl.htm. Accessed on February 27th, 2016.  
32 See law at: http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/normative/normativa_consolare/.../dpr_382_1980.pdf. Accesed 
on February 27th, 2016.  
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Considering all cohorts, women are less likely than men to hold a second specialty. But 
if one considers only the respondents who are less than 57 years old, they actually are 
more likely than men to hold one: up until that age, 9.8% of women against 8.4% of men 
hold a second specialty. Considering the respondents who are 57 years old or more, the 
percentages overturns: 36% of women against 49.7% of men (p-value never significant) 
(see table 5 and 6 in appendix 3). Since most of the physicians holding a second specialty 
are concentrated among respondents who are 57 years old or more (70% of them), the 
gender gap in the second specialty of the whole population reflects the gender gap in the 
older generations.  
No matter the two groups (respondents holding a second specialty who are less than 
57 years old and respondents holding a second specialty who are 57 years old or more) 
are not equally distributed and the differences not significant, their comparison is 
nevertheless quite interesting because it provides useful suggestions on the effects of the 
above-mentioned 1990s school reform in a gendered perspective. That is, the older group 
did not experience the effects of the reform while the younger did. Before the reform men 
were more likely to obtain a second or a third specialty while after the reform women 
were. Obtaining a second specialty before the reform was more or less equivalent to 
follow a permanent training while working already as a physician, without any effect in 
terms of the career progression. The lower percentage of women holding a second 
specialty among “pre-reform” physicians may therefore be due to their greater family 
responsibilities, and/or to lower employer’s investments in female human capital. On the 
contrary, obtaining a second specialty after the reform means to start again from the 
beginning as a resident in a new specialty thus stopping the career progression. The lower 
percentage of men holding a second specialty among “post-reform” physicians may be 
due to the fact that, today, they are less likely than women to follow non-linear career 
trajectories which are less rewarded in terms of pay and leadership (Jacobs 1989).  
With respect to the Ph.D., women are less likely than men to hold a Ph.D. than men: 
out of 65 Ph.D. respondents, 27 are female and 38 are male but, as above mentioned, the 
difference is not significant. Being a female significantly decreases the likelihood of 
holding a Ph.D. only controlling for age (see table 7 and 8 in appendix 3). Analysing 
frequencies by cohorts, it appears that this is due to younger generations. Younger 
physicians (both female and males) are more likely to hold a Ph.D. because of the 
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relatively recent introduction of the Ph.D.s in Italy and, contrary to older cohorts, show a 
significant gender difference. Indeed, the between-group difference in the likelihood of 
holding a Ph.D. is significant only considering respondents who are less than 46 years 
old: 8.6% of women in this cohort hold a PhD against 15.9% of men (table 9 in appendix 
3).  
The lower level of women holding a PhD in the five hospitals is inconsistent with 
general data on the medical population in the labour market: according to the last She-
Figures report published by the Directorate General for Research and Innovation of the 
European Commission, women account for 63% of PhD Italian students in the welfare 
and health field of study33. Data from the University of Milan confirm the national trend, 
with a percentage of female PhD students in the Health Department at 67.9% (see scissor 
diagram of the academic staff in UMIL and in the UMIL’s health sector: figure 1 appendix 
3). Hence, no matter a higher female Ph.D. supply in the labour market, hospitals keep 
hiring more male Ph.Ds. This finding runs counter neoliberal theories which emphasise 
supply-side factors in the explanation of gender inequalities. According to this approach, 
lower rate of female employment are due to lower levels of female supply in the labour 
market. Data collected in five hospitals in the Lombardy Region suggest the opposite.  
Why is there this discrepancy? Why do women Ph.D. are less likely to be working in 
hospitals in comparison to men PhDs? From the data collected it is not possible to provide 
an answer to this question. Further investigation are required. Two different hypothesis, 
paralleling two different theoretical approaches, could be tested. According to the first 
hypothesis, women with a Ph.D. may choose to follow the “pure” academic career and 
prefer to work in University. Data from the University of Milan showing a majority of 
women in the Health sector up until the step of the post doc confirms this possible 
explanation (see figure 1 in appendix 3). According to the second hypothesis, employers 
may discriminate women with a Ph.D. by favouring men with the same title. If this is the 
case, male Ph.Ds would be “ranked” ahead female Ph.Ds by employers, following a 
mechanism of “gender queue” (Reskin and Ross 1990).  
 
 
                                                 
33 Report available at: http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document_library/pdf_06/she-figures-
2012_en.pdf. Accessed on February 27th, 2016.  
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I.3. Individual work characteristics: mobility, motivational drives and hours of 
work 
Unlike the general population, physicians represent a quite homogeneous group in 
terms of human capital characteristics. Indeed, they all have invested many years in their 
education (at least 10, including the specialty) and they all have chosen a profession 
requiring long hours of work, as, at least in Italian hospitals, it rarely provides the 
possibility of part-time arrangements. No matter such homogeneity, gender differences 
still persist.  
The descriptive statistics of what many would ascribe as proxies of commitment and 
productivity, that are the willingness to move, the motivational drives and the hours spent 
at work, will be now presented. A preliminary remark must be done. If it is certainly 
important to control for these characteristics (and more specifically work hours) while 
modelling the determinants of gender inequalities, one must be aware of their inadequacy 
in providing information on commitment and productivity. They are useful tools, but to 
handle carefully. Two reasons must be advocated. First, as for any human capital 
characteristic, one must not forget the impact of structural constraints (i.e. the sexual 
division of work) and indirect discrimination in engendering different levels – if there are 
any – of “commitment” and “productivity”. Second, they are what they are: only proxy. 
The hours of work can tell us very little about commitment and productivity as one can 
reduce the hours of work while being as much (if no more) productive than those who 
work longer as Sasser (2005) has shown with respect to women physicians.   
 
 
I.3.1. Mobility  
Having made this clear, one can investigate these characteristics while keeping a 
critical approach on them. Hence, studies show that women are less likely to move (Xie 
and Schauman 2005, Wacjman and Martin 2003, Falcinelli 2009), but one must not forget 
that this may be due, for example, to major family responsibilities. The dataset confirms 
the literature: men are more willing than women to move 100 km away in case of a good 
professional offer coming from another hospital: 69.5% of males would accept that offer 
against 45.1% of females. On the contrary, no strong gender difference is found with 
respect to the portfolio career: men have changed, in average, 2.4 hospitals, against 2.2 
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for women. Mobility has been investigated also in terms of international training and 
work experience: if male respondents have spent slightly more than five months abroad 
for work and/or training, female respondents have spent slightly less than three months 
(see table 3 for summary statistics at the end of the paragraph).  
 
I.3.2. Motivational drives  
Respondents were asked if they have changed hospital at least once in life and the 
reasons why they did, with the possibility of providing multiple answers34.  In total, 703 
respondents have changed hospital at least once and 764 reasons were provided, divided 
into twelve items.  
 
Table 1  - Reasons for having changed hospital, multiple response 
 
                                                 
34 703 physicians have changed at least one hospital. They could choose between six items providing the 
reasons of their last transfer: more money, better work, too many hours, to follow the partner, bad work 
environment, all other reasons. Respondents choosing the item “all other reasons” had the possibility to 
specify the reason of their transfer in the form of a short (free) text. Because of the multiple choice option, 
764 answers were provided in total and 204 in the form of a free text. Many of the free answers were easy 
to recode. In particular, I have recoded 164 free answers, out of the 204, into six new items: to be closer to 
home, for a better work-life balance, for advancing in the career, for a better contract, for the restructuring 
of the organisation (closing of previous hospital or department), because I wanted to work in a public 
hospital. After recoding, the number of cases belonging to the item “all other reasons” was reduced to 40.  
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Almost half of the physicians (360) have changed hospital to do a better job, that is for 
advancing in their research, receiving more training or simply because they were looking 
for a more interesting activity. The second most chosen item is the increase in the salary 
(139 physicians), followed by the choice of following the partner (75) and the existence 
of a bad environment/hostility of colleagues and/or bosses (59). Forty-one respondents 
declared they needed to work closer to their house, while only eleven respondents 
specified that it was for family reasons: I have decided to distinguish these respondents 
in a specific item named “work-life balance reasons”. Worth of mention that 39 
respondents declared to have changed hospital in order to have a better contract, which in 
most cases was an open-ended contract. As open-ended contracts are rare in private 
hospitals, these cases partly coincide with a passage from a private to a public hospital.  
Analyzing the answers by gender, only three items show a significant difference 
between men and women: men are significantly more likely to change hospital for doing 
a better job (p=0.002) and for advancing in the career ladder (p=0.002), while women are 
significantly more likely to change hospital for a better contract (p=0.000). As it will be 
clear in the next paragraph, women are concentrated in less stable contracts than men and 
this certainly explains the higher percentage of female physicians who have changed 
hospital for ameliorate their contractual position. Women are more likely to change to 
follow the partner while men are more likely to change for money but the differences are 
not significant, while women and men are very similar in their answers with respect to 
commuting (21 vs 20)  and work-life balance (6 vs 5).  
Physicians’ motivation has been tested through a second question. Respondents 
working extra hours (basically everybody, that is 1051 physicians out of 1074) were asked 
why they stay longer at work through a multiple-choice question35. In total, 1911 answers 
were provided divided into eight items. No items shows a significant difference between 
the two groups (males and females). Only the “advancement-in-career” motivation is 
                                                 
35 Respondents could choose among six items with the multiple choice option: it’s not a choice as it is 
required by the organisation/the type of work; to gain more money; to enhance my skills and grow 
professionally; to advance in the career ladder; because of a sense of responsibility towards patients; all 
other reasons. As for the previous question, respondents choosing the option “all other reasons” had the 
possibility to specify the reasons of their working extra-hours in the form of a short text. Eighty-nine 
respondents choose to write their own answer. Many of these answers were attributable to the five items 
provided in the questionnaire. Others (28) were easy classifiable into two new items: for lack of 
colleagues/human resources; for doing research. After recoding, the number of cases belonging to the item 
“all other reasons” was reduced to 12.  
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“almost” significant at 90% CI (p=0.0509) with men more likely to choose it but the cases 
are too few (19).  
 
 
Table 2 – Reasons for working extra hours, multiple response 
 
 
 
Both questions on motivation – the former being linked to having changed hospital 
and the second to working extra hours – don’t follow clear female and male stereotypical 
patterns. Within the literature on gender differences in motivations or job “rewards” 
(Mottazl 1986, Pelletier et al. 1995, Konrad et al 2000, Rusillo 2004), scholars tend to 
distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations/rewards. The former refers to 
inherent satisfaction or pleasure in performing certain activities without expecting any 
reward; the latter refers to the tendency to perform activities for external rewards, whether 
they are tangible (money, power) or psychological (praise) (Brown 2007). Some studies 
have highlighted the existence of gender differences in motivations, thus arguing that 
women tend to be more “intrinsically” motivated (Pelletier et al. 2005), while men are 
more “extrinsically” motivated (Rusillo 2004). Other studies have contested this idea, by 
showing that either there is no significant gender difference in job rewards (Mottazl 1986) 
or that differences don’t follow stereotypical patterns (Konrad et al. 2000). This study 
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substantially support this second strand of arguments.  Except for the advancement in the 
career ladder, which is a significant male characteristic with respect to the reasons for 
changing hospital and significant at 90% level with respect to the reasons for working 
extra hours, women and men don’t seem to follow the extrinsic-intrinsic schema.  
Sometimes they actually reverse it, as men are more likely to have changed hospital for 
the job in itself (intrinsic motivation) and women for a better contract (extrinsic 
motivation). Significant gender difference, moreover, has not been identified neither with 
respect to pay nor with respect to responsibility towards patients or to commuting/work-
life balance.  
 
I.3.3. Hours of work 
Women physicians tend to work fewer hours than men after marrying/having children 
(Hinze 2000, Jagsi et al. 2012) even though Sasser (2005) highlights that such reduction 
in working hours doesn’t lead to a reduction in productivity. She operationalizes 
productivity as the hourly wage and finds that, having made significant investments in 
human capital, women physicians are able to preserve their hourly earning potential while 
working fewer hours (Sasser, 2005).  
In the five hospitals analysed, men tend to work slightly more than women, and more 
specifically less than three hours a week: 47.78 hours against 44.97 hours in average. 
Nevertheless, this difference decreases to 1 hour and 20 minutes if the time spent in doing 
private practice is not taken into account (see table 3 at the end of the paragraph I). In 
other words, considering only the hours of work spent within and for the hospital, the 
difference in work hours between men and women is about 1 hour and twenty minutes 
per week.  Indeed, men tend to do more private practice, which is more lucrative, than 
women: 3.7 hours a week for males against 2 hours for females. Part-time work is residual 
among physicians, with no big difference between men and women. Only 13 physicians 
–  6 men and 7 women – work less than 20 hours, their number increases up to 34 
considering those who work less than 30 hours (22 women and 12 men). These data are 
not surprising: unlikely many North-European countries where part-time work is 
widespread, in Italy it is not as much. According to Eurostat data, no matter the recent 
growth in part-time work, the percentage of part-time workers in Italy is 18.4% in 2014, 
slightly less than the EU17 average (22.5%) and much less than countries like the 
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Netherlands (50.4%), Germany (27.6%) and UK (26.8%)36. This is particularly true for 
most high-qualified professions, where part-time work is barely absent and long hours of 
work are required.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 EUROSTAT (2015), Persons employed part-time, EUROSTAT Employment Statistics.  
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00159&plugin=1 
Accessed on February 27th, 2016.  
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Tab 3. Human capital characteristics, mean or percentage37 and difference test 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
37 The percentage refers to the percentage of women (or men) holding that specific characteristic with 
respect the total number of women (or men).  
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II. Institutional work characteristics  
II.1. The type of practice and type of contract 
Out of 1074 physicians, 36 are academic physicians, that are professors working in the 
hospitals, while 1038 are “pure” hospital physicians. Besides the type of practice 
(academics vs hospitalists), respondents have been distinguished according to their type 
of contract. Indeed, the literature on gender inequalities in medical careers has much 
focused on vertical and horizontal segregation (Lorber 1984, Boulis and Jacobs 2010, 
Jagsi et al. 2011, Spina and Vicarelli 2015, Kass et al. 2006, Carnes et al. 2008,), as well 
as on the pay gap between men and women (Becker 1996, Hinze 2000, Hoff 2004, Sasser 
2005, Weeks et al. 2009, Jagsi et al. 2012). Nevertheless, not much attention has been 
addressed to gender differences in the types of contracts.  
As in many European countries, over the past decades Italy has recorded an increase 
in the use of atypical employment. Flexible contracts are particularly widespread among 
women and young workers (Barbieri and Schrer 2009), while the traditional “protection 
effect” of high education against unemployment and underemployment has recently been 
eroded by the economic crisis (Murgia and Poggio 2014). In the health sector, the most 
common a-typical employment are: short-term contracts, consultancy (partita Iva), 
contracts of collaboration (which takes two forms: the “continuous and coordinated 
collaboration” or co.co.co. and the “collaboration on a project” or co.co.pro.), the grant 
or scholarship (“borsa di studio”). Short-term contracts are atypical contracts envisaging 
a relationship of subordination with one employer, thus providing almost the same 
benefits of an open-ended contract in terms of welfare benefits and career progression, 
allowing physicians to enter into a sort of “tenure track”. As for the consultancy (“partita 
Iva”), it is a form of self-employment regulated either by a contract or not (with the 
physician simply issuing an invoice to the hospital). As such, it should not avoid 
physicians to work in more than one hospital as a free-lancer. Nevertheless, as in other 
professions in Italy (i.e. lawyers or architects), many free-lancers work full-time in one 
single hospital, exactly as their colleagues who are officially hired. In these cases, the 
free-lance contract becomes a pseudo form of self-employment which implies the same 
obligations (but not the same benefits) of a regular contract. The contracts of collaboration 
(co.co.co and co.co.pro) are temporary contracts with no relationship of subordination 
and very little benefits (even in terms of unemployment schema). Introduced by the 
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reforms on labour market de-regulation of the mid-nineties, the co.co.co. has been 
substituted by the co.co.pro. in 2003 through the so-called Biagi law, which forced 
employer to link the contract to a specific project. As for the grant, it is a scholarship 
provided either by Universities or private Foundations (or both) to young physicians once 
they have ended their residency. It often lasts one or two years and it doesn’t provide any 
sort of welfare benefits. Considering the duration and the lack of benefits provided, grants 
and contracts of collaborations are very similar.   
No matter the growing flexibilisation of the labour market in the health sector, the 
open-ended contract remains the most common contract in the three public hospitals, 
where from 80% to more than 90% of physicians, depending on the hospital, hold a 
permanent contract and only a residual part of the workforce (from 1.2% to 5.4%) has a 
free-lance contract. In private hospitals, on the contrary, the free-lance contract is the rule. 
It accounts for more than 83% of total contracts in San Donato. As for Machado, the 
percentage “decreases” to 29% (see tables38). Nevertheless, because of the above-
mentioned discrepancy between the email lists provided by the hospital and the 
population, the rate of free-lance contracts in the Machado dataset is not representative 
of the population. According to institutional data, free-lance physicians accounts for 77% 
of total physicians, while the rest is made of open-ended contracts39. 
Hence, public hospitals tend to offer permanent contracts while private ones make a 
larger use of atypical employment, especially free-lancers. This difference have some 
important implications in terms of career progression. Being a freelancer in a private 
hospital is perfectly compatible with the fact of holding top positions. Actually, many 
heads of units, either academics or hospitalists, have a free-lance contracts which are very 
well paid. On the contrary, in public hospital, except for a few number of retired 
physicians who continue to work as consultant, freelancers are often young and out of the 
career-ladder, as long as collaborators or grant-fellows. The “meaning” of being a free 
lancer is completely different whether one works in public or in private hospitals. Being 
                                                 
38 The frequencies on the type of contract in the respondent dataset are illustrated in tables 10 and 11 in 
appendix 3. 
39 The frequencies in the type of setting in Machado comparing the population and respondents are 
illustrated in table 12 in appendix 3. The comparison has been made on the base of the type of setting since 
it is the only data provided by the hospital on the population. The type of setting distinguishes between 
academic physicians and hospital physicians. Within hospital physicians, it distinguishes among employees 
(who can hold either an open-ended or a short-term contract), freelancers (“partita Iva”) and collaborators 
(co.co.co/pro or grants) 
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a freelancer in public institutions means to be an “outsider” who won’t necessarily be part 
of the organisation one day, while being a free-lancer in private hospitals doesn’t mean 
anything less than being a regular “hired” physician in terms of career progression and 
pay (but not in terms of welfare schema). In San Donato being a free-lancer is the rule: 
298 physicians out of 302 are freelancers, the rest is made by one open-ended employee 
and three collaborators. Out of the three collaborators, two of them are, respectively, vice 
and head of unit. Like freelancers, also collaborators in San Donato can hold top positions.  
Having made this clear, differences in contract between men and women will be now 
investigated. Because of the small number of cases holding a grant or a contract of 
collaboration (11), the variable contract has been recoded in three items by merging the 
contracts of collaboration and the short-term contracts in one single category as they both 
are a form of atypical employment presenting lots of common characteristics, no matter 
if the short-term contract is a better contract than the collaboration. They are a form of 
precarious employment, often seen as a passage before recruitment much used in public 
hospital, where they are offered (mostly) to young people (the mean age is 39.5 for 
co.co.pro. vs 40.7 for short-term) and women (10 women out of 11 in co.co.pro and 57 
out of 97 in short-term).  
Data suggest that women are less likely to hold a stable (and more remunerative) 
contract than men are: 74% of women against 78% of men hold an open-ended contract, 
while 13% of women against 7% of men hold either a co.co.pro/co, a grant, or a short-
term contract. No much difference persists with respect to free-lance contracts (13% of 
females vs 15% of males) (see table at the end of the paragraph II). Worth to mention that 
“bad” atypical contracts (co.co.co/pro and grants) are the less remunerative ones, while 
“good” ones (free-lance contracts) are the most remunerated ones. And even within each 
category, gender differences in pay persist as it shown by the following table:  
 
 
Table 4 – mean income by gender and contract (n. observations: 1002) 
  Men Women total 
Short-
term/co.co.co/grants 60221 47778 52139 
Free-lance 107923 62241 87384 
Open-ended 84324 65421 75506 
total 85973 62738 74773 
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II.2. The horizontal segregation: institutional characteristics and specialty  
Women tend to cluster in less remunerative types of organisations and specialties 
(Sasser 2005, Boulis and Jacobs 2010, Crompton and Lyonette 2011). In the dataset, 84% 
of women work in a public hospital, against 81.5% of men. There is a slight tendency, for 
women, to cluster in public institutions but the difference is not significant. This result is 
consistent with Hinze (2000) but not with Jagsi et al. (2012) who finds a higher propensity 
for women to work in private organisations. Public institutions offer better schedules and 
slightly shorter hours of work: in private hospitals physicians, considering both males and 
female, work around 48.7 hours a week, compared to the 46.5 hours worked in public 
hospitals, for a difference of two hours.  
Gender segregation is evident also in the gender composition of each specialty (Baker 
1996, Hinze 2000, Sasser 2005, Magnusson 2005, Boulis and Jacobs 2010, Crompton and 
Lyonette 2011, Jagsi et al. 2011 and 2012, Magnusson 2015). The Italian Ministry of 
education, universities and research clusters specialties in four areas: medicine, surgery, 
diagnostic and public health. In the respondent dataset, more than half of the female 
workforce (and precisely the 56%) work in the medical area (against 40% of males) while 
only 16% of them is a surgeon, against 35% of men. The diagnostic area appears to be 
the most balanced one, with 24% of female physicians working there against 21% of men. 
The public health area is made of only 30 cases (17 men and 13 women), which makes it 
difficult to draw conclusions. The medical area includes twenty-three specialties like for 
instance general medicine, internal medicine, dermatology, haematology, endocrinology, 
gastroenterology, neurology, paediatrics, psychiatry, etc.. Some specialties are more 
“gendered” than others: in neonatology and rheumatology 80% of physicians are females. 
High female rates can also be found in paediatrics (67,5%), radiotherapy (66,7%), 
neuropsychiatry (60%), while psychiatry exhibit a lower proportion of women (56,2%).  
If women are clustered in the medical area, men are more concentrated in the surgical 
one, where, out of ten physicians, seven are males and three are females. The highest level 
of segregation occurs in oral and maxilla-facial surgery (91%-9%), orthopaedics (88%-
12%), urology (88%-12%), hearth surgery (83%-17%), general surgery (77%-23%), 
vascular surgery and otorhinolaryngology (both at 75%-25%). A traditionally male-
dominated branch – at least in Italy – like genecology has experienced a strong 
feminization in the last years: now 49 physicians out of 100 are females. Only two surgical 
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specialties, out of thirteen, appear perfectly gender-balanced: paediatric surgery and 
neurosurgery, where the proportion of males and females is 50%-50%. Together, the 
medical and the surgical area cover the 74% of the entire medical population. Considering 
also the diagnostic area, which is the third most populated area, the three areas represent 
up to 96.3% of physicians. The diagnostic area is quite gender balanced, with a slight 
majority of women working in (51 out of 100). More than half of the physicians in this 
area (58%) and three quarter of physicians  concentrated in two specialties: anesthetic and 
intensive care, which are both female dominated: 54%-46% is the proportion for the 
former and 5%-4% is the proportion for the latter. 
 
 
II.3. The vertical segregation: the career steps  
Studies on medical careers have shown that women physicians concentrate in lower 
steps of the career ladder and progress more slowly through steps (Carnes et al. 2008, 
Boulis and Jacobs 2010). Data based on the five hospital in Lombardy confirm the 
existence of a mechanisms of vertical segregation among physicians. In order to 
investigate whether women and men are differently positioned within the organisational 
structure, the different career ladders have been harmonized taking in consideration the 
differences between public and private hospitals. The former follow the national contract 
for physicians in the public sector, made of six formal ranks. The two private hospitals 
have their own contract, made of three (for San Donato) and five (for Machado) ranks. I 
have re-categorized the steps on the base of a content analysis and through the comparison 
of elements such as age and income in order to create one single career ladder.  
The result is a ladder made of three ordinal ranks. The first level gather the first two 
steps of public hospitals, the first level of San Donato and the first two levels of Machado. 
For those physicians who will never be promoted, this level can be at the same time the 
first and the last step of their career: one can retire with a “first level” position with her/his 
salary being determined by merely seniority or accomplished targets (but not by any 
responsibility allowance derived from promotions).  The following step – “vice” – is 
where promotional mechanisms and responsibilities comes into play. “Vice” gather three 
different steps in the public contract, one step in San Donato and two in Machado. The 
third and last step – “head” – is the highest level of the ladder and stands for physicians 
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who are responsible for an operational “unit”.   
 
 
Tab. 5 – The career ladder  
  Frequencies Percent 
1st level 646 60.15 
Vice 255 23.74 
Head 136 12.66 
All others 37 3.45 
total 1074 100 
 
 
The “all others” step gathers three figures which are hard to code in an ordinal scale: 
the collaborators or grant fellows of public hospitals, the freelancers of public hospitals 
and “pure” academic researchers. Collaborators and freelancers in public institutions are 
precarious – often young – workers waiting to be hired. Such (often) temporary positions 
are scarcely compatible with a progressive ladder because not everybody passes through 
that step. Officially, once the residency is over, one should participate to a public 
competition (“concorso”) and, if he/she wins it, be hired as a first level physician (either 
with a short-term or open-ended contract). Furthermore, this is true only in public 
hospitals: in private ones, where no public competition is needed, precarious contracts are 
compatible with any step of the career-ladder. Together with atypical public contracts, the 
step “all others” gather four academic physicians “non convenzionati” (without 
agreement between the Hospital and the University) whose career progression takes place 
only within the University and, therefore, it follows the academic steps40. Because of the 
impossibility to “order” into a progressive scale these figures (precarious positions within 
the public institutions and academics “non convenzionati”), they have been coded as “all 
others” (see table 5). For the same reason, they were excluded from the scissor diagram.  
Figure 1  – The scissor diagram: men and women in each rank of the ladder 
                                                 
40 Academic physicians “non convenzionati” (literally: not covered by an agreement between the University 
and the Hospital) are paid only by the University, even if part of their activities take place in the hospital. 
Their career progression follows only the University “ladder” and that is the reason why I was obliged to 
cluster them into the “all others” step of the ladder. On the contrary, academic physicians “convenzionati” 
(most of them: that is covered by an agreement between the University and the Hospital) have a double 
employer: the University and the Hospital. Their career progression takes place both at the University and 
in the Hospital and their salary is much higher than the academics “non convenzionati” because, by law, 
must be equal to hospitalists’ pay. 
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The scissor diagram shows the percentage of women and men within each rank. As 
one can see, women are the majority of physicians in the lower rank of the ladder (being 
56% of first level physicians) while they are the minority both as vices (38%) and heads 
(24%). On the contrary, considering the percentage of women and men within each sex 
(see table 6 at the end of the paragraph), women are concentrated into the lower ranks, 
with 70% of them working as a 1st level physicians (against 50% of men) and 5% as “all 
others” (against 2% for men), while they are under-represented both in vice (19% of 
women against 29% of men) and in head (6% of women against 19% of men).  
 
 
II.4. The gender pay gap  
In order to have the highest rate of physicians declaring their income, they were given 
the opportunity to choose among 21 income classes, going from the lowest one (up to 
10.000 euro) to the highest one (more than 400.000 euro). Each class has then been 
transformed into its mean when modelling the pay gap. Respondents were asked to 
provide the income, and not the salary, in order to account for earnings made in private 
practice and all other consultancy activities, if there are any. Moreover, as these earnings, 
due to extra work, are taxed once a year through the income tax filling, I have considered 
that the gross value would be easier to remember than the net one. Overall, the mean 
income of the respondents, considering both sexes, is 74753.5 euro, with a median class 
of 65000 euro. Men in the dataset earn, in average, 87973 euro while females earn 62747 
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euro for a earn differential of 23226 euro (number of observations=1004). The 
distribution of income, both for men and women, is rather skew with male income 
reporting more outliers than the female income. Adopting the Oecd definition of the 
gender pay gap41, men earn 26,6% more than women.  
 
 
Figure 2 – Boxplot of the income by gender  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 The gender wage gap is unadjusted and is defined as the difference between median earnings of men 
(75.000 in the dataset) and women (55.000 in the dataset) relative to median earnings of men. Data refer to 
full-time employees. See https://data.oecd.org/earnwage/gender-wage-gap.htm. Accessed on February 28th, 
2016.  
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Tab 6. Work characteristics, mean or percentage and difference tests 
 
 
 
 
 
III.  Family characteristics 
Because of persisting traditional gender roles within the family and the inadequacy of 
welfare provisions, women in high-qualified professions face strong challenges in 
balancing work and family responsibilities. Many studies have pointed out that marriage 
and children have a negative impact on women’s career and income (Lundberg and Rose 
2000, Buding and England 2001, Sasser 2005). To avoid such penalties – in rank and pay 
– women in non traditional jobs are more likely than men to be single, to reduce the 
number of children or to be childless (Wajcman 1998). This is particularly true in Italy, 
which is a country traditionally characterized by long hours of work, with inadequate (or 
too expensive) care services (especially for early childhood) and where family 
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responsibilities are still a woman’s issue, no matter the growing, and recent, commitment 
of Italian fathers in the care of children (Zajczyk and Ruspini 2008, Saraceno and Naldini 
2011).  
 
 
 III.1. Parental and marital status  
In the dataset, 692 physicians out of 1074 are married. Men are more likely to be 
married than women (70.5% of male physicians are married against 58% of female 
physicians), while not much gender difference appears in the likelihood of having a 
cohabiting partner (15.9 versus 15.7%). As for children, 739 physicians (318 females and 
421 males) have at least one children. The percentage of women being mother is lower 
than the percentage of men being father: 61% against 76%. On the other hand, 39% of 
women are childless, against 24% of men. Among parents, there is a significant gender 
difference in the number of children: male physicians have in average 1,51 children 
against 1,06 of females physicians (for all the summary statistics see table 9 at the end of 
the paragraph).  
The debate on the gendered dimension of organisations (Acker 1990, Britton 2000) 
has shown how organisations promote the idea of an “abstract worker” which is based on 
males’ characteristics. Such ideal worker have very little care responsibilities and, 
eventually, can count on a non-working spouse taking care of the children and supporting 
him in his work aspirations (Pateman 1988, Wajcman 1998). Descriptive statistics 
partially confirm this picture. In the dataset, males physicians are more likely than their 
female colleagues to have a non working partner (defined as spouse or cohabiting 
partner). The difference is striking: 24% of male physicians have a housewife, while 8.6% 
of female physicians are married with a non working partner, which is, nonetheless, a 
quite high percentage anyway. Male physicians are more likely to have a partner working 
residually or part-time: 12% and 14% of men have partners working, respectively, up to 
20 and up to 30 hours, while the percentages shrink to 3% and 5% for women physicians. 
Gender parity occurs only when the partner works full time: 32.2% of males and 33.8% 
of female physicians exhibit a partner working from 30 up to 40 hours a week. On the 
contrary, female physicians are more likely to have a spouse working over-time: almost 
50% of women in the dataset have a partner working more than 40 hours, against 18% of 
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men. Gender balance occurs also with respect to homogamy: 24.5% of females and 25.5% 
of males are married (or are living together) with a physician. 
 
 
III.2. The sexual division of labour 
Being married and having children have different impacts on women and men’s use of 
time devoted to non paid work, defined as both domestic and care work. Respondents had 
the choice to report the time devoted to nonpaid work distinguishing between five items: 
care for children; care for the elderly, traditionally female domestic activity (cleaning, 
laundry, etc.), traditionally male domestic activity (repairing, gardening, etc.), the 
coordination of the maid/baby-sitter.  
Overall, men and women spend in average, respectively, 15 and a half and 25 and a 
half hours per week in non paid activities. This translates into about one and a half hour 
a day of gender gap in non-paid activities. The result is not consistent with data on the 
general population, which show a much worse picture. According to the National Institute 
of Statistics (Istat), Italian men and women spend, respectively, 104 and 315 minutes par 
day in non paid activities, which translates into a gap of three and a half hours (211 
minutes) par day and sets the country  among the worst ones in the OECD area (Gaiaschi 
2014). The discrepancy is mostly due to women’s side: translating hours into minutes, 
female physicians report 218 minutes of non paid work par day (against 315 minutes in 
the general population according to Istat), while male physicians report 133 minutes (104 
for Istat).  
Part of the reason of such discrepancy could be due to the difference in methods: Istat 
uses (daily) diaries, while my data are based on (weekly) estimates (respondent’s 
declarations). It is well acknowledged that the former are much more accurate than the 
latter, both with respect to paid and nonpaid work (Robinson and Bostrom 1994, 
Robinson et al. 2002, Robinson et al. 2011). With respect to nonpaid work in particular, 
it has been shown that women tend to underestimate the time spent in non paid activities 
(Bonke 2004). One second reason for the discrepancy between my results and national 
data on the sexual division of labour could due to the target population. Indeed, general 
data account for women working part-time and for women not working at all, while this 
research targets a very selected population, composed by high-skilled professionals who 
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have invested a lot in their education and who work long hours of work. As a 
consequence, 39% of them are childless while mothers tend to outsource care and 
domestic work in order to balance work and family.  
Data on outsourcing are quite interesting indeed: women in the dataset have reported 
to pay a maid working, in average, almost 7 hours of a week, against 5.4 hours declared 
by men. Among women, childless women report having a maid working three hours a 
week, exactly as their male childless colleagues, while mothers report having a maid 
working nine hours and a half par week, against 6.40 minutes declared by fathers.  Hence, 
mother physicians tend to reduce their time in nonpaid work by outsourcing domestic 
work. Such circumstance, together with the high rate of childless women, reduce the 
overall data on women physicians’ nonpaid work activities.  
The time devoted to non paid work varies not only according to parenthood but also 
according to the parental status. Both single and men with a partner (either a spouse or a 
cohabiting partner) devote around 15 hours a week to non paid activities. This means that 
marriage doesn’t have any impact on men’s use of time in non paid work. This is not the 
case for women: if as single woman spend 19 hours a week in non paid work, as spouse 
or cohabiting partner she will spend 28 hours a week. In this case, a change in marital 
status parallels a change in women’s use of time in non paid work, enhancing hours in 
nonpaid work of almost nine hours a week. Stronger involvements by men occurs when 
they become fathers. Childless men devote 10.7 hours a week to unpaid work, which 
increases to 17 hours a week with the first child. Nevertheless, the increase is much higher 
for women: from 14 hours a week when they are childless to 33 when they are mother. 
Indeed, gender inequalities at work reflect gender inequalities at home: it is because 
domestic work and the care of children are still a “women issue” that marriage and 
children constitute a “penalty” for women’s career (Saraceno 1980, Crompton 2006, 
Gerson 2009).  
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Figure 3  – Nonpaid work for women and men (single and in couple)  
 
 
 
 
 
III.3. Work-life conflict  
The problem of work-life balance is strongly felt by women: 46% of female physicians 
experience a situation of work-life conflict while 45% experience it sometimes, against, 
respectively, 35% and 48% for men.  
 
Tab 7 – Do you have a hard time to balance work and life?  
 
 
 
Respondents experiencing a work-life conflict were invited to provide an explanation 
for it by choosing among five items: rigid schedule, long hours of work, lack of care 
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          Pearson chi2(2) =  19.1365   Pr = 0.000
                100.00     100.00      100.00 
     Total         553        521       1,074 
                                             
                 35.08      45.87       40.32 
       Yes         194        239         433 
                                             
                 48.82      45.11       47.02 
 Sometimes         270        235         505 
                                             
                 16.09       9.02       12.66 
        No          89         47         136 
                                             
   onflict        male     female       Total
worklife_c          gender
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services, lack of grandparents caring for children and lack of support by the partner in 
sharing care responsibilities. Each item provided a four-point scale (“very”; “slightly”; “a 
little”; “not at all”). Women are (significantly) more likely than men to complain for a 
rigid schedule, long hours of work, a lack of care services and a lack of support by the 
partner in sharing care responsibility. On the contrary, there is no much gender difference 
with respect to the lack of grand parents, with the majority of both male (43%) and female 
(41%) physicians declaring it doesn’t pose a problem (see figures 2-6 in appendix 3).  
Analyzing women’s answers, it’s worth of notice that the lack of care services matters 
much more than that the lack of the partner’s support in care responsibilities. Only 24% 
of women has indicated the latter as explanation for their work-life conflict (9% of them 
have chosen the item “very” and 15% of them have chosen the item “slightly”) while 52% 
(divided between 26% as “very” and 24% as “slightly”) has indicate the former. How to 
interpret this finding? Either men equally share non paid work with their partners or 
women don’t feel it as a problem. Since the unequal division of nonpaid work between 
men and women existing among physicians, it seems more reasonable to opt for the 
second explanation. In other words, the majority of female respondents facing a work-life 
conflict don’t recognize the traditional division of paid and non paid work between the 
sexes – which in Italy remains quite strong –  as the cause for it (Saraceno 1980, Saraceno 
and Naldini 1998, Saraceno and Naldini 2011).  
On the other side, the organisation of the time in the workplace is clearly identified by 
women as a cause of their work-life conflict: 70% and 84% of them (against 61% and 
76% of men) think that, respectively, the rigidity of work schedules and too many hours 
of work negatively impact their work-life balance in a “very” or “slightly” manner. The 
Person’s Chi2 test is significant in both cases, thus confirming the findings of Lyness et 
al. (2003) according to which: 1. Women have less “control” of their schedule than men 
do as long as they work in occupations or they are clustered in ranks which don’t provide 
enough possibility of flexi-time; 2. Women report working too many hours more often 
than men do.  The gender difference in the possibility of “controlling” its own schedule 
is confirmed by a specific question. Physicians have been asked to explain how their 
workday is structured. Four items were proposed from the least to the most flexible 
schedule arrangements: no flexibility; flexibility in entry; flexibility both in entry and in 
exit, total flexibility. In the table below the results are divided by gender.  
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Tab 8 – Control over worktime 
 
 
Women are more concentrated in the two first items, which provides less flexibility, 
while men in the second two, which provides more flexibility, even if the gender 
difference is not significant (p.=0.081).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Pearson chi2(3) =   6.7263   Pr = 0.081
                          100.00     100.00      100.00 
               Total         553        521       1,074 
                                                       
                           21.70      19.00       20.39 
   Total flexibility         120         99         219 
                                                       
                           56.24      52.40       54.38 
  Flexy entry & exit         311        273         584 
                                                       
                           10.13      11.90       10.99 
    Fixed entry only          56         62         118 
                                                       
                           11.93      16.70       14.25 
Fixed entry and exit          66         87         153 
                                                       
             control        male     female       Total
                              gender
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Tab. 9 - Family characteristics  
 
 
 
 
 
IV. Conclusions 
Women and men respondents report many differences in human capital, work and 
family characteristics. Women graduate with better grades than men do but once they 
have entered in the profession they are less likely to acquire further specializations. Even 
if today they are the majority of PhD students at University, it is not the case in hospitals, 
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where more men than women have a post-graduate title. Women physicians tend to have 
a smaller portfolio-career than men, they appear less “mobile” and they work fewer hours 
than men (mainly because they do less private practice). On the other hand, motivational 
drives don’t seem to follow gender stereotypical patterns.  
As for the “choice” of specialization, women tend to cluster in medical specialties 
while surgery still remains a male-dominated specialty area, with around 70% of 
physicians being males. Women are more likely than men to hold an atypical, and less 
remunerated, contract. The career ladder still remains harder to climb for them: by 
analysing the composition of the medical population, a strong vertical segregation still 
persists. Women are the majority of physicians in the lower rank of the ladder but they 
are the minority in the upper ranks. Pay differentials are relevant: men earn 26.6% more 
than women, which is much greater than the national pay gap (7.3%). Both data are 
unadjusted, that is they are not controlled for any work characteristics, but if the former 
is based on the income, the latter is based on earnings. Such difference makes the pay gap 
found among physicians inclusive of revenues dues to private practice and external 
consultancies (if there are any), thus providing a more realistic picture of pay differentials 
between men and women.  
The analysis of family characteristics has shown a quite traditional picture. Women, 
and in particular mothers, are the main responsible for non paid work. In order to face 
work-life obstacles they reduce, with respect at least to the general population, the time 
devoted to domestic and care activities, either by outsourcing nonpaid work or renouncing 
to motherhood and thus confirming the findings of previous research in non traditional 
profession (Wajcman 1998, Roth 2006).  
One may objects that these disparities are only a “matter of time”, that they will 
gradually disappear as long as the level of women entering in the profession will be equal 
to all cohorts. Studies on the general labour market have refuted these arguments 
(Palomba 2013). If this is the case also with respect to the medical profession, it should 
be further investigated: researches on early cohorts of physicians (Jagsi et al. 2012) and 
using longitudinal data (Sasser 2005) show that gender inequalities persist among 
younger physicians. Yet, further longitudinal data with respect to the European context 
are needed to analyse changing conditions across time.  
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Chapter 4 – Explaining the gender pay gap 
 
 
 
 
 
It is well known that women physicians earn less than their male counterparts. Most 
of the studies finds that the pay gap persists no matter equal characteristics (Hinze 2000, 
Hoff 2004, Sasser 2005, Weeks et al. 2009, Jagsi et al. 2012, Magnusson 2015). On the 
contrary, Baker (1996) finds no earning difference after controlling for experience, 
specialty, practice setting, family status and other characteristics42.  Sasser (2005) focuses 
on the child penalty and finds that mothers earn significantly less than childless women 
after controlling for all characteristics, with the penalty growing with the number of 
children, while fathers with two children earn significantly more than childless men.  
In order to examine the determinants of the pay differential, a model for the log annual 
income using OLS will be estimated (paragraph II). Afterwards, a model accounting for 
interaction terms will be estimated in order to investigate how gender mediates the effects 
of characteristics on income (paragraph III). Finally, the pay gap will be composed by 
using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (paragraph IV).  
 
 
I. Measures  
The natural logarithm of the annual income is the dependent variable. The type of 
hospital is the control variable43. Independent variables include human capital, work and 
family characteristics. Human capital characteristics include a four-item variable for 
grade and the number of years of work experience. Grade, originally an interval variable, 
has been recoded into a multinomial one in order to correct for its distribution as it is 
                                                 
42 Coherently with the theoretical approach of this thesis (see Chapter 1), the results of Baker’s study 
“should not be interpreted as evidence that discrimination is no longer a problem” (Baker 1996, p. 963). He 
explicitly reminds such concept on his conclusions as he underlines the importance of the structure of 
limitations and opportunities in determining the differences in characteristics between men and women 
through socialization.  
43 In the models of chapter 4 and 5 hospitals are named as following: Public 1 is the Policlinico, Public 2 
Legnano, Public 3 Como, Private 1 San Donato and Private 2 Machado. 
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negative skewed, with very few observations on the left tail. Work characteristics include 
individual ones, as the number of hours and the number of hours of private practice 
worked in a week. Institutional work characteristics include the rank (a three-item 
variable divided in first level, vice and head) and the specialty (a four-item variable 
divided in medicine, surgery, diagnostic and “all others”44). Family characteristics 
include the marital status and the number of children. The marital status is a multinomial 
variable accounting for the work status of the partner. It is made by six categories: no 
partner, no working partner, partner working residually (from 0 to 20 hours a week), 
partner working part-time (from 21 to 30 hours a week), partner working full time (from 
31 to 40 hours) and partner working overtime (working more than 40 hours a week). A 
dummy variable was also added for having (=1) or not (0) a partner who also works as a 
physician to control for homogamous couples. Finally, the number of children is a 
categorical variable made on the base of the question on the number of children living at 
home45. It is composed by four category: 0 for no children, 1 for 1 children, 2 for 2 
children and 3 for more than 2 children. This variable has been transformed into a 
categorical variable for two reasons: first, to correct for its distribution. As in the general 
population, also with respect to this specific dataset, the right tail of the distribution of 
the variable children is not continuous in its extreme values. Second, from a theoretical 
point of view, I assume that the impact of children varies importantly across the first steps 
(and therefore between 0 children and 1, between 1 and 2, 2 and more than 2), while it 
doesn’t so much after the third child (Sasser 2005).   
 
 
                                                 
44 The item “all others” of the variable specialty used in the regression includes the specialty of public 
health, specialties difficult to recode, physicians with no specialty and missing casses. Cases in these four 
groups are very few (44 in total) and, in order to correct for their distribution in the multinomial variable 
“specialty”, I had to merge them in one single item. Betas and pvalues for such an item haven’t been taken 
then then in consideration as they refer to a very heterogeneous category.  
45 I had the possibility to chose between the answers of two different questions. The former regarding the 
number of children in general (including the adults one), the second regarding the number of children living 
at home. I have chose to add the latter on the base of the literature (Sasser 2005) and because it is the most 
coherent with theoretical framework of this work, which emphasizes the sexual division of labour as an 
explanatory factor of gender inequalities. Children at home require parents taking care of them (at least 
until they are not independent) and thus they impact on the division of paid and unpaid work. This is not 
the case, at least in a much lesser extent, for adult children. This is confirmed by the fact that, running the 
same regression with the total number of children (instead of the number of children living at home), the 
beta decreases (from 2% to 1,4%) and the pvalue increases (from 0.070 to 0.221, in both case not 
significant), indicating that children at home have a stronger impact on pay than children in total.  
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II. Hypothesis  
I consider five mechanisms by which being a woman physician may negatively affect 
pay. First, in anticipation of taking the majority of family responsibilities, women acquire 
less human capital (either because they choose it or, alternatively, because employers 
provide them with less training) (first hypothesis). In this perspective, women’s lower 
pay is attributable to lower levels of human capital (Becker 1981). The human capital 
theory is less plausible for a specific and quite homogeneous group as the one composed 
only by physicians, as they have chosen a profession requiring many years of education 
and  long hours of work. On the other hand, descriptive statistics in the previous chapter 
show that women report, in average, better grades but lower levels of secondary 
specialties, while no relevant gender differences have emerged with respect to the Ph.D.. 
Moreover, they report fewer years of work experience which may negatively impact the 
pay.  
Second, women may earn less because they work fewer hours (hypothesis 2) and 
because they do less private practice, which is more lucrative, than men (hypothesis 2bis). 
The difference in total work hours and in private practice hours may be due to greater 
family responsibilities or, in the case of the private practice, to a greater commitment to 
the institution.  
Third, by anticipating major family responsibilities, women may “choose” family-
friendly specialties like the medical ones which are less paid (hypothesis 3). Medical 
specialties are less well paid with respect to surgical ones but they offer better time-
arrangements, with more predictable schedules and shorter hours of work. On the 
contrary, surgical specialties implies higher probability of working extra-hours 
(especially when complications with patients in the operating rooms occur) and/or facing 
emergency situations. This is confirmed by the following table which shows that 
physicians in surgical specialties work, in average, two hours more than physicians in the 
medical ones. Data include the hours of private practice, which are higher in surgical 
specialties.  
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Tab 1. Weekly total hours of work and weekly hours of private practice by specialty 
  
total weekly 
work hours 
weekly hours of 
private practice frequency 
Medicine 45.8 2.4 512 
Surgery 47.7 4.6 277 
Diagnostic 46.2 2 241 
all others 46.4 2.9 44 
Total 46.4 2.9 1074 
 
 
Fourth, women may earn less because of their greater family workload. As already 
mentioned, the sexual division of labour ensures that women and men are differently 
affected by their marital and parental status. Hence, having children may negatively 
impact women’s pay while it may enhance men’s pay (hypothesis 4). Moreover, being 
married (or living together with) can engender different returns too: positives for men, 
negatives for women (hypothesis 4bis).  
Fifth, women may earn less because either they are discriminated by their employers 
or because of the effect of unobservable characteristics, such as productivity and skills 
(hypothesis 5).  
 
 
III. Interpreting the gap through an OLS multivariate model  
In order to test these five hypothesis, a step-wise multivariate regression model using 
OLS has been run. Table 1 reports the coefficients on pay for different sets of variables. 
Column 1 shows the “gross” effect of gender on income: without no control for 
differences in characteristics, women earn 30% less than men. Column 2, 3, 4 and 5 
reports the coefficients for different sets of variables, including the control variable 
“hospital”. Column 2 controls for human capital characteristics only. Controlling for 
grade and years of experience, the penalty decreases to 23.5% but it is still significant. 
Column 3 adds for work variables, which includes hours of work, hours of private 
practice, the specialty and the rank. Controlling both for human capital and work 
variables, the female penalty decreases to 15% thus remaining significant. Column 4 
controls for family variables only, while Column 5 reports the full model. Controlling for 
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all characteristics, the female penalty on pay is still significant. Adding family 
characteristics doesn’t add to much to the model in terms of explained variance as the 
female penalty still lays at 15% in the full model. Such part of pay gap may be due either 
to discrimination or to unobservable characteristics.  
Over all, table 2 shows that no matter equal (observable) characteristics between men 
and women, women earns significantly less. This suggests that, net of unobservable 
characteristics, mechanisms of discrimination take place. As for observable 
characteristics affecting income, the reduced experience and the reduced hours of work, 
both in total and with respect to private practice only, are part of the explanations of the 
pay gap. Having obtained honors increases the pay with respect to the reference category 
but only at a 90% level of confidence interval. Clearly, being in the top levels of the career 
ladder increases income, as it is shown by the significance impact of the “vice” and 
“head” ranks with respect to the first level. Working in a surgical specialty with respect 
to a medical one significantly increases income, as it does working in diagnostic. 
Therefore, the higher concentration of women in the lower ranks of the ladder as well as 
in the medical specialties is one of the explanation of the pay gap. All in all, differences 
in human capital and work characteristics play a role in engendering a pay differential 
between men and women. Nevertheless, they are only part of the whole story, as 
controlling for differences in such characteristics, the female penalty on pay persists.  
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Tab. 2. Step-wise multivariate model on income 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log income Log income Log income Log income Log income 
Female -0.305*** -0.232*** -0.149*** -0.279*** -0.150*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hospital: Public 1  0 0 0 0 
  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Hospital: Public 2  -0.0423 -0.0196 -0.115*** -0.0285 
  (0.173) (0.489) (0.000) (0.318) 
Hospital: Public 3  -0.00575 0.0169 -0.0478 0.0109 
  (0.871) (0.602) (0.200) (0.740) 
Hospital: Private 1  0.180*** 0.0913* 0.0432 0.0948* 
  (0.000) (0.028) (0.367) (0.023) 
Hospital: Private 2  0.234*** 0.176*** 0.207*** 0.173*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Grade: up to 104  0 0  0 
  (.) (.)  (.) 
Grade: 105-110  0.0408 0.0314  0.0392 
  (0.237) (0.315)  (0.213) 
Grade: honors  0.0542 0.0451  0.0501 
  (0.100) (0.135)  (0.099) 
Experience  0.0191*** 0.0122***  0.0122*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Work hours   0.00477***  0.00491*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Hours of private practice   0.00881***  0.00842*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Rank: Up to 1st level   0  0 
   (.)  (.) 
Rank: Vice   0.193***  0.184*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Rank: Head   0.434***  0.440*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Specialty: Medicine   0  0 
   (.)  (.) 
Specialty: Surgery   0.0741**  0.0806** 
   (0.007)  (0.003) 
Specialty: Diagnostic   0.149***  0.149*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Specialty: All others   0.0636  0.0570 
   (0.255)  (0.307) 
No partner    0 0 
    (.) (.) 
No working partner    0.108* 0.0365 
    (0.023) (0.365) 
Partner working residually    0.0597 -0.0172 
    (0.331) (0.737) 
Partner working part-time    0.0838 0.0791 
    (0.133) (0.097) 
Partner working full-time    -0.00287 0.0353 
    (0.943) (0.303) 
Partner working over-time    0.0481 0.0786* 
    (0.235) (0.022) 
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No children    0 0 
    (.) (.) 
One child    0.0795* 0.0434 
    (0.017) (0.123) 
Two children    0.0658 0.0567* 
    (0.050) (0.046) 
More than two children    0.0633 0.0429 
    (0.194) (0.297) 
Having a physician as 
partner 
   -0.00765 -0.0447 
    (0.801) (0.079) 
Constant 11.27*** 10.81*** 10.51*** 11.22*** 10.45*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R-square 0.123 0.362 0.484 0.177 0.494 
N 1004 914 914 1004 914 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
IV. Interpreting the pay gap through interaction terms  
Family variables must be treated carefully. Because of the persistence of the sexual 
division of labour assigning major family responsibilities to women, the marital status 
and the number of children may affect women’s and men’s pay in different ways. Many 
studies have documented the existence of a marital wage premium for men (Korenman 
and Neumark 1991, Loh 1996, Hersch and Stratton 2000). Qualitative contributions in 
the study of gendered organisations have shed light on the positive effect, on men’s career, 
of being married with a non-working spouse (Pateman 1988, Wajcman 1998, Wajcman 
and Martin 2001). On the other hand, married women may be penalized in terms of 
earnings (Buding and England 2001, Sasser 2005). As for the effect of children on 
parent’s wages, many contributions have shed light on the wage penalty for motherhood 
(Folbre 1994, Waldfogel 1997, Lundberg and Rose 2000, Buding and England 2001, 
England 2005, Sasser 2005) as well as on the fatherhood wage premium (Sasser 2005, 
Glabuer 2008, Hodges and Budig 2010, Kelly 2012). In order to account for such 
differences in “slopes”, many scholars interact the marital and the parental status with the 
gender variable while modelling the pay gap (Tharenou 1999, Sasser 2005, Kelly 2012).  
Nevertheless, if the use of interaction terms with respect to family characteristics in 
modelling the pay gap is quite common in the literature, it is not with respect to human 
capital and work variables. Only a few empirical studies, in the area of gender work and 
organisation, go in that direction (Hoff 2004). Yet, that gender moderates the effects of 
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human capital and work characteristics is well known. In the economic literature, the 
decomposition methods (i.e. Oaxaca-Blinder) are based on the assumption that the pay 
gap is due both to differences (between males and females) in characteristics between 
males and females as well as to differences in their returns. Within the sociological 
debate, both the queue tradition and the debate on comparable worth (see Chapter 1) 
suggest that the “effort” - in education and in employment – are differently “assessed” in 
the labour market whether they refer to men or women thus leading to mechanisms of 
horizontal segregation and pay inequalities. In multivariate analysis, these differences 
could be accounted for by interacting gender with human capital and work characteristics.  
In order to investigate the different “slopes” – between men and women – of the same 
variables, interaction terms have been added with respect not only to family 
characteristics, but also with respect to human capital and work characteristics. The idea 
underneath is to investigate whether, for example, women have lower “returns” on their 
educational credentials or on the time they spent at work. Whether being a female surgeon 
or a female “head” “pay” less than being a male surgeon or a male “head”, controlling for 
all other characteristics.   
Descriptive statistics suggest that being surgeon or working in a top position is less 
rewarding for women than for men, as it is shown in the tables below:  
 
 
Tab 3. Mean income by specialty and gender 
 
 
 
 
                   519        485        1004
     Total   85973.025  62747.423   74753.486
                                             
                    21         19          40
 all other   95238.095  77236.842     86687.5
                                             
                   109        120         229
 diagnosti   87568.807      67125   76855.895
                                             
                   183         76         259
   surgery   89986.339  61085.526   81505.792
                                             
                   206        270         476
  medicine   80618.932      60250   69065.126
                                             
 specialty        male     female       Total
                   gender
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Tab 4. Mean income by rank and gender 
 
 
 
Yet the simple crosstabs do not take into account other important differences in human 
capital, individual work and family characteristics. In order to do this, one must make use 
of an OLS multivariate regression accounting for interactions terms.  
Two sets of models have been run. Each set of model shows the full model in the first 
column and the model accounting for the interaction terms in the second column. 
Preliminary regressions separately for men and women have been run in order to identify 
which explanatory variable reported opposite coefficients thus suggesting the need of an 
interaction. Afterwards, interaction terms have been added in the full model and 
significant interactions up to 90% level have been kept. In the first set of model children 
and partner are categorized as dummy variables (1=having children - 0=no children; 1= 
having a partner – 0=no partner). In the second set of models both children and partner 
are multinomial variables where partner accounts for the hours of work of the partner. 
The second set of model reports, in the first column, the same exact full model of table 4 
and, in the second column, its version with the interaction terms.  
The differences in the use of the children and partner variables make sense as long as 
they answer to different research questions. The first set of models reports the effect of 
having or not having children and having or not having a partner. The second set of 
models – which corresponds exactly to the full model of the previous paragraph – goes 
further in details and reports the incremental effect of having children and the effect of 
having a working partner, with different degrees of work-schedules, with respect to not 
having a partner at all (reference category).  
                   519        485        1004
     Total   85973.025  62747.423   74753.486
                                             
                    98         28         126
      Head   130765.31  104107.14   124841.27
                                             
                   150         93         243
      Vice   88166.667  78010.753   84279.835
                                             
                   271        364         635
 up to 1st   68560.886  55666.209   61169.291
                                             
      rank        male     female       Total
                   gender
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As one can see, using a different recodification of the same two variables doesn’t 
change much in terms of observations, R squared and F tests, while betas and t statistics 
are slightly different but such difference doesn’t modify the interpretation. Each couple 
of model presents the full model in the first column and the same model with the 
interactions terms in the second column.  
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Table 5. Ols models with interactions 
 
  Set 1                       Set 2 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
 Log income Log income  Log income Log income 
Female -0.141*** 0. 0843  -0.150*** 0.0774 
 (0.000) (0. 354)  (0.000) (0.397) 
Hospital: Public 1 0 0  0 0 
 (.) (.)  (.) (.) 
Hospital: Public 2 -0.0294 0. 0382  -0.0285 0.0381 
 (0.301) (0. 348)  (0.318) (0.349) 
Hospital: Public 3 0.00273 0. 0445  0.0109 0.0454 
 (0.933) (0. 320)  (0.740) (0.318) 
Hospital: Private 1 0.0879* 0.201***  0.0948* 0.213*** 
 (0.034) (0.000)  (0.023) (0.000) 
Hospital: Private 2 0.170*** 0.238***  0.173*** 0.247*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.000) 
Hospital*female: Public 1  0   0 
  (.)   (.) 
Hospital*female: Public 2  -0.115*   -0.115* 
  (0.043)   (0.045) 
Hospital*female: Public 3  -0. 0585   -0.0456 
  (0. 369)   (0.491) 
Hospital*female: Private 1  -0. 232**   -0.228** 
  (0.005)   (0.006) 
Hospital*female: Private 2  -0.102   -0.0923 
  (0.306)   (0.361) 
Grade: up to 104 0 0  0 0 
 (.) (.)  (.) (.) 
Grade: 105-110 0.0340 0.0437  0.0392 0.0461 
 (0.275) (0.290)  (0.213) (0.269) 
Grade: honors 0.0475 0.0937*  0.0501 0.0920* 
 (0.114) (0.019)  (0.099) (0.023) 
Grade*female: up to 104  0   0 
  (.)   (.) 
Grade*female: 105-110  -0.0276   -0.0221 
  (0.661)   (0.727) 
Grade*female: honors  -0.0935   -0.0848 
  (0.123)   (0.167) 
Experience 0.0120*** 0.0117***  0.0122*** 0.0121*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Work hours 0.00504*** 0.00476***  0.00491*** 0.00455*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Hours of private practice 0.00879*** 0.00932**  0.00842*** 0.00872** 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.003) 
Hours of private practice*female  -0.00283   -0.00277 
  (0.557)   (0.570) 
Rank: Up to 1st level 0 0  0 0 
 (.) (.)  (.) (.) 
Rank: Vice 0.183*** 0.145***  0.184*** 0.143*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Rank: Head 0.437*** 0.398***  0.440*** 0.399*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Rank*female: Up to 1st level  0   0 
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  (.)   (.) 
Rank*female: Vice  0.0823   0.0864 
  (0.130)   (0.112) 
Rank*female: Head  0.159*   0.153 
  (0.046)   (0.060) 
Specialty: Medicine 0 0  0 0 
 (.) (.)  (.) (.) 
Specialty: Surgery 0.0754** 0.0991**  0.0806** 0.110** 
 (0.006) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.002) 
Specialty: Diagnostic 0.145*** 0.145***  0.149*** 0.150*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Specialty: All others 0.0601 0.199*  0.0570 0.207* 
 (0.280) (0.014)  (0.307) (0.011) 
Specialty*female: Medicine  0   0 
  (.)   (.) 
Specialty*female: Surgery   -0.0295   -0.0328 
  (0.603)   (0.565) 
Specialty*female: Diagnostic  -0.00548   -0.00462 
  (0.919)   (0.932) 
Specialty*female: All others   -0.292*   -0.298** 
  (0.010)   (0.009) 
Partner dummy 0.0511 0.109*    
 (0.084) (0.021)    
Partner dummy*female  -0. 0795    
  (0.182)    
Children dummy 0.0501* 0.0659*    
 (0.033) (0.048)    
Children dummy*female  -0. 0383    
  (0.413)    
No partner    0 0 
    (.) (.) 
No working partner    0.0365 0.0698 
    (0.365) (0.204) 
Partner working residually    -0.0172 0.0774 
    (0.737) (0.233) 
Partner working part-time    0.0791 0.164** 
    (0.097) (0.009) 
Partner working full-time    0.0353 0.0980 
    (0.303) (0.064) 
Partner working over-time     0.0786* 0.155** 
    (0.022) (0.006) 
No partner*female     0 
     (.) 
No working partner*female     -0.0315 
     (0.723) 
Partner working residually*female      -0.274* 
     (0.028) 
Partner working part-time*female      -0.202 
     (0.063) 
Partner working full-time*female     -0.0807 
     (0.250) 
Partner working overtime*female     -0.0945 
     (0.187) 
No children    0 0 
    (.) (.) 
One child    0.0434 0.0561 
    (0.123) (0.168) 
Two children    0.0567* 0.0691 
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    (0.046) (0.077) 
More than two children    0.0429 0.117* 
    (0.297) (0.043) 
No children*female     0 
     (.) 
One child*female     -0.0313 
     (0.580) 
Two children*female     -0.0365 
     (0.527) 
More than two children*female     -0.157 
     (0.059) 
Having a physician as partner -0.0401 -0.0493  -0.0447 -0.0683 
 (0.108) (0.050)  (0.079) (0.058) 
Having a physician as 
partner*female 
    0.0232 
     (0.654) 
Constant 10.44*** 10.33***  10.45*** 10.33*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
R-square 0.491 0.505  0.494 0.514 
N 914 914  914 914 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
With respect to family interactions, Column 2 shows that having a partner significantly 
grows men’s income while it doesn’t have an effect on women’s income. Column 4 
provides further details by reporting that the positive effect on men’s income occurs when 
the wife or the cohabiting partner works, and more specifically when she works more 
than 40 hours (partner working overtime) or part-time (at 95% level of significance) and 
when she works full time (at 90% level of significance). Hence, the analysis of the 
working status of the partner rejects previous results of the literature on the positive effect 
of housewives on men’s careers (Pateman 1988). Nevertheless, if the male’s partner is a 
physician, this seems to have a negative impact on his income at 90% level, while it is 
not the case for female physicians (having a physician as partner). This is, apparently, a 
contradictory result with respect to the previous findings on the effect of partner’s 
working status for men’s pay. The latter suggest that men’s pay is positively affected by 
working partners (from 20 to more than 40 hours of work par week). If this partner is a 
physician though, the effect is negative. Unfortunately, data on working partners provide 
the hours of work but not the type of work that partners do. Certainly, it includes (also) 
women working part-time. Moreover, one can assume it includes many different types of 
jobs, including typical female-dominated (and low-paid) jobs. Previous studies on 
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aerospace engineers have shown that male scientists have high-educated partners who 
either are aerospace engineers as well or, if not, they work in female-dominated and low-
paid sectors (Falcinelli 2009). If this was true also for physicians, it would explain the 
different effect of an apparently similar situation. Working wives are a heterogeneous 
group (also) including part-time and low-paid workers, while wives working as 
physicians represent a very selected group with high income. If this is true, male 
physicians with a working partner are more likely to be the breadwinner of the family, 
while male physicians in homogamous couples are not, as both members of the couple 
are career-oriented. Further investigations though are needed to confirm this 
interpretation.  
As for children, the “gross” effect of having children (no matter their number) with 
respect to not having them at all is positive for men (column 2) while it is not significant 
(but worth of notice it is the negative sign of the beta) on women. Analyzing the effects 
of each specific number of children, though (column 4), the effect of having more than 
two children is significant at 95% level for men (p value 0.043) and at 90% level (p value 
0.059) for women. In other words, with the third child a bonus for fatherhood and a 
penalty motherhood occur.  
Human capital and work characteristics interactions show some interesting results. 
Educational credentials “pays” differently by gender: honors (grade) increase men’s 
income but not women’s one, no matter if women have, in average, better grades. As for 
work variables, the interactions terms show that working in private hospitals is worth for 
men, but not for women, as only men’s income increase. On the contrary, working in 
Public 2 (Legnano) and Private 1 (San Donato) is disadvantageous for women, as their 
income decreases. That is, public institutions seem to guarantee a better gender equality 
in terms of revenues, while private don’t. This may be due to the fact that in private 
hospitals, unlike in public ones, a substantial part of annual earnings is distributed to 
physicians through bonuses. Bonuses depend on employer’s evaluation of physicians’ 
performances and they can be affected by gender bias (Valian 1999), which explain lower 
females’ earnings. These results confirm previous researches on other high-skilled 
professions showing that bonuses play a crucial role in determining the gender pay gap 
(Roth 2006). As for the choice of the specialty, being in surgery and diagnostic, with 
respect of being in medicine, “pays” only for men, while it doesn’t for women. Worth of 
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interest that, while the hours of work don’t behave differently whether they refer to 
women or men, it is not the case for the hours of private practice, which increase the 
income for men but do not increase the income for women. Finally, there is a positive 
effect of being in the top positions for men but not for women, with the “vice” and “head” 
position incrementing men’s income.  
 
 
V. Decomposing the pay gap through the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition  
The idea that the same characteristics can have different effects whether they refer to 
women or men is at the base of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca 1973, Blinder 
1973, Oaxaca and Ransom 1999). Its formula is based on the assumption that the pay 
differential between men and women is due to two components: a component related to 
the difference in observable characteristics and a component related to the difference in 
returns of these same characteristics. Its formula is the following one:  
 
log(Wm) – log(Wf) = βm (Xm-Xf) + (βm-βf) Xf 
 
where log (W) is the natural logarithm of wage, X are the characteristics and β the 
coefficients which refer either to males (m) or females (f). The formula is based on the 
linear function of pay46 and indicates that the gender difference in the log wage is equal 
to the difference in characteristics of the two groups weighted for the coefficients of the 
advantaged group (which is assumed to be men’s group) plus the difference in the returns 
of characteristics weighted for the (mean) characteristics of the disadvantaged group 
(which is assumed to be women’s group). The first part of the pay difference is the 
“explained” part of the gap which economists usually interpret as “fair”, as long as it is 
“justified” by a difference in characteristics. The second component, on the contrary, is 
the “unexplained” part of the gap and it relates to discrimination, as it is due to the 
difference in “values” that employers attribute to women and men’s characteristics.  
This interpretation has two limits: on one hand, it doesn’t account for unobservable 
characteristics, on the other, it doesn’t account for indirect discrimination. In the light of 
                                                 
46 The above-illustrated formula is the difference in average outputs between two groups (males and 
females) : ӯ m – ӯ f. Where the output y (log wage) is the linear function of the covariates X and the error ɛ 
is independent of X: y=∑βX + ɛ.  
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this, one should take two precautions in the interpretation of the decomposition. First, the 
explained part doesn’t have to be interpreted as the part “justifying” the pay gap as the 
difference in characteristics can occur because women “anticipate” discrimination in their 
choices. More correctly, the first part should be interpreted as the component accounting 
both for the differences in observable characteristics and for indirect discrimination. 
Second, the unexplained part also includes the potential effect of unobservable 
characteristics which can’t be “controlled” in the model, for example ability and 
productivity. As a consequence, it should be correctly interpreted as the component 
accounting both for direct discrimination and unobservable characteristics.  
An Oaxaca decomposition based on the full OLS model presented in paragraph II 
(table 2, column 5) and paragraph III (table  5, set 2, column 1) is shown in the following 
table. 
 
Tab 6 – The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
 Log income     
overall       
group_1 11.28*** (0.000)    
group_2 10.95*** (0.000)    
difference 0.326*** (0.000)    
explained 0.176*** (0.000)    
unexplained 0.150*** (0.000)    
explained   unexplained   
Public 2 0.00183 (0.355) Public 2 0.0428* (0.048) 
Public 3 0.000496 (0.741) Public 3  0.00949 (0.497) 
Private 1 0.00364 (0.175) Private 1 0.0230* (0.024) 
Private 2 -0.000536 (0.843) Private 2 0.00411 (0.471) 
Grade: 105-110 -0.000517 (0.691) Grade: 105-110 0.00839 (0.714) 
Grade: honors -0.00281 (0.257) Grade: honors 0.0410 (0.215) 
Experience 0.0561*** (0.000) Experience -0.0777 (0.107) 
Hours of work 0.0156** (0.010) Hours of work -0.215 (0.140) 
Private practice 0.0151* (0.027) Private practice 0.0125 (0.494) 
Rank: Vice 0.0192*** (0.001) Rank: Vice -0.0104 (0.332) 
Rank: Head 0.0597*** (0.000) Rank: Head -0.00600 (0.485) 
Specialty: Surgery 0.0148** (0.008) Specialty: Surgery 0.00930 (0.469) 
Specialty: Diagnostic -0.00505 (0.232) Specialty: Diagnostic 0.000533 (0.962) 
Specialty: All others -0.000246 (0.759) Specialty: All others 0.0114 (0.053) 
No working partner  0.00510 (0.382) No working partner 0.00630 (0.564) 
Partner working residually -0.00137 (0.753) Partner working residually 0.0130 (0.059) 
Partner working part-time 0.00695 (0.112) Partner working part-time 0.0143 (0.059) 
Partner working full-time 0.000599 (0.613) Partner working full-time 0.0189 (0.326) 
Partner working overtime  -0.0157* (0.032) Partner working overtime 0.0174 (0.328) 
One child -0.000779 (0.562) One child 0.00894 (0.504) 
Two children 0.00382 (0.116) Two children 0.00981 (0.478) 
More than two children 0.0000869 (0.914) More than two children 0.0141 (0.063) 
Having a physician as partner -0.000367 (0.780) Having a physician as partner  -0.00582 (0.659) 
Constant  0.199 (0.327)    
N 914     
  p-values in parentheses 
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
105 
 
 
The natural log of the mean income of males (group 1) is 11.28, while the natural log 
of the mean income for females (group 2) is 10.95. The natural log of the difference of 
the two mean incomes is 0.32. Out of it, 0.17 is the explained part and 0.15 is the 
unexplained part. The explained part provides the effects of the difference in 
characteristics on the gap: a negative coefficient means that women’s mean value with 
respect to a specific characteristic is higher than men’s (Xm-Xf) and it contributes to 
decrease the gap of β. On the contrary, a positive coefficient means that women’s mean 
value is lower than men’s and it contributes to increase the gap of β. The unexplained part 
provides the effects of the difference in returns of the characteristics on the gap. A 
negative coefficient means that women’s mean return on a specific characteristic is higher 
than men’s and it contributes to decrease the gap of β. A positive coefficient means that 
women’s mean return on a specific characteristic is lower than men’s and it contributes 
to increase the gap of β.   
Among the observable characteristics, the fact that men have, in average, a longer work 
experience, work longer hours and do more private practice than women increase the 
gender gap. Being more likely than women to be in a “vice” or in a “head”  position, as 
well as being more likely to work in a surgical specialty, also increase the gender pay gap. 
On the other hand, the fact that women are more likely than men to have a partner working 
overtime decreases the gap. Looking at the unexplained part, the lower returns, for 
women, of working in Public 2 and Private 1 translates into an increase of the total pay 
gap, given all other characteristics equals. The lower returns, for women, of having a 
partner working residually or part-time also increases the gap at 90% level. Finally, the 
“return” on children is higher for men than for women, as all the coefficients regarding 
the multinomial variable in the unexplained component report a positive sign but only 
having more than two children is significant at 90% level, that is the higher returns, for 
men, of having more than two children (with respect to women), increases the pay gap.  
 
 
VI. Conclusions  
The OLS analysis shows that no matter equal (observable) characteristics, women earn 
15% less than men. This suggests that, net of unobservable characteristics, mechanisms 
of discrimination take place in the five hospitals. These findings challenge the human 
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capital perspective by calling for the role of structural mechanisms in producing 
inequalities.  
Moreover, adding interaction terms in the model provides useful insights for 
understanding the mechanisms of discrimination though the use of interaction terms. The 
study confirms previous findings of the literature on the interaction of family 
characteristics with gender and more specifically that having a partner and having 
children significantly increases men’s income. Nevertheless, it has no effects on women’s 
income. Accounting for the incremental number of partner’s working hours and 
accounting for the number of children, a significant negative impact for women occurs 
with respect to partners working residually or part time and with respect to the third child 
at 90% level. Overall, the analysis shows that the “husband” and “fatherhood” premium 
for men appear stronger than the “wife” and the “motherhood” penalty for women47. 
Further interesting findings have emerged in the analysis of human capital and work 
characteristics: the use of interaction terms has shown that honors increase men’s income 
but not women’s one. Working in private hospitals increases men’s income but it 
decreases, at least in Private 1, women’s. That is, public institutions seem to guarantee 
more gender equality in terms of revenues, while private don’t and this may be due to the 
fact that in private hospitals, unlike in public ones, a substantial part of annual earnings 
is distributed to physicians through bonuses. Different “rewards”, whether they refer to 
male or female physicians have been found with respect to the hours of private practice, 
the choice of a surgical specialty and working in a top position. 
The decomposition partially confirms the results pointed out by the models accounting 
for interaction terms. Indeed, if the latter quantify the return of women’s (or men’s) 
                                                 
47 The causal relation between children and men’s income doesn’t have to be interpreted merely as a matter 
of (positive, in this case) discrimination. In other words, It is not only because employers discriminate 
workers on the base of their gender that, once they have children, they differently “reward” them, by 
positively discriminating men and increasing their income. The effect of children on men’s income should 
be interpreted also as a matter of “choice”. Once they have children, women and men may choose to 
differently invest in their paid work and non paid work activities because, on one part, their earnings are 
different, and, on the other, because women may anticipate discrimination. In other words, if on one hand 
women earn less than their male’s partner even before becoming mothers and, on the other, they expect to 
have greater difficulties in terms of career progression once they will have children, then the choice that 
both women and men make within the couple – in terms of splitting responsibilities and time devoted to 
paid and non paid activities on the base of the structure of their opportunities - are perfectly rational (Becker 
1985). Having considered this, men’s income are positively affected by children not only because 
employers reward parenting differently whether it refers to women or men (demand-side: direct 
discrimination), but also because of men’s and women’s choices of differently investing in paid activities 
once they become parents (supply-side: indirect discrimination).  
107 
 
characteristics on women’s (or men’s) income, the former tells if and how this difference 
in the returns increases or decreases the difference in pay. The analysis of the explained 
part has confirmed the results of the OLS model: the fact that men have a longer work 
experience, work longer hours, do more private practice, are clustered in surgical 
specialties and in top position increase the pay gap. The analysis of the unexplained part 
confirms the role of family interactions in producing inequalities but not the role of human 
capital and work interactions. Hence, the higher returns, for men, of having a working 
partner and more than two children increases the gap. Women report negative but not 
significant betas. Once again, the “husband” and fatherhood bonus seems stronger than 
the “wife” and motherhood penalty in determining the pay gap.  
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Chapter 5 – Explaining the vertical segregation  
 
 
 
 
 
I. The gender gap in authority in the literature  
The existence of the “vertical segregation” in workplaces is well documented in the 
literature (Jacobs 1995, Reskin and Roos 1990, Crompton and Sanderson 1993, Baxter 
and Wright 2000, Roth 2006, Crompton 2005). Three main metaphors have been used by 
scholars to describe its mechanisms: the “glass ceiling”, the “sticky floors” and the “leaky 
pipeline”. The former refers to the existence of an invisible barrier blocking the vertical 
mobility of women (Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, 1995), thus suggesting that the 
obstacles that women face in promotions are greater at the end of the career ladder than 
at the bottom (Baxter and Wright 2000). Sticky floors are complementary to the glass 
ceiling and suggest the idea that the obstacles that women face are grater at the beginning 
of the career ladder (Baert et al. 2016). The leaky pipeline (Alper 1993, Blickenstaff 2005) 
suggests that there is no difference between barriers at the beginning and barriers at the 
end of the ladder as female talents are “dropped” all along the career trajectory.   
Whether the obstacles are at the beginning, at the end, or all along the career ladder, 
the consequence is that women are clustered in the lower ranks of the hierarchies, while 
they are under-represented in the middle and in the top positions. While there are several 
studies describing the mechanisms of the vertical segregation, very few ones have 
addressed the empirical question of the relative probabilities of women and men being 
promoted (Baxter and Wright 2000). Even fewer studies apply this question to medical 
careers. At my knowledge only Jagsi et al. (2011) have done it with respect to academic 
careers, while no study have been conducted with respect to hospital careers yet.  
Beyond the more specific debate on medical career, in the more general literature on 
the labour market, the study of Baxter and Wright (2000) represents an important 
contribution in the study of the vertical segregation as it empirically investigates the 
probability of promotion at given steps of the career ladder through logistic regressions. 
The idea is to test the existence of the glass ceiling in three labour markets (Us, Sweden 
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and Australia) by calculating the female coefficients of promotion throughout a six-steps 
ladder. Baxter and Wright provide two definitions of glass ceiling. In its strict version, it 
implies the existence of barriers at the end of the ladder. In its broader version, it implies 
the existence of increasing barriers all along the ladder. Considering the two definitions 
of glass ceiling, its existence would be confirmed empirically if, on one hand, significant 
negative female coefficients to promotion are found at the end of the ladder (strict version) 
or if these coefficients worsen throughout the different steps (broader version). 
Empirically, the glass ceiling can be tested by running different logit models for each 
(adjacent) step of the career. If the female coefficient to promotion at a given level is 
worse than at the previous – adjacent – level of the ladder, then one must conclude that 
there is a glass ceiling. Their findings don’t confirm the existence of a glass ceiling, as in 
all the three countries analysed the female odds ratio to promotion are significant lower 
than men’s at the first of the six steps of the ladder, while Sweden and Australia report 
significant negative beta also at the third level. Overall, the study shows that in the three 
countries analysed, women are less likely to reach the top positions because of the 
existence of barriers at the beginning of the career ladder. Moreover, in two out of three 
countries, significant obstacles preventing women to climb the hierarchy are identified in 
the middle of the ladder. While denying the existence of a glass ceiling, the two authors 
are, de facto, confirming the existence of the sticky floors and the leaky pipeline, no 
matter if they don’t use such metaphors for describing their results.  
Baxter and Wright’s study has given rise to a rich debate. More specifically, their paper 
has been the object of two reviews – one by Ferree and Purkayastha (2000) and the other 
by Britton and Williams (2000) – shedding light on the critical aspects of their work. Both 
reviews contend the definition of glass ceiling provided by Baxter and Wright. According 
to the reviewers, the glass ceiling is not the result of increasing female disadvantages. It 
is, rather, the result of cumulative disadvantages (thus not necessarily increasing) faced 
by women all along their career trajectory. If this is the case – if the glass ceiling is the 
effect of tiny, even invisible, disadvantages, not necessarily increasing, throughout all the 
steps of the hierarchy – the fact that female coefficients to promotions stay constant or 
ameliorate at the top levels (as it is the case of Baxter and Wright’s study), in the critics’ 
point of view it doesn’t deny the existence of a glass ceiling. In other words, the glass  
ceiling is the effect of an accumulation of disadvantages (Merton 1968, Valian 1999). 
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What Britton and Williams suggest is to investigate the glass ceiling otherwise: by 
intensive qualitative case studies in order to capture detail information on the whole of 
the career trajectory. As for Ferre and Purkayastha (2000), they suggest to calculate the 
cumulative odds otherwise: any woman who made it to level 4 of a five-steps ladder has 
already survived severe discrimination, they say. Therefore, her odds of promotion to 
level 5 are the product of all the relative disadvantages she has gone trough at each step. 
If, for example, women have constant relative disadvantage to men, i.e. two thirds the 
chance of relative promotion at each level of a four-steps career ladder, the cumulative 
odds to promotion for women at level one, compare to their male colleagues at the same 
level, will be (2/3)4, that is the relative disadvantage raised to the number of steps (Ferree 
and Purkayastha 2000, p. 810).  
Both critics, no matter the different “solutions” they propose, insist on the fact that 
women face cumulative disadvantages and consider the glass ceiling as the effect of a 
leaky pipeline.  In other words, they both propose a different definition of glass ceiling 
and – on the base of this different definition – they contest Baxter and Wright’s empirical 
investigation. This is quite strong in Britton and Williams’s where their critic assumes 
theoretical insights. Recalling Reskin and Padavic’s work, the two authors argue that the 
glass ceiling and the sticky floors can be the same thing. But whatever language one use, 
such critics doesn’t contradicts Baxter and Wright’s empirical findings. It only suggests 
how to better interpret them, by taking in consideration the cumulative disadvantages 
women experience. By arguing – as Baxter and Wright do – that female odds to promotion 
are higher at the lower levels than at the top levels of the ladder simply means to argue 
that the problem deals more with sticky floors and leaky pipelines rather than with glass 
ceilings. This doesn’t mean to deny that women face cumulative disadvantages, on the 
contrary. Nor to deny that they are discriminated. It simply means that early steps of the 
career ladder are crucial, even more crucial than later steps, in determining women’s 
career outputs and – therefore  - their equal representation at the top positions. If they are 
crucial, they imply specific policies (i.e. mentoring) which are different from the ones 
used for addressing the problem of the glass ceiling (i.e. gender quota). For this reason, it 
is important to analytically distinguish the two concepts as it will be do in this chapter. 
Denying the existence of the glass ceiling doesn’t mean to deny the existence of the 
vertical segregation.  
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The reviewers’ critics appear more appropriate, in terms of empirical consequences, 
when they point out the lack of adequate indicators of the horizontal segregation in the 
labour market and of the “quality” of employees. If the former of the two problems can 
be solved by adding more adequate controls of the occupational segregation, the latter 
deals with the well-known problems of the measurability of unobservable characteristics 
(i.e. productivity and skills) in regression-based methods. The problem of unobservable 
characteristics is even more crucial in the study of the probabilities of promotion as, like 
Ferree and Purkayastha (2000) have pointed out, is intertwined with the issue of 
accumulated disadvantages. Indeed, since women are subjected to a more stringent 
selection process (due to discrimination), they are likely to be increasingly more qualified 
than men in the available pool of potential candidates for promotion. Therefore, “even a 
constant differential probability of promotion in favor of men would constitute an 
intensification of discrimination against women” (Wright and Baxter 2000, p. 817).  
Given that characteristics such as ability and skills are very hard to measure, their impact 
can be controlled by recurring to very homogeneous population as it is the case of this 
research.  
In this chapter the mechanism of vertical segregation will be investigated by 
replicating Baxter and Wright’s methodology. By adding the variable specialty in the 
model, the horizontal segregation will be controlled. Moreover, because of the choice of 
investigating one single profession, the problem of unobservable characteristics will be 
also reduced.  
 
 
II. Research design and hypothesis 
Drawing from Bexter and Wright’s study, the female odds of promotion will be 
calculated through three sets of logistic regressions. The dependent variable is constructed 
on a three-step career ladder (first level, vice and head). The first two sets of models are 
adjacent-level models calculating the probability of being in level n+1 compared to level 
n. The first set of models calculates female coefficients of promotion to “vice” compared 
to the first level. The second set of models calculates the female coefficient to promotion 
to the “head” level compared to the vice level. If the female odds of becoming head with 
respect to vice is worse than the female odds of becoming vice with respect to the 1st level 
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(net of unobservable characteristics), then it means that there is a glass ceiling at the end 
of the carrier. On the contrary, if the female odds of becoming vice (with respect to 1st) is 
worse than the female odds of becoming head (with respect to head), then it means that 
obstacles to women’s career advancement should be identified at the middle of the ladder 
and, more specifically, where responsibility (towards a sub-unit and its components) come 
into play for the first time48. In addition to the two adjacent level-models, a group-level 
model calculates the probability of becoming head compared to both first level and vice 
physicians. This set of models allows to relax the assumptions of the first two and it works 
as reliability check (I will come back to this point later).  
In addition to Baxter and Wright, once having assessed in which step of the ladder 
women face greater obstacles than men, I will explore the determinants of these obstacles. 
Five mechanisms by which being a woman physician may negatively affect the 
probability of career progression will be explored. Women may be less likely to be 
promoted because of their lower work experience (hypothesis 1) or because they work 
fewer hours (hypothesis 2). Women may be less likely to be promoted because of their 
grater family responsibilities. Hence, having children may negatively impact women’s 
probability to climb the career ladder while it may enhance men’s one (Hypothesis 3). 
Moreover, being married (or living together with) can engender different returns too: 
positives for men, negatives for women (Hypothesis 4).  Women may be less likely to be 
promoted because either they are discriminated by their employers or because of the effect 
of unobservable characteristics, such as quality, which are not included in the model.  
 
                                                 
48 Physicians can very well end their career as 1st level physicians. Being promoted a vice is not automatic, 
as it means to be responsible for a sub-unit and for its components. For this reason, it appears more correct 
to use the expression “glass ceiling”, rather than “sticky floors”, to refer to the barriers at the vice level. 
Unfortunately, I can’t test the sticky floor hypothesis because of the way the career ladder is constructed. 
As already mentioned (see chapter 3), each of the five hospitals had its own career ladder. The three public 
hospitals have a six-steps career ladder, Machado has a five-steps ladder while San Donato has a three-
steps ladder. In order to harmonize the three models of the ladder and correctly “sets” the physicians of San 
Donato (which presents the shortest ladder) in their right rank, I was obliged to create a three-step ladder, 
that is to reduce all the ladders to the San Donato model. The first level of the new scale groups two different 
ranks of the three public hospitals and Machado. The vice level group three levels of the public hospitals 
and two levels of Machado. If, by simplifying the scale, I have certainly gained in robustness, I 
unfortunately have lost in details. Such lost is reflected in the analysis of the probability of promotions. 
Indeed, I couldn’t analyze in details the probability of promotion through the different middle steps of the 
ladder and, most importantly I couldn’t analyze at all the odds of promotion of the early steps of the career. 
This analysis would have provided me with information on the existence, or not, of sticky floors. I certainly 
can run such analysis by restricting the dataset only to the three public hospitals (with, eventually, Machado) 
and excluding San Donato physicians. This will be the object of future researches.  
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III. The model  
The position in the career ladder is the dependent variable. According to the way it is 
coded, it will be possible to explore the odds of promotion at different levels of the ladder. 
In order to do this, three sets of models have been set. The first and the second set of 
models are adjacent level models analyzing, respectively, the odds of becoming vice with 
respect to the 1st level (vice-versus-1st level: first set) and the odds of becoming head with 
respect to the vice level of the career ladder (head-versus-vice: second set). In the first 
set, the dataset is restricted to physicians in the first or vice levels, the rank is coded as a 
dummy variable where 1=vice and 0=first level. In the second set, the dataset is restricted 
to physicians in the vice or head levels, the rank is coded as a dummy variable where 
1=head and 0=vice.  
The model of the two sets is a logistic regression estimating, for individuals i in a given 
level n of the career ladder, the odds ratios of being in the upper level n+1:  
 
Log [Pr(n+1)/Pr(n)]=a)+∑β(n+1)iXi+ ɛ 
 
where Pr(n+1) is the probability of being at level n+1 and Pr(n) is the probability of 
being at level n, the subscript n+1 indicates that the coefficients β refers to the probability 
of being in the level n+1, X are the covariates, a the intercept and ɛ the error. In the group-
level model, n is a macro-category including both 1st level and vice physicians, while n+1 
is the head level.  
In addition to the two adjacent level-models, a group-level model calculating the 
probability of becoming head compared to both first level and vice physicians is 
proposed. To do so, the adjacent levels “1st” and “vice” are collapsed together in a broader 
category. In this case, the dependent variable rank is coded as a dummy variable where 
1=head and 0=all other levels in order to analyze the probability of becoming head  after 
a certain cut-point, that is with respect both to the first and the vice levels. The group-
level model is useful for three reasons. First, it allows to increase the sample size as all 
the three steps of the ladder are included in the regression. On the contrary, the two 
adjacent level models are based on a restricted population. In the head-versus-vice model, 
for example, the number of observation is very low (391) as the most populated category 
– the 1st level – is excluded. Second, the two adjacent models assumes that the career 
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ladder is somewhat progressive and exclude that a 1st level physician can become head 
without passing though the step “vice”49. The group-level model relaxes this assumption. 
Third, it works as reliability check. If the results are consistent across the different 
codification of the dependent variable, then it provides confidence to the interpretation 
(Baxter and Wright, 2000a) 50.  
The analysis of the female probability to promotion will be reported in a first table, 
while the analysis of the determinants to promotion will be reported in a second table. In 
the first table, each sets of models includes two models. The first model reports the 
“gross” gender gap in authority without controlling for characteristics (the gender is the 
only explanatory variable added in the model). The second model reports the “net” gender 
gap controlling for human capital, work and family and characteristics. In the second 
table, each sets of models includes two models as well. The first model is the full model 
reporting the coefficients of all explanatory variables, the second model is the full model 
accounting for interaction terms.  
 
 
IV. Measures  
The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating the rank in the career ladder. 
The type of hospital is the control variable. Independent variables include human capital, 
work and family characteristics. Human capital characteristics include educational 
credentials and the years of experience. Educational credentials include a categorical 
variable with four outcomes for grade and a dummy variable for further titles where 
                                                 
49 “Skipping a step” is rare but not impossible. Certainly, the fact of having merged many different steps 
into only three (in order to harmonize the San Donato’s career ladder with the other four ladders) strongly 
reduce such probability.  
50 Reliability checks have also been done on the two adjacent-level models by running the same analysis 
through two multinomial logistic regressions. In this case, the dependent variable is coded as a three-item 
multinomial variable where 0=first level; 1=vice and 2=head. The two multinomial logits are run on the 
whole population. In the first model, the reference category is the first level. The logit provides two results: 
the odds of promotion to the vice level and the odds of promotion to the head level, both with respect to the 
reference category 1st level. The first model’s results are kept for doing reliability checks. In the second 
model, the reference category is the vice level. The logit provides two results: the odds of promotion to the 
head level and the odds of promotion to the 1st level with respect to the reference category vice. The first 
model’ results are kept for doing reliability checks. Comparing the four models (odds of promotion to head 
through logit and odds of promotion to head through multinomial logit; odds of promotion to vice through 
logit and odds of promotion to vice thorough multinomial logit) it emerges that the coefficients of the 
covariates, their p values and confidence intervals are very similar. Only the pseudo R2 changes, showing 
higher values in the multinomial logit than in the logit. The female coefficients of the multinomial logit 
models are reported in table 1 of this chapter.  
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1=having more than one specialty or a Ph.D and 0=having no or one specialty only. 
Individual work characteristics include the number of hours and the number of hours of 
private practice worked in a week. Institutional work characteristics include the rank (a 
three-item variable divided in first level, vice and head) and the specialty (a four-item 
variable divided in medicine, surgery, diagnostic and all others). 
Family characteristics include the marital status and the number of children. The 
marital status is a dummy variable where 1=being married or living together with a 
partner and 0=not married nor living together with a partner. The models have been run 
also using a multinomial variable for partner instead of the dummy, thus accounting for 
the work status of the partner. The multinomial variable is made of six categories: no 
partner, no working partner, partner working residually (from 0 to 20 hours a week), 
partner working part-time (from 21 to 30 hours a week), partner working full time (from 
31 to 40 hours) and workaholic partner (working more than 40 hours a week). The results 
of this alternative analysis are provided in the notes. A dummy variable has also been 
added for having (=1) or not (0) a partner who also works as a physician to control for 
homogamous couples. The number of children is a categorical variable made on the base 
of the question on the number of children living at home. It is composed by four category: 
0 for no children, 1 for 1 children, 2 for 2 children and 3 for more than 2 children. In order 
to account for the sexual division of work, two interval variables were added indicating 
the weekly hours of non-paid work and the weekly hours of non-paid work which is 
outsourced (through a maid, baby-sitting, etc.). Family networks are controlled through 
two dummies: one for having a partner physicians and the one for having a father 
physician.  
 
 
V. Results 
Table 1 reports the female coefficient for the gross gender gap and for the net gender 
gap for each level of comparison: the vice level against the 1st level (first row); the head 
level against the vice level (second row), the head level against the first and vice level 
grouped together (third row). The gross gender gap provides the female coefficient 
without controlling for differences in characteristics, while the net gender gap provides 
the female coefficient controlling for differences in characteristics (in human capital, 
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work and family). Tables from 2 to 4 provide the coefficients for the independent 
variables. Column 1 reports the full model, while column 2 reports the full model with 
interaction terms. For the second set of models only (vice-versus-head), a further column 
has been added reporting a nested model which is very similar to the full model without 
interaction except that the variable experience is not included.  
 
 
V.1. The female odds to promotion 
Table 1 reports the gross and net female coefficients to promotion divided by the level 
of comparison. As one can see, the coefficients of the binary logit regressions are 
consistent with the coefficients of the multinomial logit regressions. The only remarkable 
difference is the pseudo R2, which is bigger in the multinomial regressions. The logit only 
will be commented. Considering the two adjacent-level models (first and second row), 
there is a significant gross gender gap in authority both at the vice (set 1, column1) and 
at the head level (set 2, column 1). That is, without controlling for characteristics, first 
level female physicians are significantly less likely than men to be promoted to a vice 
level and vice female physicians are significantly less likely than men to be promoted to 
a head level. Interpreting the results in percentage terms, the odds of a first level woman 
being at the vice level are 54.4% smaller than the odds of her male colleagues, and the 
odds of a vice women being at the head level are 49.9% smaller than their male 
colleagues. The odds in set 2 are slightly better than the odds in set 1, that is the 
disadvantages women face (compared to men) at the middle level of the career are bigger 
than the disadvantages they face (compared to men) at the upper level. This is true also 
in the logit with controls (column 2): female coefficients to promotion to vice (set 1) are 
worse than female coefficient to promotion to head (set 2). Interpreting the result in 
percentage terms, the odds of a first level woman being at the vice level are 44.4% smaller 
than the odds of her male colleagues and the odds of a vice women being at the head level 
are 36.2% smaller than their male colleagues, controlling for differences in 
characteristics. Nevertheless, if the former are significant, the latter are not. That is, 
women experience significant relative disadvantages to promotion (with respect to men) 
only at the middle level of the career. As it will be discussed later, this is due to the control 
variable “experience”. Hence, after controlling for differences, it appears that the 
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disadvantages that women face have less to do with the existence of a glass ceiling and 
more with the existence of obstacles at the middle level of the career.  
Considering the grouped-level model (set 3), women are significantly less likely to be 
head both without and with controls in characteristics. Interpreting the results in 
percentage change, the odds for a woman to be head are 71.7% smaller than men’s odd 
without controlling for differences in characteristics and 50.1% smaller controlling for. 
Both relative “cumulative” disadvantages are significant.  
 
Tab 1 – Gross and net female gap in authority (logit and mlogit)  
          Logit Logit M-logit M-logit 
           (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Levels being compared Gross female gap 
(no controls) 
Net female gap 
(with controls) 
Gross female gap 
(no controls) 
Net female gap 
(with controls) 
Set 1: Vice vs 1st level  -0.786*** -0.586** -0.786*** -0.558** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.006) 
Pseudo R2 0.0255 0.2154 0.0360 0.2991 
N 938 853 1074 979 
Set 2: Head vs Vice -0.691** -0.449 -0.691** -0.419 
 (0.004) (0.196) (0.004) (0.195) 
Pseudo R2 0.0172 0.2676 0.0360 0.2991 
N 391 343 1074 979 
Set 3: Head vs all others  -1.264*** -0.696*   
 (0.000) (0.022)   
Psuedo R2  0.0501 0.4052   
N 1074 979   
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
V.2. The determinants of the vertical segregation 
Table 2 reports the three sets of logit models with controls and explanatory variables. 
For each set, the first column (1) reports the full model, while the second column (2) 
reports the full model with interaction terms. In Set 2, a further model (0) has been 
included: it is a nested one which is very similar to the full model except that the variable 
experience is not included.  
Overall, 1st level women are significantly less likely to become vice but the 
disadvantage is not significant anymore when it’s time, for a vice, to become head, 
keeping all characteristics constant. Nevertheless, as the nested model in Set 2 shows 
(column 0), without controlling for the years of experience the disadvantage turns 
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significant again. In other words, vice women are less likely to become head because, in 
general, they report a lower work experience. Women report a lower work experience 
because they are, in average, younger than men, as they have entered into the medical 
profession later. At first sight, this means that – considering the adjacent level model – 
the glass ceiling at the top level is more a matter of time and cohorts than a matter of 
discrimination (net of unobservable characteristics and not considering the cumulative 
disadvantage that vice women have already experienced in the earlier steps).  
As for the other determinants of the gender gap in authority, table 2 shows that men in 
private hospitals are more likely to become head, while it is not the case for women. 
Actually, working in Private 2 (Machado) decreases the likelihood of climbing the career 
ladder for women, as all the female coefficients in the three sets of model are negative 
though significant only in Set 1. Having a second specialty or a Ph.D. increases the 
likelihood of becoming vice, both for men and for women, but it increases the likelihood 
of becoming head only for men. Work hours increases the likelihood of becoming vice 
(set 1) and the cumulative likelihood to become head (set 3) for men, while they don’t 
have any positive effect for women. Even increasing years of experience have a different 
impact whether they refer to female or male doctors: they increase the likelihood of 
climbing the career for men but not for women. Contrary to the model on pay, the private 
practice doesn’t increase the likelihood (and the cumulative likelihood) to become head. 
As for the promotion to the vice levels, it actually decreases the likelihood for men while 
it doesn’t have any effect on women.  
As for the rest of the attributes, the hours of non paid work show a negative sign in the 
full models but they are not significant. Interacting them with gender proved to be 
significant at 90% level only in the cumulative-level model. In this case, they decrease 
the likelihood of becoming head for women while they have no effect on men. To 
correctly assess the impact of nonpaid work hours a control variable has also been added 
in order to account for the hours of nonpaid work outsourced (through a maid or a baby-
sitter).  
Contrary to the pay model, the career progression doesn’t seem to depend so much 
from the parental and the marital status. Being married (or living together with) doesn’t 
have an impact on the likelihood of promotion, nor it does by interacting the variable with 
gender. The parental status plays a role only in the likelihood to be promoted to the vice 
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level – as having two children significantly increases the likelihood for men and 
significantly decreases the likelihood for women – but not at the very top level. Having a 
partner working as a physician doesn’t have any impact, while it does have an impact – 
in order to become head – to have a father who is/was a physician. It is true at 90% level 
in the adjacent level model of the likelihood to become head and it is true at 95% level in 
the group-level model. Interacting the father physician with gender, it appears that having 
a father physicians does increase men’s likelihood of becoming head but it doesn’t with 
respect to women. This result is worth further analysis. Earlier studies on female 
“pioneers” in non traditional jobs have shown that the father’s profession plays a crucial 
role in the educational choices of daughters towards traditionally male sectors (Ridgeway 
1978, Auster and Auster 1981, Harlan and O’Farrell 1982). More recently, Falcinelli 
(2009) finds that having a father who is/was an aerospace engineer significantly increases 
female’ earnings. No matter if they refer to different career outcomes, the comparison 
between physicians and engineers is quite interesting as it may shed light on how the 
different professions work. Indeed, one must consider that the two labour markets – for 
engineers and for physicians – are very different in Italy. The latter is strongly intertwined 
with social networks and familism, while the former it is not. Different generations of the 
same family can work in the same hospital, and fathers can determine the career of their 
children. This is particularly true in public institutions and University hospitals, where 
academic logics characterized by nepotism (Wenneras and Wold 1997) and familism 
(Durante et al. 2011) –  come into play. Hence, the different results with respect to the 
role of the father should be interpreted considering the differences in the work dynamics. 
In a “free” market like engineering, fathers works as role model for female daughters. In 
a market like medicine, which is affected by networks and family relations, fathers have 
an active role in facilitating their sons’ careers (but not their daughters’).   
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Tab 2 – The determinants of the vertical segregation  
 
 Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 
 Vice vs 1st level  Head vs Vice Head vs all others 
 (1)  (2)  (0) (1)  (2)    (1)    (2) 
Female  -0.586** 2.761* -0.743* -0.449 0.396 -0.696* 1.332 
 (0.005) (0.035) (0.020) (0.196) (0.819) (0.022) (0.568) 
Hospital: Public 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Hospital: Public 2 -0.851*** -0.583 0.773* 0.622 0.217 0.536 0.503 
 (0.000) (0.090) (0.033) (0.109) (0.650) (0.143) (0.277) 
Hospital: Public 3 -0.577* -0.168 1.293** 1.065* 0.827 1.049** 1.249* 
 (0.036) (0.655) (0.001) (0.014) (0.114) (0.009) (0.013) 
Hospital: Private 1 -0.421 -0.128 1.985*** 2.567*** 2.129** 2.391*** 2.252*** 
 (0.266) (0.792) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hospital: Private 2 0.613 1.609* 1.292** 1.897*** 2.150** 2.351*** 2.713*** 
 (0.125) (0.016) (0.006) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hospital*female: 
Public 1 
 0   0  0 
  (.)   (.)  (.) 
Hospital*female: 
Public 2 
 -0.555   1.283  0.387 
  (0.244)   (0.124)  (0.617) 
Hospital*female: 
Public 3 
 -0.921   0.422  -0.419 
  (0.092)   (0.670)  (0.640) 
Hospital*female: 
Private 1 
 -0.863   1.361  0.759 
  (0.301)   (0.306)  (0.486) 
Hospital*female: 
Private 2 
 -1.820*   -0.697  -0.904 
  (0.031)   (0.534)  (0.401) 
Grade: up to 104 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Grade: 105-110 -0.0685 -0.0754 0.491 0.256 0.237 0.353 0.382 
 (0.795) (0.780) (0.227) (0.550) (0.595) (0.360) (0.335) 
Grade: honors 0.0896 0.0636 0.711 0.438 0.417 0.531 0.587 
 (0.732) (0.813) (0.077) (0.307) (0.347) (0.166) (0.137) 
Further titles  0.374 0.431* 0.675* 0.202 0.121 0.396 0.713* 
 (0.078) (0.047) (0.014) (0.501) (0.693) (0.135) (0.029) 
Further title*female        -0.972 
       (0.106) 
Experience  0.106*** 0.130***  0.151*** 0.175*** 0.189*** 0.204*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Experience*female  -0.0432   -0.0445  -0.0151 
  (0.060)   (0.409)  (0.740) 
Work hours 0.0416*** 0.0596*** -
0.00744 
0.00855 0.0136 0.0441** 0.0453* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.638) (0.623) (0.459) (0.002) (0.010) 
Work hours*female   -0.0385     -0.0116 
  (0.077)     (0.719) 
Hours of private 
practice 
-0.0549* -
0.0809** 
0.00834 0.000991 0.00263 -0.0461 -0.0430 
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.804) (0.978) (0.943) (0.082) (0.107) 
Hours of private 
practice*female  
 0.0849      
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  (0.052)      
Specialty: Medicine  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Specialty: Surgery  0.113 0.0458 -0.477 -0.139 -0.143 0.0489 -0.0253 
 (0.632) (0.850) (0.150) (0.703) (0.698) (0.878) (0.939) 
Specialty: Diagnostic  0.0922 0.0347 0.393 0.443 0.435 0.274 0.198 
 (0.697) (0.886) (0.291) (0.267) (0.284) (0.425) (0.570) 
Specialty: All others  0.930 1.074* 1.183* 1.704** 1.523* 2.021*** 1.958*** 
 (0.065) (0.035) (0.022) (0.004) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hours of non-paid 
work  
-0.00241 -0.00155 -
0.0228* 
-0.0124 -0.0109 -0.0135 0.000160 
 (0.633) (0.762) (0.028) (0.245) (0.322) (0.142) (0.988) 
Hours of non-paid 
work*female 
      -0.0363 
       (0.078) 
Outsourced domestic 
work (h)  
0.00543 0.00864 0.0394** 0.0256 0.0294 0.0286* 0.0324* 
 (0.607) (0.418) (0.007) (0.106) (0.076) (0.033) (0.020) 
No children  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
One child 0.297 0.231 -0.415 -0.223 -0.218 -0.0284 -0.0434 
 (0.250) (0.519) (0.211) (0.532) (0.547) (0.927) (0.892) 
Two children  0.512* 0.820* -1.085** -0.545 -0.509 -0.301 -0.365 
 (0.045) (0.013) (0.003) (0.168) (0.211) (0.386) (0.311) 
More than two 
children  
0.596 0.614 -1.226* -0.648 -0.557 -0.576 -0.533 
 (0.084) (0.182) (0.034) (0.276) (0.353) (0.288) (0.335) 
No children*female   0      
  (.)      
One child*female   0.0171      
  (0.972)      
Two children*female   -0.967*      
  (0.049)      
More than two 
children*female  
 -0.277      
  (0.677)      
Partner 0.442 0.472 -0.0706 -0.419 -0.529 -0.0359 0.0883 
 (0.109) (0.092) (0.852) (0.313) (0.215) (0.919) (0.806) 
Partner physician  -0.404 -0.405 0.228 0.276 0.275 0.0947 0.0331 
 (0.076) (0.081) (0.453) (0.392) (0.405) (0.746) (0.913) 
Father physician  0.229 0.295 0.173 0.591 0.917 0.816* 1.224** 
 (0.448) (0.343) (0.667) (0.172) (0.069) (0.035) (0.008) 
Father 
physician*female  
    -1.824  -1.823 
     (0.148)  (0.117) 
Constant  -4.970*** -6.671*** -1.256 -6.034*** -
6.693*** 
-
9.936*** 
-10.92*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.174) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
pr2 0.2154 0.2319 0.1623 0.2676 0.2855 0.4052 0.4240 
N 853 853 343 343 343 979 979 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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VI. Conclusions 
The adjacent-level models show that the obstacles that women face are stronger in the 
middle of the career ladder than at the top. This is confirmed by the fact that the female 
relative disadvantage (to men) in the likelihood of becoming head is not significant once 
the years of experience are added into the model. Does it mean that what appears to be as 
a glass ceiling at the head level is only a matter of time? Yes, but only if one doesn’t 
consider the disadvantages that vice female physicians have experienced before arriving 
there. In a “cumulative” perspective, being head remains, indeed, significantly more 
difficult for women than for men. Interpreting these results at the light of Baxter and 
Wright’s critical reviews, the glass ceiling that women physicians face is more the effect 
of a leaky pipeline all along the career progression than the effect of existing obstacles at 
the end of the ladder.  
As for the determinants of the lower female representation at top levels, some work 
variables seems to have a different impact whether they refer to women or men: working 
in private hospitals helps men but not women, while the hours spent at work and the years 
of experience count “more” for men than for women. Family variables don’t play a crucial 
role as they did in the pay model, as the second child affect career outcomes (positively 
for men and negatively for women) only at the vice level. Rather, having a father 
physician helps men, but not women.  
Overall, women are significantly penalized when they move from the first level to the 
vice level. This is a very important step, as it is the very first step where physicians are 
responsible for a sub units and for a team. It is were, actually, the progression of career 
starts. As for the reasons why this happens, the child penalty explains only a tiny part of 
the problem. Discrimination plays an important role as female disadvantage stands 
controlling for all characteristics and equal work attributes produce different outcomes 
(work institution, hours, experience).  
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
This research is an attempt to shed light on the mechanisms and on the causes of gender 
inequalities in medical careers. Data on more than a thousand physicians have been 
collected through an online survey sent to the medical workforce of five health 
organisations in the Lombardy Region. The survey submission lasted for more than a year 
and 48.7% of the target population answered to the questionnaire. The research is based 
on a very specific population made of high-skilled professionals who strongly invested in 
their education and work long hours. This has the advantage of reducing heterogeneity 
bias while investigating the reasons of gender inequalities. As it has already argued, if 
gender inequalities occur no matter women are similar to men in their human capital and 
work characteristics, than it is reasonable to think that they occur in a greater extent in 
the rest of the labour market.  
 Arguing that women and men show similar characteristics doesn’t mean they don’t 
show any difference at all. On the contrary, descriptive statistics show that women in the 
dataset graduate with better grades than men do but once they have entered in the 
profession they are less likely to have further specializations. Even if today they are the 
majority of PhD students in the health sector in Italy (and at the University of Milan), it 
is not the case in the five hospitals, where more men than women have a post-graduate 
title. Women physicians tend to have a smaller portfolio-career than men, they are less 
mobile and they work three hours less than men per week, but once the hours of private 
practice are not taken into account, the gap decreases to only slightly more than one hour 
per week. On the other hand, motivational drives do not seem to follow gender 
stereotypical patterns. With respect to the mechanisms of segregation, women tend to 
cluster in medical specialties while surgery still remains a male-dominated specialty area. 
The career ladder still remains harder to climb for them: women are the majority of 
physicians in the lower rank of the ladder but they are the minority in the upper ranks. 
Pay differentials are relevant: men earn 26.6% more than women, which is much greater 
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than the national pay gap (7.3%). The analysis of family characteristics has shown a quite 
traditional picture, with women, and in particular mothers, remaining the main 
responsible for non paid work while reducing, with respect at least to the general 
population, the time devoted to domestic and care activities, either by outsourcing 
nonpaid work or renouncing to motherhood (39% of women in the dataset are childless), 
as other studies on high-skilled professionals have shown (Wajcman 1998, Roth 2006).  
Once having “mapped” the population, two forms of gender inequalities have been 
explored: the pay gap and the authority gap. The Ols analysis shows that no matter equal 
characteristics, women earn 15% less than men. This suggests that, net of unobservable 
attributes, mechanisms of discrimination take place in the five hospitals. Adding 
interaction terms in the model provides further insights as it allows to investigate the 
effect of characteristics by gender. Hence, being married and being father significantly 
increases men’s income, while being married and being mother has no effects on 
women’s income. Only controlling for the number of children, a negative impact at 90% 
for women appears with the third child. In other words, the “husband” and “fatherhood” 
premium for men appear stronger than the “wife” and the “motherhood” penalty for 
women. This should be interpreted in terms of direct (positive) discrimination towards 
fathers (by employers) but also in terms of indirect discrimination, that is in terms of 
conditioned choices within the couple, given the structure of opportunities. This is a quite 
interesting funding as it may suggest that women’s struggles for emancipation have 
reduced employer’s bias against women at work but they haven’t reduced men’s 
privilege. Further findings have emerged with respect to human capital and work 
characteristics: obtaining honors in medical school is more “rewarding”, in terms of pay, 
for men than for women. Similarly, it is more rewarding for men working as a surgeon, 
doing private practice or being in a top position (keeping all other characteristics 
constant). Working in private hospital is disadvantageous for women while it is 
advantageous for men. Overall, public institutions seem to guarantee a greater gender 
equality in pay, while private organisations do not and this may be due to the crucial role 
played by bonuses – mostly used in private hospitals – in determining  revenues (Roth 
2006).  
The logit models on the likelihood of reaching a top position in the career ladder show 
a complementary picture to the one provided by the analysis of the pay gap. Considering 
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the three steps of the career ladder – 1st level, vice and head – women face stronger 
obstacles to become “vice” than to become “head”. Metaphorically speaking, the vertical 
segregation among physicians seems more a matter of a “leaky pipeline” than a matter of 
a “glass ceiling”. Women are significantly less likely than men to become vice and this 
may be due to a process of accumulation of disadvantages in the previous steps of the 
career. But once they reach that level, it is easier (with respect to the previous steps) to 
progress further. As for the determinants of the vertical segregation, family variables don’t 
seem to play a crucial role as they do in the pay model except for the second child, who 
positively affects the likelihood for men to become vice and negatively affects women’s. 
Interaction terms show interesting results. Having a father physicians helps men in 
progressing the ladder, but not women, as well as the fact of  working in private hospitals. 
Work hours and years of experience are also differently “rewarded” in terms of career 
outcomes whether they refer to women or men, suggesting once more that gender 
inequality is not only a matter of “being like men are” (Wajcman 1998).  
These results challenge the human capital approach by arguing that discriminatory 
mechanisms, preventing female physicians to earn as much as men do and to have the 
same chances of career than men have, are taking place. Structural constraints should be 
then advocated to better understand the persistence of gender disparities in medical 
careers. This calls for the demand of adopting and implementing equal opportunities and 
anti-discriminatory policies in workplaces. Special attention should be devoted to early-
careers, where the risk of loosing women who are likely to become head one day is higher, 
as well as to private hospitals, where the pay gap is higher because of the higher 
propensity, with respect to public institutions, of rewarding physicians through bonuses. 
Gender-aware policies should therefore also be taken in order to reduce the impact of 
unconscious gender biases on the bonus policy (Valian 1999). Finally, inequalities in the 
distribution of paid and unpaid activities within the couple should also be considered. 
Italian women physicians have much invested in their (market) human capital but, at the 
same time, they are still most responsible for the care of the children and the elderly. As 
a consequence, they “solve” their work-life conflict either by reducing the number of 
children or by renouncing to motherhood. Italy lacks of adequate work-life balance 
policies (Saraceno and Naldini 1998, Saraceno 2003, Naldini and Saraceno 2008). 
Therefore, affordable early-child and elderly care services should be promoted, as well as 
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a stronger sharing in family responsibilities by strengthening paternity and parental 
leaves. Italian fathers dispose of only two days of mandatory paternal leaves (plus two 
facultative days) and parental leaves are not sufficiently paid (30% of the salary). This is 
not enough, as it reinforce traditional gender roles with negative consequences in terms 
of women’s occupation and gender equality.  
This study has also some limits. First, as it is based on cross-sectional data, it is not 
able to provide a solution to the problem of time (or the problem of numbers, if one 
prefers) in the study of gender inequalities. Are gender equalities only a matter of time? 
Will be they disappear once parity in numbers – between men and women – will be 
reached in all cohorts? Recent studies – using either experimental methods (Baert et al. 
2016) or longitudinal data (Palomba 2013, Sasser 2005) – argue that they won’t. If this is 
the case also with respect to the medical profession, it should be further investigated. 
Second, this research is based on quantitative methods, both in the data collection and in 
their analysis. This has an advantage – providing information on a large-scale sample – 
but it also has a limit, as it sometimes lacks of a deep understanding of the dynamics 
which are behind the determinants of gender inequalities. Such understanding could be 
provided by in-depth qualitative case studies. Indeed, this was the original idea at the base 
of the S.T.A.G.E.S. project, which was eventually discarded for organisational reasons, 
as it has been illustrated in the second chapter. Now that the implementation phase of the 
project has ended, this idea will be realized during the sustainability phase. In-depth 
interviews will be realized to privileged witnesses of the Policlinico Hospital and to 
physicians working in the surgical department. The reason of focusing on the surgical 
area is motivated by the fact that, unlikely the medical one, surgery is still strongly male-
dominated and its study could provide precious insights on the gender dynamics in “non 
traditional” specialties, thus making part of the larger debate on non traditional jobs.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Copy of the questionnaire sent to the Legnano hospital 
 
18 febbraio 2015 
Questionario informatizzato Indagine Gender in Medical Careers 
Azienda Ospedaliera “Ospedale civile di Legnano” 
 
 
Nota interna CAMPIONE: 1 -4- 5- 6- 7 
 
Intro 
L’Università degli Studi di Milano ha realizzato il presente questionario con l’obiettivo di 
mappare i percorsi di carriera del personale medico con attenzione alle differenze di età, 
specialità, genere nonché a temi come la qualità dell’ambiente di lavoro, il rapporto con i 
colleghi, la precarietà e i meccanismi di promozione.  
La ricerca si inserisce nell’ambito del progetto STAGES - Structural Change to Achieve Gender 
Equality in Science. La Sua partecipazione al questionario è importante e consentirà di colmare 
una lacuna in ambito europeo rispetto alla conoscenza delle carriere mediche.  
Non Le occorrerà molto tempo: la compilazione varia infatti da un minimo di 7 a un massimo di 
15 minuti.  
Le garantiamo che le Sue risposte saranno utilizzate solo in modo aggregato e a fini scientifici, 
nel pieno rispetto della normativa a protezione della privacy e dei dati personali (D.L. n. 196 del 
30/6/2003). 
 
ISTRUZIONI PER LA COMPILAZIONE DEL QUESTIONARIO:  
- Per accedere alle domande: clicchi sulla scritta verde in basso a destra, “procedi 
all’indagine”.  
- Per modificare/rivedere le sue risposte: clicchi sul bottone in alto a sinistra “Domande 
Precedenti” e poi su "correggi".  
- Per rivedere l'intero questionario compilato: una volta concluso apparirà il bottone 
CORREGGI LE DOMANDE PRECEDENTI .  
- AL TERMINE per salvare le sue risposte definitivamente e chiudere il questionario: clicchi 
su CONFERMA.  
ATTENZIONE: L'inattività per 60 minuti comporta lo scadere della sessione. E' 
possibile interrompere la compilazione del questionario e riprendere in seguito dal punto in cui 
l'ha lasciata, senza perdere le risposte già inserite --> clicchi su "continua l'indagine in 
seguito" e per accedere nuovamente usi il link che le abbiamo inviato. 
Può accedere di nuovo a queste istruzioni durante la compilazione cliccando sul tasto .:HELP:. 
che trova in alto a destra. 
Per ulteriori informazioni puo' scrivere al Laboratorio di Indagini Demoscopiche: lid@unimi.it 
 
Alessandra Caserini 
LID- Laboratorio Indagini Demoscopiche  
Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali e Politiche 
http://www.socpol.unimi.it/lid  
______________________________________ 
000 
146 
 
Per cominciare, Lei è: 
 
01 Maschio 
02 Femmina 
--- 
001_D Campione =06 e Campione =07 
Specifichi quante ore ha lavorato la scorsa settimana... 
 
 N. ore tra,0-100 
001_D01 /G 001_D per l'Azienda Ospedaliera Ospedale Civile di 
Legnano 
 
001_D02 per altra Azienda Ospedaliera  
001_D03 per altra attività clinica (ad es. studio privato)  
--- 
001_E Se Campione=06 
Lei è: 
 
01 Supplente 
02 Titolare 
03 Titolare responsabile di branca 
77 Altro, specificare ->T 
--- 
002 Se 001=02 OPPURE001=03  Non viene visualizzata a nessuno 
Qual è la sua posizione all’interno dell’ Università ?  
 
01 Dottorando/a 
02 Borsista (con Borsa per giovani promettenti) 
03 Collaboratore (co.co.co) 
04 Assegnista di ricerca 
05 Ricercatore a tempo determinato 
06 Ricercatore a tempo indeterminato 
07 Professore Associato 
08 Professore Ordinario 
77 ALTRO, specificare  ____________ 
--- 
003 Se 002>01 E 002<06 Non viene visualizzata a nessuno 
Potrebbe specificare durata del contratto ? 
 
01 MESI  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 0-120" 
--- 
004 Se Campione =05 OPPURE Campione =04 
Qual è la sua posizione all’interno dell’ OSPEDALE ?  
 
02 Borsista 
04 Dirigente con meno di cinque anni di servizio 
05 Dirigente con più di cinque anni di servizio 
06 Dirigente con incarico professionale 
07 Dirigente con incarico di struttura semplice (UOS) 
08 Dirigente con incarico di struttura semplice dipartimentale (UOSD) 
09 Dirigente con incarico di struttura complessa (UOC)/ PRIMARIO  
11 Direttore di dipartimento ->ESCLUDE LE PRECEDENTI 
77 ALTRO,  specificare (es.: consulente o altro non previsto prima)  ____________ 
--- 
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005 Se Campione =01 
Qual è la sua area di specializzazione? 
 
01 AREA MEDICA 
02 AREA CHIRURGICA 
03 AREA SERVIZI CLINICI 
04 AREA VETERINARIA 
--- 
006_1 Se 005 =01 
Indichi la specializzazione 
 
01 Medicina interna 
02 Geriatria 
03 Medicina dello sport 
04 Medicina termale 
05 Oncologia medica 
06 Medicina di comunità 
07 Allergologia ed Immunologia clinica 
08 Dermatologia e Venereologia 
09 Ematologia 
10 Endocrinologia e malattie del ricambio 
11 Gastroenterologia 
12 Malattie dell’apparato cardiovascolare 
13 Malattie dell’apparato respiratorio 
14 Malattie infettive 
15 Medicina tropicale 
16 Nefrologia 
17 Reumatologia 
18 Neurofisiopatologia 
19 Neurologia 
20 Neuropsichiatria infantile 
21 Psichiatria 
22 Psicologia clinica 
23 Pediatria 
--- 
006_2 Se 005 =02 
Indichi la specializzazione 
 
01 Chirurgia Generale 
02 Chirurgia dell’apparato digerente 
03 Chirurgia pediatrica 
04 Chirurgia plastica, ricostruttiva ed estetica 
05 Ginecologia ed Ostetricia 
06 Neurochirurgia 
07 Ortopedia e traumatologia 
08 Urologia 
09 Chirurgia Maxillo-Facciale 
10 Oftalmologia 
11 Otorinolaringoiatria 
12 Cardiochirurgia 
13 Chirurgia Toracica 
14 Chirurgia Vascolare 
77 Altro, Specificare  ____________ 
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--- 
006_3 Se 005 =03 
Indichi la specializzazione 
 
01 Anatomia Patologica 
02 Biochimica Clinica Microbiologia e Virologia 
03 Patologia Clinica 
04 Radiodiagnostica 
05 Radioterapia 
06 Medicina nucleare 
07 Anestesia Rianimazione e Terapia Intensiva 
08 Audiologia e foniatria 
09 Medicina fisica e riabilitativa 
10 Tossicologia Medica 
12 Genetica medica 
13 Scienza dell’alimentazione 
14 Farmacologia 
15 Chirurgia orale 
16 Ortognatodonzia 
17 Odontoiatria Pediatrica 
18 Odontoiatria clinica generale 
19 Igiene e Medicina Preventiva 
20 Medicina Aeronautica e Spaziale 
21 Medicina del Lavoro 
22 Medicina Legale 
23 Statistica sanitaria 
24 Farmacia ospedaliera 
25 Fisica Medica 
77 Altro, Specificare  ____________ 
--- 
007 Se 001=03 (non si visualizza mai!) 
In Università, qual è il suo settore scientifico-disciplinare? 
 
01 AREA 05 - Scienze biologiche 
02 AREA 06 - Scienze Mediche 
77 ALTRO Settore, specificare  ____________ 
--- 
008 Se 007=01 (non viene visualizzata) 
Esattamente in quale settore delle SCIENZE BIOLOGICHE? 
 
01 Bio/01 botanica generale 
02 Bio/02 botanica sistematica 
03 Bio/03 botanica ambientale e applicata 
04 Bio/04 fisiologia vegetale 
05 Bio/05 zoologia 
06 Bio/06 anatomia comparata e citologia 
07 Bio/07 ecologia 
08 Bio/08 antropologia 
09 Bio/09 fisiologia 
10 Bio/10 biochimica 
11 Bio/11 biologia molecolare 
12 Bio/12 biochimica clinica e biologia molecolare clinica 
13 Bio/13 biologia applicata 
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14 Bio/14 farmacologia 
15 Bio/15 biologia farmaceutica 
16 Bio/16 anatomia umana 
17 Bio/17 istologia 
18 Bio/18 genetica 
19 Bio/19 microbiologia generale 
77 ALTRO Settore, specificare  ____________ 
--- 
009 Se 007=02 (non viene visualizzata) 
Esattamente in quale settore delle SCIENZE MEDICHE 
 
01 Med/01 statistica medica 
02 Med/02 storia della medicina 
03 Med/03 genetica medica 
04 Med/04 patologia generale 
05 Med/05 patologia clinica 
06 Med/06 oncologia medica 
07 Med/07 microbiologia e microbiologia clinica 
08 Med/08 anatomia patologica 
09 Med/09 medicina interna 
10 Med/10 malattie dell'apparato respiratorio 
11 Med/11 malattie dell'apparato cardiovascolare 
12 Med/12 gastroenterologia 
13 Med/13 endocrinologia 
14 Med/14 nefrologia 
15 Med/15 malattie del sangue 
16 Med/16 reumatologia 
17 Med/17 malattie infettive 
18 Med/18 chirurgia generale 
19 Med/19 chirurgia plastica 
20 Med/20 chirurgia pediatrica e infantile 
21 Med/21 chirurgia toracica 
22 Med/22 chirurgia vascolare 
23 Med/23 chirurgia cardiaca 
24 Med/24 urologia 
25 Med/25 pschiatria 
26 Med/26 neurologia 
27 Med/27 neurochirurgia 
28 Med/28 malattie odontostomatologiche 
29 Med/29 chirurgia maxillofacciale 
30 Med/30 malattie apparato visivo 
31 Med/31 otorinolaringoiatria 
32 Med/32 audiologia 
33 Med/33 malattie apparato locomotore 
34 Med/34 medicina fisica e riabilitativa 
35 Med/35 malattie cutanee e veneree 
36 Med/36 diagnostica per immagini e radioterapia 
37 Med/37 neuroradiologia 
38 Med/38 pediatria generale e specialistica 
39 Med/39 neuropsichiatria infantile 
40 Med/40 ginecologia e ostetricia 
41 Med/41 anestesiologia 
42 Med/42 igiene generale e applicata 
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43 Med/43 medicina legale 
44 Med/44 medicina del lavoro 
45 Med/45 scienze infermieristiche generali, cliniche e pediatriche 
46 Med/46 scienze tecniche di medicina di laboratorio 
47 Med/47 scienze infermieristiche ostetrico-ginecologiche 
48 Med/48 scienze infermieristiche e tecniche neuro-psichiatriche e riabilitative 
49 Med/49 scienze tecniche dietetiche applicate 
50 Med/50 scienze tecniche mediche applicate 
77 ALTRO Settore, specificare  ____________ 
--- 
010 Se Campione=04 OPPURE Campione=05 OPPURE  Campione=06 OPPURE  
Campione=07 
Qual è l'area della sua specializzazione (D.M.  30 gennaio e 31 gennaio 1998)? 
 
01 AREA CHIRURGICA E DELLE SPECIALITA' CHIRURGICHE. 
02 AREA DELLA MEDICINA DIAGNOSTICA E DEI SERVIZI. 
03 AREA DI ODONTOIATRIA (Specializzazione in ODONTOIATRIA) 
04 AREA DI SANITA' PUBBLICA. 
05 AREA MEDICA E DELLE SPECIALITA' MEDICHE 
06 AREA DELLA SANITA’ ANIMALE 
07 AREA DELL’IGIENE DEGLI ALLEVAMENTI E DELLE PRODUZIONI 
ZOOTECNICHE (Specializzazione in IGIENE DEGLI ALLEVAMENTI E DELLE 
PRODUZIONI ZOOTECNICHE) 
77 ALTRO, specificare  ____________ 
--- 
011_1 Se 010=05 
Precisamente, qual è la sua specializzazione? 
 
01 ALLERGOLOGIA ED IMMUNOLOGIA CLINICA 
02 ANGIOLOGIA 
03 CARDIOLOGIA 
04 DERMATOLOGIA E VENEREOLOGIA 
05 EMATOLOGIA 
06 ENDOCRINOLOGIA 
07 GASTROENTEROLOGIA 
08 GASTROENTEROLOGIA 
09 GERIATRIA 
10 MALATTIE DELL'APPARATO RESPIRATORIO 
11 MALATTIE INFETTIVE 
12 MALATTIE METABOLICHE E DIABETOLOGIA 
13 MEDICINA DELLO SPORT 
14 MEDICINA E CHIRURGIA D'ACCETTAZIONE E D'URGENZA 
15 MEDICINA FISICA E RIABILITAZIONE 
16 MEDICINA INTERNA 
17 NEFROLOGIA 
18 NEONATOLOGIA 
19 NEUROLOGIA 
20 NEUROPSICHIATRIA INFANTILE 
21 ONCOLOGIA 
22 PEDIATRIA 
23 PSICHIATRIA 
24 RADIOTERAPIA 
25 REUMATOLOGIA 
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26 SCIENZA DELL'ALIMENTAZIONE E DIETETICA 
77 ALTRO, specificare  ____________ 
--- 
011_02 Se 010=01 
Precisamente, qual è la sua specializzazione? 
 
01 CARDIOCHIRURGIA 
02 CHIRURGIA GENERALE 
03 CHIRURGIA MAXILLO-FACCIALE 
04 CHIRURGIA PEDIATRICA 
05 CHIRURGIA PLASTICA E RICOSTRUTTIVA 
06 CHIRURGIA TORACICA 
07 CHIRURGIA VASCOLARE 
08 GINECOLOGIA E OSTETRICIA 
09 NEUROCHIRURGIA 
10 OFTALMOLOGIA 
11 ORTOPEDIA E TRAUMATOLOGIA 
12 OTORINOLARINGOIATRIA 
13 UROLOGIA 
77 ALTRO, specificare  ____________ 
--- 
011_04 Se 010=02 
Precisamente, qual è la sua specializzazione? 
 
01 ANATOMIA PATOLOGICA 
02 ANESTESIA E RIANIMAZIONE 
03 BIOCHIMICA CLINICA 
04 FARMACOLOGIA E TOSSICOLOGIA CLINICA 
05 LABORATORIO DI GENETICA MEDICA 
06 MEDICINA LEGALE 
07 MEDICINA NUCLEARE 
08 MEDICINA TRASFUSIONALE 
09 MlCROBlOLOGIA E VIROLOGIA 
10 NEUROFISIOPATOLOGIA 
11 NEURORADIOLOGIA 
12 PATOLOGIA CLINICA (LABORATORIO DI ANALISI CHIMICO-CLINICHE E 
MICROBIOLOGIA) 
13 RADIODIAGNOSTICA 
77 ALTRO, specificare  ____________ 
--- 
011_05 Se 010=04 
Precisamente, qual è la sua specializzazione? 
 
01 DIREZIONE MEDICA DI PRESIDIO OSPEDALIERO. 
02 EPIDEMIOLOGIA 
03 IGIENE DEGLI ALIMENTI E DELLA NUTRIZIONE 
04 IGIENE EPIDEMIOLOGIA E SANITA' PUBBLICA 
05 MEDICINA DEL LAVORO E SICUREZZA DEGLI AMBIENTI DI LAVORO 
06 ORGANIZZAZIONE DEI SERVIZI SANITARI DI BASE 
77 ALTRO, specificare  ____________ 
--- 
011_06 Se 010=06 
Precisamente, qual è la sua specializzazione? 
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01 AREA DELL’IGIENE DELLA PRODUZIONE, TRASFORMAZIONE, 
COMMERCIALIZZAZIONE, CONSERVAZIONE E TRASPORTO DEGLI ALIMENTI DI 
ORIGINE ANIMALE E LORO DERIVATI. 
77 ALTRO, specificare  ____________ 
--- 
012 Se Campione=04 OPPURE Campione =05 OPPURE Campione =06  
Che tipo di contratto ha? 
 
01 Tempo determinato 
02 Tempo indeterminato 
03 A progetto/co.co.co 
04 A partita Iva 
77 ALTRO, specificare  ____________ 
--- 
013 Se 012=01 OPPURE  012=03 
Potrebbe specificare durata del contratto? (in mesi) 
 
01 MESI  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 0-120" 
--- 
013_01 Se 012 =01 
Dalla specialità all'assunzione a tempo determinato quanti anni ha lavorato in una posizione 
precaria (es: libera professione, contratto a progetto etc.)? 
 
01 Indica anni  ____________  VALORI ACCETTATI 0-30" 
--- 
013_02 Se 012=02 
Dalla specialità all'assunzione a tempo indeterminato quanti anni ha lavorato in una posizione 
precaria (es: libera professione, contratto a progetto e contratti a tempo determinato etc.)? 
 
01 Indica anni  ____________  VALORI ACCETTATI 0-30" 
--- 
014 
Ora ricostruiamo la sua carriera a partire dalla laurea. Ci può indicare con quale voto si è 
laureata/o? 
 
01 voto  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 66-110" 
02 con lode ->M 
99 Non ricordo il voto di laurea 
--- 
015A Se Campione DIVERSO 01 risposta multipla 
Quali  altri titoli di studio ha conseguito? (possibili più risposte) 
 
01 Dottorato 
02 Specializzazione 
03 Seconda specializzazione 
04 Master 
99 Nessuno di questi titoli -> ESCLUDE LE ALTRE 
--- 
015B Se Campione =01 risposta multipla 
Esclusa la specializzazione che Lei sta facendo, quali  altri titoli di studio ha conseguito? 
(possibili più risposte) 
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01 Dottorato 
03 Specializzazione 
04 Master 
99 Nessuno di questi titoli -> ESCLUDE LE ALTRE 
--- 
016 
Ha mai fatto esperienze di studio o di lavoro all’estero? Se sì, indichi per quanti mesi 
complessivamente?  
(se ha avuto più esperienze all'estero faccia la somma totale dei mesi): 
 
01 Sì, di durata inferiore al mese 
02 ►Sì, indichi il totale di MESI...  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 1-200" 
03 No, non ho mai fatto esperienze di studio o di lavoro all’estero 
--- 
017 Se Campione DIVERSO 01 
In che anno ha iniziato la sua attività lavorativa? Nel caso abbia conseguito una specializzazione 
e/o un dottorato post-laurea, ci dica in che anno ha iniziato la sua attività lavorativa una volta 
terminata l’eventuale specializzazione e/o dottorato. 
 
01 ANNO  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 1930-2014" 
--- 
018 
In che anno ha cominciato a lavorare nella struttura in cui attualmente lavora? Consideri anche i 
contratti precari, i rapporti di collaborazione, ecc. 
 
01 ANNO  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 1930-2014" 
--- 
019 Se 004=07 OPPURE 004=08  OPPURE 004=09 
In che anno è diventato dirigente con incarico di struttura semplice (UOS)? 
 
01 ANNO  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 1930-2014" 
02 Non ho avuto incarichi di UOS 
--- 
020 Se 004=08 OPPURE 004=09 
In che anno è diventato dirigente con incarico di struttura semplice dipartimentale (UOSD)? 
 
01 ANNO  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 1930-2014" 
02 Non ho avuto incarichi di UOSD 
--- 
021 Se 004=09 
In che anno è diventato dirigente con incarico di struttura complessa (UOC)? 
 
01 ANNO  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 1930-2014" 
--- 
024 Se Campione DIVERSO 01 
In quante strutture ospedaliere ha lavorato nella sua carriera? 
 (Indichi 1 se ha sempre lavorato presso il medesimo Ospedale) 
 
01 N. OSPEDALI  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 1-20" 
--- 
025 Se 024>1 risposta multipla 
Pensi all’ultimo spostamento: per quale motivo ha cambiato struttura? (possibili più risposte). 
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01 Per migliore offerta economica 
02 Per migliorare la mia formazione/ricerca 
03 Per ricongiungimento con il mio/la mia partner 
04 Perché ero costretto/a a lavorare troppe ore 
05 Per conflitto con colleghi/superiori 
77 ALTRO, specificare  ____________ 
--- 
026_01 
Parliamo ora della sua situazione lavorativa attuale. Considerando il complesso delle sue 
attività, quante ore ha EFFETTIVAMENTE lavorato la settimana scorsa, compresa l'eventuale 
libera professione ? 
 
01 N. ore  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 0-100" 
--- 
026_02 
E quante ore sarebbero previste a settimana dal suo contratto?  
Se intrattiene rapporti lavorativi con più di un’azienda, faccia la somma delle ore previste in 
ciascuno contratto e scriva il totale. 
 
01 N. ore  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 0-100" 
--- 
027 risposta multipla FINO A MAX  3 
Se Le capita di lavorare più di quanto stabilito da contratto, quali sono le principali tre ragioni?( 
al massimo 3 risposte)  
  
01 No, non mi capita -> ESCLUDE LE ALTRE 
02 Sì, è richiesto dal tipo di lavoro, non è una scelta 
03 Sì, per guadagnare di più, arrotondare lo stipendio 
04 Sì, per crescita professionale 
05 Sì, per fare carriera 
06 Sì, per responsabilità nei confronti dei miei pazienti 
77 Sì, ALTRA RAGIONE, quale?  ____________ 
--- 
028 
Quale delle affermazioni che seguono descrive meglio la sua situazione? 
 
01 Il mio contratto prevede determinati orari di entrata non modificabili 
02 Il mio contratto prevede determinati orari di entrata ed uscita non modificabili. 
03 Il mio contratto prevede flessibilità in entrata ed uscita 
04 Non ho vincoli di orari di entrata ed uscita 
--- 
029  
Pensi al suo lavoro: indicativamente, quanta parte del suo tempo lo dedica a ciascuna delle 
seguenti attività? Risponda in percentuale. 
 
01 CLINICA _______________VALORI ACCETTATI 0-100" 
02 RICERCA _______________VALORI ACCETTATI 0-100" 
77 Altro, specificare (per es. attività di gestione/management): VALORI ACCETTATI 0-100" 
--- 
(warning in caso di errore) 
029W se 029_77>1 e 029_77 vuota  
ATTENZIONE! E' STATO INSERITO UN VALORE PERCENTUALE SENZA 
SPECIFICARE NULLA NEL CAMPO DI TESTO "ALTRO"   Clicchi sull'opzione "Correggo 
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la risposta precedente" e su prosegui e compili correttamente il campo SPECIFICA. 
 
01 Correggo la risposta precedente torna a  029 
--- 
(warning in caso di errore) 
029W2  Se la somma delle 29 è diversa da 100  (warning in caso di errore) 
ATTENZIONE! LA SOMMA DELLE VOCI NON CORRISPONDE al 100%" Clicchi 
sull'opzione Correggo la risposta precedente e su prosegui e corregga le cifre. 
 
01 Correggo la risposta precedente torna a  029 
--- 
030 Se Campione diverso da 7 
La scorsa settimana per quante ore ha praticato la libera professione ? 
 
01 N. ore  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 0-100" 
02 Non pratico la libera professione 
--- 
032 
Se le proponessero un importante avanzamento di carriera o un’interessante occasione 
professionale che richiede uno spostamento geografico di oltre 100 km, Lei accetterebbe?  
 
01 Sì 
02 No 
--- 
035 
Pensi alla sua attività in ospedale. Il suo capo è: 
 
01 Uomo 
02 Donna 
03 Non ho un capo a cui rispondo direttamente 
--- 
036 
Lei ha l’incarico di coordinare il lavoro svolto da altre persone? 
 
01 Sì 
02 No 
99 Non so/non rispondo 
--- 
037 
A suo avviso che cosa conta veramente per poter fare carriera nell’ospedale in cui lavora? 
Esprima il suo livello di accordo per ciascuna delle seguente affermazioni: 
 01 Per 
nulla 
02 
Poco 
03 
Abbastanza 
04 
Molto 
038_01 Numero di ore lavorate in Ospedale     
038_02 Risultati conseguiti/performance 
lavorativa 
    
038_03 Anzianità     
038_04 Avere un buon network sociale di 
conoscenze 
    
038_05  Pubblicazioni     
 
--- 
039 
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Chi le ha dato maggiore appoggio durante la sua carriera? 
 
01 Partner 
02 Un genitore/i genitori 
03 Colleghi 
04 Capo uomo 
05 Capo donna 
06 Un mentore (guida, consigliere di fiducia, maestro) 
07 Rete di conoscenze/amici/network informali 
77 ALTRO, specificare  ____________ 
99 Nessuno 
--- 
040 Se 039 =06 
il mentore/la guida è un uomo o una donna? 
 
01 uomo 
02 donna 
--- 
041 Se 039 =07 
Prevalentemente maschili o femminili? 
 
01 maschili 
02 femminili 
99 Non so/Non rispondo 
--- 
042 
Esprima il suo livello di accordo per ciascuna delle seguenti affermazioni. Nel suo lavoro... 
 
 01 Per 
nulla 
02 
Poco 
04 
Abbastanza 
05 
Molto 
Le mie capacità non sono adeguatamente 
valorizzate 
    
Sicurezza e decisione sono le mie doti     
Comprensione, condivisione e ascolto sono le mie 
doti 
    
E’ fondamentale avere l’appoggio di qualche 
collega più anziano 
    
Gli uomini sanno farsi valere meglio delle donne     
--- 
044 Lei ha un/una partner convivente? 
 
01 Sì 
02 No 
--- 
045 Se 044=01  
Siete sposati? 
 
01 Sì 
02 No 
--- 
046 Lei ha figli?, se sì quanti? 
 
01 N. figli  - VALORI ACCETTATI DA 1 A 9 
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-09 No, non ho figli 
--- 
047 Se 046>=01 
Quanti minori di 14 anni? 
 
01 N. figli minori di 14 anni  - VALORI ACCETTATI DA 0 A 9 
--- 
048 Se 046>=01 
Quanti convivono con Lei? 
 
01 N. figli coabitanti  - VALORI ACCETTATI DA 0 A 9 
--- 
049 
Ha mai divorziato o si è mai separato (di fatto o legalmente) ? 
 
01 Sì, ho divorziato 
02 Sì, mi sono separato 
03 No 
--- 
050 Se 047>=01 
Chi si occupa dei figli quando Lei è al lavoro? Attenzione  Selezioni  in ordine di tempo 
trascorso. Sono possibili  FINO A due risposte. Es: se i vostri figli trascorrono 6 ore alla scuola 
materna e 3 ore con la nonna, cliccare ,  NELL'ORDINE, PRIMO su “servizi per l’infanzia” e 
SECONDO su “nonni”. 
  
 01 Primo 02 Secondo 99 Non scelto 
Il mio partner/la mia partner    
Servizi per l’infanzia (nido-materna) o scuola    
Baby sitter    
Nonni    
ALTRO, specificare...    
 
(warning in caso di errore) 
050W  se 050_77=01 e 050_77 vuoto OPPURE  SE 050_77=02  E 050_77 VUOTO->  
ATTENZIONE! E' STATA SCELTA L'OPZIONE ALTRO  SENZA SPECIFICARE NULLA 
NEL CAMPO DI TESTO "ALTRO" Clicchi sull'opzione, Specifica prosegui e completi il 
campo . 
 
01 Specifica -> TORNA ALLA 50 
--- 
051 
Ha sperimentato o sperimenta delle difficoltà a conciliare il lavoro con la vita privata? 
 
01 Sì 
02 No 
03 Qualche volta 
--- 
052 Se 051 =01 OPPURE 051 =03 
Indichi quanto ciascuno di questi fattori incide sull’equilibrio vita-lavoro nel suo quotidiano . 
Attenzione: qualora l'opzione non fosse applicabile al suo caso perché non ha figli selezioni  
"Non sperimentato". 
 01 Non 
sperimentato 
02  
Per nulla 
03 
Poco 
04 
Abbastanza 
05  
Molto 
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rigidità dell’orario / turni 
notturni 
     
giornata lavorativa troppo 
lunga 
     
mancanza di servizi per 
l’infanzia 
     
mancanza di nonni vicini      
mancata condivisione dei 
ruoli di cura all’interno 
della coppia 
     
Altro, specificare      
--- 
(warning in caso di errore) 
052W Se 052_77=02 e 052_77= senza specifica o 052_77=03 e 052_77= senza specifica 
oppure 052_77=04 e 052_77= senza specifica , oppure 052_77=05 e 052_77= senza specifica 
ATTENZIONE! NON E' STATO SPECIFICATO NULLA NEL CAMPO DI TESTO "ALTRO" 
Clicchi su La preghiamo di correggere e su prosegui, poi corregga specificando un fattore che 
incide sull’equilibrio vita-lavoro oppure selezionando "NON SPERIMENTATO 
 
1 La preghiamo di correggere ->torna a  052" 
--- 
053 risposta multipla FINO A MAX  2 
Nella sua carriera, ha incontrato o sta incontrando qualcuno dei seguenti ostacoli? Quali? Può 
indicare  fino a 2 risposte 
 
01 nessun ostacolo -> ESCLUDE LE ALTRE 
02 mancanza di una guida/di un mentore 
03 pregiudizi da parte dei colleghi e/o supervisori 
04 ambiente/colleghi ostile/i 
05 mobbing 
06 difficoltà nell’accedere alle reti informali di conoscenze che contano 
07 discriminazione sessuale 
77 ALTRO, specificare  ____________ 
--- 
055 
Si avvale di un aiuto domestico retribuito? Se sì, per quante ore la settimana? 
 
01 Sì, indichi il n. di ore settimanali  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 1-60" 
-9 Non ho un aiuto domestico 
--- 
 
056 Se 044=01 
La settimana scorsa, indicativamente, quante ore Lei e il suo/la sua partner avete dedicato alle 
seguenti attività? Se non avete svolto queste attività indichi 0 
           
 Lei    il suo partner 
056.01 Cura dei figli minori di 14 anni:   
056.02 Cura di genitori/suoceri anziani 
056.03 Attività domestiche di pulizia/cucina/bucato ecc: 
056.04 Attività come l’amministrazione e la riparazione della casa/dell’auto, il giardinaggio, 
ecc: 
056.05 Coordinamento della baby sitter / domestica  
--- 
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057 Se 044=02 
La settimana scorsa, indicativamente, quante ore ha dedicato alle seguenti attività? Se non le ha 
svolte indichi 0 
 
057.01 Cura dei figli minori di 14 anni:   
057.02 Cura di genitori/suoceri anziani 
057.03 Attività domestiche di pulizia/cucina/bucato ecc: 
057.04 Attività come l’amministrazione e la riparazione della casa/dell’auto, il giardinaggio, 
ecc: 
057.05 Coordinamento della baby sitter / domestica  
--- 
058 Se 044=01 
Indicativamente, per quante ore (retribuite) ha lavorato il suo/la sua partner la settimana scorsa? 
 
01 0 ore 
02 da 1 a 10 ore 
03 da 10 a 20 ore 
04 da 20 a 30 ore 
05 da 30 a 40 ore 
06 da 40  a 50 ore 
07 oltre 50 ore 
--- 
059 (RISPOSTA MULTIPLA) 
Ci sono altri medici nella sua famiglia? Specifichi chi, oltre a lei, pratica (o ha praticato prima 
del pensionamento) la professione medica. Sono possibili più risposte.  
 
01 Mio padre 
02 Mia Madre 
03 Il mio/la mia partner 
77 Altro familiare? specifichi qui...  ____________ 
99 Nessuno -> ESCLUDE LE ALTRE 
--- 
060 Se 059=03 
Qual è posizione suo/ la sua partner? 
 
01 Assegnista 
02 Borsista 
03 Contrattista/ collaboratore (co.co.co/co.co.pro) 
04 Dirigente in formazione con meno di cinque anni di servizio 
05 Dirigente con più di cinque anni di servizio 
06 Dirigente con incarico professionale 
07 Dirigente con incarico di struttura semplice (UOS) 
08 Dirigente con incarico di struttura semplice dipartimentale (UOSD) 
09 Dirigente con incarico di struttura complessa (UOC)/ PRIMARIO 
10 Direttore di area ->M 
11 Direttore di dipartimento ->M 
77 ALTRO,  specificare (es.: consulente o altro non previsto prima)  ____________ 
--- 
061 Se 046>=01 
Ha utilizzato almeno una volta o sta utilizzando i  congedi parentali ?Definizione di Congedo 
parentale o astensione facoltativa: congedo per entrambi i genitori della  durata max di 10 mesi 
nei primi 8 anni  di vita del bambino  remunerato al 30% . (Se è la donna a usufruirne si parla 
comunemente di maternità facoltativa)  
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01 No, non ne ho avuto bisogno 
02 No, non li ho chiesti: la legge è entrata in vigore quando mio figlio/i miei figli erano già 
grandi. 
03 No, sono un/una lavoratore/lavoratrice autonomo/a e non ne ho diritto 
04 No, li ho chiesti ma non mi sono stati concessi 
05 No, li ha utilizzati il mio/la mia partner 
06 No, ho preferito non utilizzarli per non compromettere la mia carriera 
07 Sì 
--- 
062 Se 061=07 
Per quanti giorni complessivamente? Pensi a tutte le volte in cui ne ha usufruito per i suoi figli 
 
01 N. giorni  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 1-365" 
99 Non ricordo 
--- 
 
063 Se 000==02 E 046>=1 
Pensi al/la suo/a primogenito/a: ha usufruito o sta usufruendo dei cosiddetti permessi per 
allattamento? 
 
01 No, non ne ho avuto bisogno 
02 No, non li ho chiesti: la legge è entrata in vigore quando mio figlio/i miei figli erano già 
grandi. 
03 No, sono un/una lavoratore/lavoratrice autonomo/a e non ne ho diritto 
04 No, li ho chiesti ma non mi sono stati concessi 
05 No, li ha utilizzati il mio/la mia partner 
06 No, ho preferito non utilizzarli per non compromettere la mia carriera 
07 Sì 
--- 
064 Se 000==01 E 046>=1 
Ha mai usufruito del  congedo di paternità ? In Italia il congedo di paternità è previsto come 
diritto autonomo del padre (Legge Fornero)  e prevede un giorno di astensione obbligatoria più 
due giorni facoltativi entro i 5 mesi dalla nascita del figlio. 
 
01 No, non ne ho avuto bisogno 
02 No, non li ho chiesti: la legge è entrata in vigore quando mio figlio/i miei figli erano già 
grandi. 
03 No, sono un lavoratore autonomo e non ne ho diritto 
04 No, li ho chiesti ma non mi è stato concesso 
05 No, ho preferito non utilizzarli per non compromettere la mia carriera 
06 Sì 
--- 
065F Se 063=07 
Fino a che mese di vita del bambino/bambina? 
 
01 MESE  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 1-12" 
--- 
065M Se 064=06 
per quanti giorni complessivamente? 
 
01 N. giorni  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 1-3" 
--- 
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066SA  
Se Campione =01 OPPURE Campione =04 E 004<04 OPPURE Campione =05 
Ultime domande. Qual è la sua retribuzione annuale lorda? Faccia riferimento all’anno passato e 
pensi alla retribuzione totale, comprensiva di eventuali indennità, bonus, percentuali sui Drg, 
consulenze, libera professione ecc. Pensi in sostanza  alla sua dichiarazione dei redditi derivante 
da lavoro dipendente e/o autonomo. 
 
01 Fino a 10mila euro 
02 Da 10mila a 15mila 
03 Da 15mila a 20mila 
04 Da 20mila a 25mila 
05 Da 25mila a 30mila 
06 Da 30 a 40mila 
07 da 40 a 50mila 
08 Oltre 50mila 
99 Non rispondo 
 
--- 
067 Se Campione =04 E 004=04 OPPURE Campione =04 E 004=05 OPPURE Campione =04 
E 004=06 e 026_02<21 ) 
Ultime domande. 
Qual è la sua retribuzione annuale lorda? Faccia riferimento all’anno passato e pensi alla 
retribuzione totale, comprensiva di eventuali indennità, bonus, percentuali sui Drg, consulenze, 
libera professione ecc. Pensi in sostanza alla sua dichiarazione dei redditi derivante da lavoro 
dipendente e/o autonomo. 
 
01 Fino a 25mila 
02 Da 25 a 30mila euro 
03 Da 30 a 40mila euro 
04 Da 40 a 50mila euro 
05 Da 50 a 60mila euro 
06 Da 60mila a 70mila euro 
07 Da 70mila a 80mila euro 
08 Da 80mila a 90mila euro 
09 Da 90mila a 100mila euro 
10 Da 100 a 120mila euro 
11 Oltre 120mila euro 
99 Non rispondo 
---  
068 Se (Campione =04 e 004>06) oppure (Campione=4 e 004=06 e 026_02>20) 
Ultime domande. 
Qual è la sua retribuzione annuale lorda? Faccia riferimento all’anno passato e pensi alla 
retribuzione totale, comprensiva di eventuali indennità, bonus, percentuali sui Drg, consulenze, 
libera professione ecc. Pensi in sostanza alla sua dichiarazione dei redditi derivante da lavoro 
dipendente e/o autonomo. 
 
01 Fino a 50mila 
02 Da 50 a 60 mila euro 
03 Da 60 a 70mila euro 
04 Da 70 a 80mila euro 
05 Da 80 a 90mila euro 
06 Da 90 a 100mila euro 
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07 Da 100 a 120 mila euro 
08 Da 120 a140mila euro 
09 Da 140 a 170mila euro 
10 Da 170 a 200mila euro 
11 Da 200 a 230mila euro 
12 Oltre 230mila euro 
99 Non rispondo  
--- 
 
068SLP Se Campione =06 OPPURE Campione =07 (sumaisti e liberi professionisti) 
Ultime domande. 
Qual è la sua retribuzione annuale lorda? Faccia riferimento all’anno passato e pensi alla 
retribuzione totale, comprensiva di eventuali indennità, bonus, bonus, percentuali sui Drg, 
consulenze, libera professione ecc. Pensi in sostanza alla sua dichiarazione dei redditi derivante 
da lavoro dipendente e/o autonomo. 
 
01 Fino a 20mila euro 
02 Da 20 a 30mila euro 
03 Da 30 a 40mila euro 
04 Da 40 a 50mila euro 
05 Da 50 a 60mila euro 
06 Da 60mila a 70mila euro 
07 Da 70mila a 80mila euro 
08 Da 80mila a 90mila euro 
09 Da 90mila a 100mila euro 
10 Da 100mila a 120mila euro 
11 Da 120mila a 140mila euro 
12 Da 140mila a 170 mila euro 
13 Da 170 mila a 200 mila euro 
14 Da 200 a 230 mila 
15 Oltre 230 mila 
99 Non rispondo 
--- 
069 
Per finire, qual è il suo anno di nascita? 
 
01 ANNO  ____________ VALORI ACCETTATI 1930-1995" 
--- 
Z77_FINE 
Il questionario è terminato, la ringraziamo molto  per la sua collaborazione. Se vuole, può 
rilasciarci qualche commento o suggerimento.  
 
01 Eventuale commento (facoltativo) ____________ 
--- 
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Appendix 2 
Analysis of the representativity of the respondent dataset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. POLICLINICO51 
Gender   m f total    
Population dataset freq 385 350 735   
  % 52.38 47.62 100   
Respondent dataset freq 126 121 247   
  % 51.01 48.99 100   
p52        0.6680   
       
 
 
       
Rank   Population dataset  Respondent dataset p 
<=IP  freq   579   194   
 %   78.78  78.54 0.1796 
Uos freq   93  21   
 %   12.65  8.5 0.0204 
Uosd freq   10  5   
 %   1.36  2.02 0.0000 
Uoc freq   53  27   
  %   7.21   10.93   0.3876 
tot freq   735  247   
  %   100   100   
       
 
 
 
       
Year of birth (mean)   Population dataset Respondent dataset p 
Men      1961.9   1962.7   
Women      1065.6   1967.1   
Tot     1063.7   1964.8 0.4655 
       
 
  
 
     
                                                 
51 For the Policlinico the statistics comparison is made using the population dataset since the email list 
dataset doesn’t contain any useful information to compare with.  
52 P values greater than 0.05 suggest that there is not a significant difference between the two values. H0: 
there is not a significant difference. If p>0.05 the null hypothesis (H0) is accepted.  
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Gross income53 (mean)   m f tot   
Population dataset    74551 73276 73906   
Respondent dataset   85973 62747 74753   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. MACHADO54 
Gender    m f total   
Email list dataset  Freq 75 71 146*   
  % 51.37 48.63 100   
Respondent dataset  Freq 34 38 72   
  %  47.22 52.78 100   
p         0.4862   
       
 
 
       
Type of practice   Email list dataset  Respondent dataset p 
Academic  Freq   12   6   
 %   8.22   8.33 0.9723 
Hospital employees Freq   86   45   
 %   58.9   62.5  0.5334 
Hospital freelancers Freq   48   21   
  %   32.88   29.17 0.4938 
Tot Freq   146   72   
  %   100   100   
 
                                                 
53 The income provided by the hospital is the salary. Therefore, it doesn't take account of private practice 
and external consultancies. On the contrary, the income in the respondent dataset does. The two data are 
therefore not comparable. No matter the impossibility of comparing the two data, this table provides 
nonetheless useful insights on the weight of the private practice in producing the gender pay gap.  
54 From now on (Machado, Legnano, Como, San Donato), the statistics comparisons are made on the email 
list datasets provided by the hospitals which were corrected by excluding residents and non medical 
professionals. For Legnano, Como and San Donato the email list dataset corresponds to the population, 
while for Machado it corresponds to a sub-population (see chapter 2).  
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3. LEGNANO 
Gender    m f total   
Email list dataset  Freq 360 360 720   
  % 50 50 100   
Respondent dataset  Freq 191 212 403   
  %  47.39 52.61 100   
p        0.2961   
       
 
 
 
 
       
Type of practice   Email list dataset  Respondent dataset p 
Academic  Freq   0   0   
 %   0   0   
Hospital employees Freq   688   394   
 %   95.55   97.77 0.0029 
Hospital freelancers Freq   28   9   
  %   3.89   2.23 0.0252 
Hospital collaborators Freq   4   0   
 %    0.56   0   
Tot Freq   720   403   
  %   100   100   
       
 
 
 
       
Specialty55   Email list dataset  Respondent dataset p 
Medicine Freq   324   186   
 %   45.83   46.5 0.8956 
Surgery  Freq   225   111   
 %   31.82   27.75  0.0554  
Diagnostic Freq   148   97   
  %   20.93   24.25 0.1421 
Public Health  Freq   10   6   
 %    1.41   1.5  0.9020 
Tot Freq   707   400   
  %   100   100   
 
       
                                                 
55 Thirteen cases in the email dataset are missing. Comparison made excluding missing cases. As missing 
cases in the email dataset corresponds to cases that in the respondent dataset which are coded either as “all 
other specialties” or “missing” (3 in total), both two items have been excluded for comparison in the 
respondent dataset.  
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Rank   Email list dataset  Respondent dataset p 
1st level Freq   523   288  
 %  72.64  71.46 0.6022 
Vice  Freq  122  71   
 %  16.94  17.62 0.7232 
Head Freq  43  36   
 %  5.97  8.93 0.0380 
All others Freq  32  8   
  %    4.44   1.99 0.0005 
Tot Freq  720  403   
  %   100   100   
       
       
 
       
Seniority (years, 
mean)   Email list dataset Respondent dataset p 
Men      16.4  17.1   
Women      14.2   12.6   
Tot     15.3   14.8 0.1603 
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4. COMO 
Gender    m f total   
Email list dataset  Freq 305 219 524   
  % 58.21 41.79 100   
Respondent dataset  Freq 134 105 239   
  %  56.07 43.93 100   
p        0.5067   
       
 
 
 
 
 
      
Type of practice   Email list dataset  Respondent dataset p 
Hospital employees Freq   491   226   
 %   93.7   94.56 0.5598 
Hospital freelancers Freq   33   13   
  %   6.3   5.44 0.5598 
Tot Freq   524   239   
  %   100   100   
       
 
 
 
       
Specialty56   Email list dataset  Respondent dataset p 
Medicine Freq   184   117   
 %   44.88   50.21 0.1054 
Surgery  Freq   117   55   
 %   28.54   23.61 0.0782 
Diagnostic Freq   104   56   
  %   25.37   24.03 0.6355 
Public Health  Freq   5   5   
  %    1.22   2.15 0.3312 
Tot Freq  410   233   
  %   100   100   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 Information provided by the hospital for employees only. The specialty of employee physicians in the 
emergency units (81 individuals) can’t be drawn from the email dataset. Comparison made only between 
employees and excluding missing cases (which in the respondent dataset are coded either as missing or as 
“all other specialties”).  
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5. SAN DONATO 
Gender    m f total   
Email list dataset  Freq 176 126 302   
  % 58.28 41.72 100   
Respondent dataset  Freq 68 45 113   
  %  60.18 39.82 100   
p       0.6822   
       
 
 
 
       
Type of practice   Email list dataset  Respondent dataset p 
Academic  Freq   17   8   
 %   5.63   7.08 0.5507 
Hospital employees Freq   1   1   
 %   0.33   0.88  0.5327  
Hospital freelancers Freq   281   102   
  %   93.05   90.27 0.3229 
Hospital collaborators  Freq   3   2   
  %   0.99   1.77 0.5344 
Tot Freq  302   113   
  %   100   100   
       
 
 
 
       
Rank   Email list dataset  Respondent dataset p 
1st level Freq   245   73   
 %  81.13  64.6   
Vice57  Freq  2  15   
  %   0.66   13.27   
1stlevel+Vice Freq  247  88   
  %    81.79   17.87   
Head Freq  55  25   
  %    18.21   22.12   
Total  Freq  302  113   
  %    100   100 0.3207 
       
       
                                                 
57 The discrepancy in the vice position between the email dataset and the respondent dataset is due to the 
fact that, formally, only two physicians in the whole organization have a vice qualification. Nevertheless, 
informally, many 1st level physicians are – de facto – vice, no matter if they don’t report it in their 
qualification. This informal step has been reported in the respondent dataset.  
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Specialty58   Email list dataset  Respondent dataset p 
Medicine Freq   109   58   
 %   40.98   51.33 0.0305 
Surgery  Freq   75   25   
 %   28.2   22.12 0.1244 
Diagnostic Freq   79   27   
  %   29.7   23.89 0.1524 
Public Health  Freq   3   3   
 %    1.13   2.65 0.3169 
Tot Freq   266   113   
  %   100   100   
       
 
 
 
 
      
Age (years, mean)   Email list dataset Respondent dataset p 
Men     49.5  49.1   
Women     41   42.2   
Tot     45.9   46.4 0.6825 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 Thirty-six cases in the email dataset either don’t report the specialty or the specialty is reported but it is 
not possible to codify according to the specialty classification used for the respondent dataset. These cases 
have been excluded for comparison. The San Donato respondent dataset doesn’t report any missing case 
(or “all other specialties” cases).  
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Appendix 3 
Tables and figures supporting descriptive statistics in Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 –Bivariate analysis on the likelihood of holding a second specialty by age  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Bivariate analysis on the likelihood of holding a Ph.D. by age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                  
           _cons    -9.122819   .6908853   -13.20   0.000    -10.47693   -7.768709
             age     .1459834   .0122187    11.95   0.000     .1220352    .1699316
                                                                                  
second_specialty        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                  
Log likelihood = -446.90224                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1970
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =     219.28
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       1074
. logit second_specialty age, nolog
                                                                              
       _cons      .313352   .6326833     0.50   0.620    -.9266844    1.553388
         age    -.0643219   .0137796    -4.67   0.000    -.0913295   -.0373144
                                                                              
         phd        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -233.72244                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0472
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =      23.16
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       1074
. logit phd age, nolog
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Table 3 – Bivariate analysis on the likelihodd of holding a second specialty by gender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – Likelihood of holding a second specialty by gender controlling for age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                  
           _cons    -1.034533   .0966826   -10.70   0.000    -1.224028   -.8450389
          gender    -.6145829   .1534295    -4.01   0.000    -.9152993   -.3138666
                                                                                  
second_specialty        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                  
Log likelihood = -548.29593                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0148
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =      16.49
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       1074
                                                                                  
           _cons    -8.990215    .721242   -12.46   0.000    -10.40382   -7.576607
             age     .1443916   .0124563    11.59   0.000     .1199776    .1688055
          gender    -.1056721   .1728947    -0.61   0.541    -.4445394    .2331953
                                                                                  
second_specialty        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                  
Log likelihood = -446.71533                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1973
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =     219.65
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       1074
. logit second_specialty gender age, nolog
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Table 5 – Cross-tab between second specialty and gender if age <57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Cross-tab between second specialty and gender if age>56  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   0.3262   Pr = 0.568
                100.00     100.00      100.00 
     Total         325        407         732 
                                             
                 11.38      10.07       10.66 
       yes          37         41          78 
                                             
                 88.62      89.93       89.34 
        no         288        366         654 
                                             
 specialty        male     female       Total
    second          gender
          Pearson chi2(1) =   2.8697   Pr = 0.090
                100.00     100.00      100.00 
     Total         228        114         342 
                                             
                 47.37      37.72       44.15 
       yes         108         43         151 
                                             
                 52.63      62.28       55.85 
        no         120         71         191 
                                             
 specialty        male     female       Total
    second          gender
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Table 7 – Bivariate analysis on the likelihood of holding a Ph.D. by gender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 – Likelihood of holding a Ph.D. by gender controlling for age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.606581   .1680998   -15.51   0.000     -2.93605   -2.277111
      gender    -.3001179   .2594588    -1.16   0.247    -.8086478     .208412
                                                                              
         phd        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -244.62438                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0028
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.2446
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       1.35
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       1074
. logit phd gender, nolog
                                                                              
       _cons     .8708749   .6745009     1.29   0.197    -.4511225    2.192872
         age    -.0703556   .0140027    -5.02   0.000    -.0978004   -.0429108
      gender    -.5936236   .2682948    -2.21   0.027    -1.119472   -.0677755
                                                                              
         phd        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -231.22522                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0574
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      28.15
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       1074
. logit phd gender age, nolog
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Table 9 - Cross-tab between Ph.D. e gender if age <46 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Scissor diagram of academic careers at UMIL, year 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   4.6166   Pr = 0.032
                100.00     100.00      100.00 
     Total         145        222         367 
                                             
                 15.86       8.56       11.44 
       yes          23         19          42 
                                             
                 84.14      91.44       88.56 
        no         122        203         325 
                                             
      Ph.D        male     female       Total
 Holding a          gender
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Table 10 – Respondents by contract 
  Frequency Percentage 
grants/co.co.co/pro 12 1.12 
short-term 92 8.57 
free-lance 149 13.87 
open-ended  817 76.07 
missing 4 0.37 
total  1074 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 – Respondents by contract and by hospital 
    Policlinco Legnano Como 
San 
Donato Machado Total 
grants/co.co Freq 10 0 0 2 0 12 
 % 4.07 0 0 1.79 0 1.12 
short-term Freq 6 66 16 0 4 92 
 % 2.44 16.46 6.69 0 5.56 8.6 
free-lance Freq 3 9 13 103 21 149 
 % 1.22 2.24 5.44 91.96 29.17 13.93 
open-ended Freq 227 326 210 7 47 817 
 % 92.28 81.3 87.87 6.25 65.28 76.36 
total  Freq 246 401 239 112 72 1070 
 % 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 – Type of setting in Machado: email list dataset vs respondent dataset  
    Population  Respondents 
Academic  Freq 13 6 
 % 2.67 8.33 
Hospital employees Freq 98 45 
 % 20.12 62.5 
Hospital freelancers Freq 376 21 
 % 77.21 29.17 
Hospital 
collaborators Freq 0 0 
 % 0 0 
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total  Freq 487 72 
 % 100 100 
Figures 2-6: Work-life conflicts explanations 
    
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Long hours of work 
answers: 909 
p-value for Chi2 test: 0.023 
 
Figure 2 - Rigid schedule 
answers: 853 
p-value for Chi2 test: 0.004 
 
Figure 3 – Lack of care services 
answers: 554 
p-value for Chi2 test: 0.000 
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Figure 3 – Lack of care services 
answers: 557 
p-value for Chi2 test: 0.726 
 
Figure 3 – Lack of care services 
answers: 650 
p-value for Chi2 test: 0.000 
 
